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Abstract 
This dissertation presents the theory and practice of Decritique, a critical 
pedagogy for the first-year college English classroom that offers an alternative to 
contemporary applications of critical theory. Underscored by a philosophy of 
language drawn from Husserl’s pure phenomenology and Derrida’s deconstruction, a 
key characteristic of the pedagogy is delineation between re-cognition and 
recognition: the former actively seeking ways to re-position one’s own thinking in 
relation to perceptions of the world; the latter endorsing existing perception. 
Concepts of “respect” and “tolerance” are questioned in Decritique, positing that 
they can operate as agents of oppression; instead, students engage in critical 
interaction and animated introspection that, in turn, opens the possibility of change.  
Concerned with the theory and practice of a reconceptualized critical pedagogy, the 
question at the core of Decritique is ways for students to reach a point of cognitive 
struggle leading to genuine discovery without the pain that can accompany criticism 
and critical self-reflection acting as a barrier to learning.  
 Chapters One through Three examine what constitutes “the critical”; namely, 
critical thinking, critical pedagogy, critical literacy, and critical care, Chapter Four 
discusses a reconceptualization of these criticalities, Chapter Five examines the 
theory of Decritique, Chapter Six presents a three-semester pilot study comparing 
Decritique with a pedagogy of “caring” in both face-to-face and online learning 
environments, and Chapter Seven provides the study’s conclusions. Results indicate 
that students taught with Decritique consistently produced more writing than those 
taught with a “caring” approach, demonstrated greater evidence of critical reflection 
on essay revisions, engaged more animatedly in verbal and written discourse, 
exhibited a strong sense of critical camaraderie, particularly in the face-to-face 
classroom, and that essays averaged nearly five percent, or half a letter grade, higher.  
Retention and pass rates were higher in the Decritique classes and students were 
more likely to be satisfied with their learning experience. Implementation of the 
pedagogy on a wider, cross-institutional level is recommended in order to investigate 
the potential of Decritique as an alternative critical pedagogy for the first-year 
college English classroom, one that promotes reflective critical analysis of discourse 
with a commitment to the possibilities of praxis. 
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  His vision, from the constantly passing bars, 
  Has grown so weary that it cannot hold 
  anything else. It seems to him there are 
  a thousand bars; and behind the bars, no world. 
  As he paces in cramped circles, over and over, 
  the movement of his powerful soft strides 
  is like a ritual dance around a center 
  in which a mighty will stands paralyzed. 
  Only at times, the curtain of the pupils 
  lifts, quietly – . An image enters in, 
  rushes down through the tensed, arrested muscles, 
  plunges into the heart and is gone. (Rilke 296) 
 
 
1. Introduction
 
 The ability to think critically – through writing and analysis of text – is 
consistently endorsed as a primary goal of a liberal, quality education. Yet, despite 
efforts to encapsulate the critical, whether through initiatives of critical thinking, critical 
literacy, critical pedagogy, or even “critical care,” first-year undergraduate college 
English curriculum is struggling to meet the demands of graduate outcomes that 
increasingly call for students who can think critically, creatively, and analytically – and 
then effectively express that thought in writing. As for what constitutes “the critical,” 
therefore, the goal is clear; the lens through which we view that goal, however, is 
tainted. 
 Rainer Maria Rilke’s poem “The Panther” animates the essence of critical 
thought. As a metaphor of the human mind, it illuminates the shards of brilliance that 
can strike us as revelatory, but fleeting, moments of cognitive clarity. Released from 
“the constantly passing bars,” the mind reflects its own workings, revealing engagement 
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in thinking beyond the possibilities of that which we know. To be critically reflective, to 
think past what is and envision what could be, is characteristic of a thinking, magnificent 
human being. The irony in education, however, is that too often the potential for 
genuinely reflective critical engagement in our own ideas and those of others are 
contained behind ideological bars, and that those bars are often of our own creation. 
Currently, the concept of what it means to think critically is a potent mismatch of 
simplistic applications that, through its inherent threads of positivity and hyper-
rationalized contradictions, is grossly ineffective in practice. The critic – and the critique 
imparted by that critic – must reflect acknowledgment of such a fundamental 
incongruity and seek, even at the risk of ostracism and at the hands of pious 
condemnation, to clear the tainted lens through which we view our world and our places 
in it.  
 This research project aims to offer such a critique. Chapters One through Three 
outline past and present perceptions of what constitutes “the critical,” specifically in 
terms of critical thinking, critical pedagogy, critical literacy, and what I have termed 
“critical care.” Chapter Four then discusses a reconceptualized view of “the critical,” 
which culminates in a revisioned critical pedagogy for teaching first-year college 
English called Decritique. Chapter Five provides the theoretical basis of this pedagogy, 
drawing from Edmund Husserl’s pure phenomenology and Jacques Derrida’s 
deconstruction, while Chapter Six puts the theory into practice through a three-semester 
pilot study that compares Decritique with a pedagogy of caring. Conclusions drawn 
from the study in Chapter Seven show that further research into Decritique is warranted 
and that it may potentially affect the way English as a critical pedagogy is taught to first-
year college undergraduates. 
 
1.1 The Question of the Critical 
 Part of the problem is that the term “critical” has become a muddied adjective 
that, in John E. McPeck’s words, is “over-worked and under-analyzed” (Critical 2). 
Among the various critical approaches, “critical thinking” is historically the most 
contested. From early attempts at articulation by William Torrey Harris in 1873, to John 
Dewey in 1910, to the 1955 “crisis in literacy” prompted by the publication of Rudolf 
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Flesch’s “Why Johnny Can’t Read” – reinscribed in contemporary guises such as “Why 
Johnny Can’t Read Even Though He Went to Princeton” in 2003 (Bartlett) and “Why 
Johny Cant Write, Its a Generasionel Thing” in 2004 (Ryan) – to the proliferation of 
tests to evaluate critical thinking skills in the 1980s and 1990s (NCEE; APA Delphi 
Report; Rockefeller Commission; Boyer Commission; Cornell Critical Thinking Test 
Level Z; Lazere; Follman, Lavely, and Berger), critical thinking currently ranges from 
association with formal and informal logic, rubric-based assessment, research and 
inquiry, and even admission to a vague understanding of what it means to think critically 
at all (Paul, Elder, and Bartell; McPeck; Sweet and Swanson; Braswell; Wilhoit; 
Lipman, “Critical”). 
 Critical pedagogy and critical literacy are less contested, mostly due to a unifying 
concern with fostering what is broadly termed a critical social conscience (Giroux; 
Freire; McLaren; Aronowitz; Janks; Johnson; Luke and Freedbody). Although the 
objective to raise social consciousness over issues of inequality and oppression in race, 
gender, class, and culture is often successful, awareness of social injustice does not 
necessarily encourage people to think reflectively (Welch; Illich), and may even result in 
no more than exchanging one set of ideological beliefs for another (Petruzzi; Horner; 
Spigelman; S. Miller; Benesch; Gallagher; V. Anderson; Ellsworth).  
 In contrast to the chaotic contestations of “critical thinking,” the concept of 
critical care is deceptively lucid, often manifested as an inherently uncritical pedagogy. 
Its overriding commitment to respect and authentic dialogue is endorsed by the concept 
of safe learning environments maintained by expressivist discourse such as the personal 
narrative and use of freewriting as a conduit for individual voice (Fulweiler; Elbow; 
Murray). The objective is to assist students to engage in more fluent expression and to 
avoid formulaic thinking (Coles; D. Stewart; Hillocks) within a democratic environment 
of sharing (Noddings).  Critics, however, see inherent danger in the concept of critical 
care in relation to unfettered respect-for-all-voices, a perspective that allegedly endorses 
egocentrism and quietism. Moreover, when individual expression of opinion is valorized 
to such an extent that it is immune from critical reflection, it becomes a barrier to 
critically reflective thought (Spigelman; Huot; D. Stewart; Bourdieu; France; Tingle, 
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Giroux; Bizzell; Bartholomae; Meyers; Connors; Dickson; B. Flores; R. Flores; Bean; 
Paul; Brookfield; Brookfield and Preskill).  
 While clearly there are many attempts to instigate what we might loosely call 
“critical thinking” in the first-year college English classroom, its misunderstandings 
paradoxically negate the opportunity for students to actively engage in critically 
reflective thinking, analysis, expression, and evaluation of their own and others’ writing. 
I am careful here to deliberately risk tautology. “Critical thinking” is too problematic, 
too mired in misuse, to be an effective referent. Instead, I write of “critically reflective 
thinking,” which seeks to capture the essence of moment in Rilke’s panther: A conscious 
and critical awareness that reflects the ideological subjectivity of the truths we think we 
know. 
 As Robert H. Ennis points out, the “concept” – to borrow McPeck’s careful word 
– of critical thinking as a goal of education has recursively gained and fallen throughout 
the twentieth century, yet neither its historical presence nor its current application 
provides definitive parameters of what it constitutes (Paul, Elder, and Bartell; McPeck, 
Critical). Some scholars emphasize the role of rubric as tools for critical thinking 
(WSUCTR; Ennis; Facione and Facione; Giancarlo and Facione; Jones), measuring how 
well students can identify and question the validity of assumptions, authorial bias, and 
the ethical dimensions of an issue. The problem is that such analyses are self-contained, 
meeting only the evaluative expectations that have already been set. Similarly, the 
“critical thinking questions” used in many college readers endorse critical thinking as a 
self-justifying slogan (McPeck; Horn; Maiorana).  
 Historically, logic has been touted as the “science of thinking,” emphasizing the 
application of both formal and informal logic, but by the early 1980s emphasis shifted 
from the “science” of analysis to the attitudes and dispositions of people that can impede 
or promote critical thought (Lazere; Giancarlo and Facione; Kytle; Perry; Gilligan; 
Meyers; Battersby). As a result, critical thinking is linked with social awareness and 
discord achieved through dialogue, imagination, and tolerance of ambiguity (Gieve; 
Benesch; Bailin; Brookfield; Paul). Where few oppose critical thinking as a term, some 
– reflecting the contribution of feminist scholarship – see it as an endorsement of 
patriarchal linear thought, and as such reject the idea of dissent in favor of emphasizing 
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the importance of consensus and sharing within a community of writers and thinkers 
(Ruggiero; H. Anderson; Bruffee). Others, however, warn that critical thinking threatens 
the stability provided by consensus (Atkinson). A majority of researchers, however, 
concur that critical thinking can be both articulated and evaluated through writing and 
text analysis, particularly when accompanied by written and/or verbal dialogue (Blattner 
and Frazier; Meyers; Jonassen; Brookfield; Paul; Shermis; Brookfield and Preskill; 
Moffett; Giroux; Aronowitz; Freire; Tingle; Benesch; Berthel; Chomsky; Coles; Yager; 
Delpit; France; Foucault; Horner; Hardin; Illich; Lipman). Therefore, rather than 
promoting the concept that critical thinking is linear – that it begins with a problem and 
results in solution – it begins by searching for questions among many possibilities. 
 In terms of defining its applicative parameters, critical pedagogy is less 
problematic than its critical thinking counterpart. The primary goal of critical pedagogy 
is, to use Paulo Freire’s term, “conscientization,” or consciousness of oppressive social 
forces and how they can be changed (Freire; Giroux; McLaren; Aronowitz; Glenn; 
Petruzzi; Tingle), with key concepts including reflection, recursivity, re-cognition, and 
empowerment – all of which indicate a paradoxical need for circumspection, humility, 
and challenging taken-for-granted truths (Benesch; Petruzzi). The criticisms of critical 
pedagogy are sharp, asserting that rather than being an “emancipatory rhetoric” 
(Burbules 251), it instead reinforces non-critical thinking and promotes the status quo 
(Horn; S. Miller; Hardin), with those outside the consensual norm dismissed or even 
ostracized (Horn; V. Anderson; Ellsworth). While the term “empowerment” is also 
problematic, particularly when viewed as a commodity (Horner), others assert that 
critical pedagogy presents simplistic binary oppositions, privileging one set of social 
values and beliefs over another, and reflecting more the sociopolitical agenda of an 
instructor or institution than a genuine commitment to open discourse (Giroux; Hardin; 
Weiler; Benesch; Gallagher; Ellsworth; D. Seitz), leading even to allegations of 
dangerous indoctrination (V. Anderson; McLaren). Perhaps because of this, others argue 
that examining the brokerage of power through the mundane and the pedestrian may be 
more critically effective, revealing the insidious ideological workings of power and 
social norms precisely due to their non-radical and unquestioned acceptance (Tingle; V. 
Anderson; McLaren; Hardin). The concepts of what constitutes “home” and 
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“homelessness” are also integral in such critical examination of the familiar versus the 
unfamiliar as proponents of resistance to ideologically determined space and place 
(JanMohammed; Giroux; Freire and Faundez).  
 Like critical pedagogy, critical literacy concerns an examination of power and 
the ways in which language constructs and circulates social identities within frameworks 
of gender, race, and culture with a goal of social transformation by way of multi-literate 
interpretation (Degener; Luke and Freedbody; Patterson; Threadgold). Critics of critical 
literacy, taking one of its tenets, challenge whose purpose is served in its application, 
charging that teaching-to-an-agenda merely replaces a privileged center with a 
marginalized one under what Gerald Graff describes as a hopelessly inadequate notion 
that we all share common ground. Others cite concern that while critical reading of text 
can be taught, this does not necessarily transform into tangible individual or social 
change (Horner; J. Seitz; Graff; Janks; Sweet and Swanson) and may even negate its 
possibility entirely (Burbules; Hardin; R. Miller). Moreover, an unsettling undercurrent 
of consensus in critical literacy is incongruous with a pedagogy describing itself as 
liberatory: the “us” versus “them” mentality underscored with a why-can’t-we-all-just-
get-along rationale. The more critically acute question seeks to investigate the impetus 
for individual and collective change – or at least its genuine possibility.  
 The concept of critical care reflects the characteristics of respect, receptivity, and 
responsiveness in classroom discussion, dialogue, and written commentary. It can also 
evoke images of nurture and safety, particularly from those who claim that criticism is 
potentially harmful to the student psyche and that the classroom, therefore, should be a 
space that exudes support, trust, and the avoidance of conflict in an environment where 
all views are respected equally (Noddings; Heydenberk and Heydenberk; Rubin; 
Morand; Murray; Elbow; DeBlase). Others warn of inauthenticity in the concept of 
critical care, pointing to a culture of infantilizing dependency and (over)protection 
(White; Meyers; Brookfield; Brookfield and Preskill), one that focuses too much on self-
esteem at the expense of self-reflection and, therefore, risks attitudes of shallow 
narcissism (Lerner; Begley and Rogers; Campbell and Foddis; Lipman; Ravitch; 
Smelser; Shokraii). While recognizing the crushing potential of criticism (Laird; 
Spigelman), many scholars maintain that overt protection from its impact can impede 
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critical thought (Lorde; Ellsworth; Paul; Brookfield; Brookfield and Preskill; Lipman; 
LaDuc; V. Anderson; Weil; Hillocks). 
 
1.2 The Critical Reconceptualized 
 The historic and contemporary muddied application of “critical” and “caring” 
lend urgency to reinscribing the meaning of these terms and how they can be used in an 
affective critical pedagogy for the first-year college English classroom. Such an 
alternative, however, need not involve binary oppositions of uncaring or the uncritical, 
but instead consider a reconceptualized understanding of what it is to care critically. 
Although noting the traditionally pejorative connotations, some scholars seeking 
reinscription endorse the use of “shaming” (Yager; Coles, “Response”), or the liberal 
incorporation of parody, satire, irony, and even a sense of serious-playfulness (Bakhtin; 
Janks; Oakeshott; Giroux; Kenway and Bullen) in an attempt to foster the type of 
disequilibria that is characteristic of critically reflective thought (Phelps; Salibrici; 
Roberts-Miller; Shermis; Paul; Ellsworth). The concept of disequilibria as exile, of 
moving beyond self-imposed ideological barriers or borders to explore alternative 
cognitive worlds, is reflected in the work of Giroux, Piaget, Derrida, Said, Foucault, 
Tingle, Freire, and Husserl. At the same time, concern for authentic engagement from 
individuals and the degree to which their learning reflects genuine investiture is a crucial 
component of critical thought. A reconceptualized, critically affective pedagogy, 
therefore, would draw from aspects of all the “criticals” and merge them with a new 
understanding of what it means to care in terms of opening the possibilities for genuine 
transformative change. This is precisely the rationale for Decritique as a revisioned 
critical pedagogy, one that rests on two applicative elements: Deracination, and the 
Detached Intellectualized Space (D.I.S.). As a rearticulation of “the critical,” Decritique 
provides a means to set the discourse and dialogue of individuals as self-reflexive 
inquiry that turns on itself (McKerrow; Castricano; France; Hardin), a phenomenological 
act of perceiving ourselves perceiving (Eagleton; Brookfield; Berthel), and an eidetic 
reduction to the essence of our own thoughts (Husserl). Once it becomes possible to re-
vision our selves as containing many traces of otherness, many centers and re-centers 
that are sometimes reconcilable, sometimes not (Derrida), we set in place the critical 
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possibilities of change – and it is the possibility for change rather than the 
transformation itself that needs exploring.  
 
1.3 Decritique in Theory 
 As a theory, Decritique is informed by Husserl’s pure phenomenology and 
Derrida’s deconstruction. Although acknowledging the tensions between the two, 
Husserl’s eidetic and transcendental reductions, aligned with Derrida’s concept of 
différance and the instability of meaning, combine to provide the theoretical premise of 
deracination and the D.I.S. In tandem, this forms the framework of Decritique as a 
reconceptualized critical pedagogy for teaching first-year college English. Within that 
frame is inherently an examination of what we think we see as truth and what we believe 
in our reality. For if truth is delible and impermanent, and if what we perceive as truth is 
no more than perception, then reality is a fiction just as fiction is reality – a possible 
world, a plausible world, and a self-referential world. As Foucault rhetorically asks, 
when “behind all these questions, we would hear hardly anything but the stirring of an 
indifference: ‘What difference does it make who is speaking?’” (“Author” 988). If we 
could find a way for our students to examine the referential possible worlds of self and 
to critically reflect on those worlds, then we might discover that it may, indeed, make a 
difference who is speaking and who is writing about those thoughts.  
 
1.4 Decritique in Practice: Purpose and Scope of the Pilot Study 
 In order to test the theory of Decritique in practice, I taught multiple class 
sections of first-year college English courses over three successive semesters. Half the 
courses were taught with Decritique and the other half with a pedagogy of “caring” so as 
to observe possible gains or differences between the two approaches, both framed by a 
research question comprising primary and secondary components: 
 
Primary: Does the application of Decritique (DEC) in the first-year college English 
classroom result in student writing that shows greater depth, 
sophistication of analysis, and reflective thought than an equivalent 
classroom taught with a Concept of Critical Care (CCC)? 
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Secondary: Does the learning environment, whether traditional face-to-face computer 
assisted or fully-online classroom, affect the depth and sophistication of 
analysis and reflective thought in the writing of first-year college English 
students? 
 
 The scope of the pilot study involves analysis of writing produced by students 
during the course of their studies in first-year college English classes taught by the 
researcher at Del Mar College, Corpus Christi, Texas between September 2003 and 
December 2004, with the total population represented in Table 1.1.  
 
Table 1.1 
Pilot Study Population Fall 2003 to Fall 2004 
 
Semester Class Pedagogy Mode Population Retention 
Fall 2003 English 1301 
English 1301 
DEC 
CCC 
OL 
F2F 
11 
15 
91.6 % 
65.2 % 
Spring 2004 English 1302 
English 1302 
DEC 
DEC 
OL 
F2F 
12 
13 
100.0 % 
68.0 % 
Fall 2004 English 1301 
English 1301 
English 1301 
DEC 
CCC 
CCC 
F2F 
F2F 
OL 
10 
10 
9 
59.1 % 
50.0 % 
81.8 % 
   Total: 80  
 
Each semester, the student population from two class sections of English 1301 or 
English 1302,1 with the exception of those students who either failed or withdrew from a 
course (N = 80), was considered eligible for inclusion. The mode of classroom 
environment is indicated by OL (online) or F2F (face-to-face). Students were assigned 
by an objective third party to the control-group class (CCC) and the intervention-group 
class (DEC). The participants did not self-select their groups and were not aware of their 
participation in the study. No student assigned to the intervention group (DEC) crossed 
over to the control group (CCC), nor vice versa (NCEERA 5). 
                                                 
1 See Appendix A for Glossary of Terms 
Critical Possibilities  10 
1.4.1 Methodology 
 Each semester, I instructed two or three course sections of English 1301 or 
English 1302. While the texts, WebCT environments, readings, course sequencing, and 
writing assignments were identical for the respective class groups each semester, the 
method of instruction differed, using Decritique (DEC) or the Concept of Critical Care 
(CCC). Table 1.2 represents the characteristics of both approaches to instruction. 
 
Table 1.2 
Characteristics of Decritique (DEC) and Concept of Critical Care (CCC) 
 
Pedagogical Characteristics DEC CCC 
Critical commentary; concept of “shaming” Yes No 
Deracination Yes No 
Extensive critical commentary on essays Yes No 
Identical writing assignments Yes Yes 
Rubric-Guided Peer Review No Yes 
Sense of safe, respectful community of sharing No Yes 
Sharp “negative” questioning Yes No 
Supportive “positive” questioning No Yes 
Weekly portfolio journal assignments (IPJ) Yes Yes 
Working within parameters of D.I.S. Yes No 
 
In keeping with the secondary research objective, courses were taught either fully online 
using the commercial educational software program WebCT2 or face-to-face in an on-
campus computer classroom, using WebCT as an auxiliary component.   
 
1.4.2 Data Collection, Analysis, and Statistical Design 
 To enable a consistent set of writing samples each semester, data were collected 
from the following five assignments: Individual Portfolio Journal (IPJ)3 from weeks 1-3 
                                                 
2 WebCT: A password protected, integrated software system that provides course content materials, 
asynchronous discussion forums/bulletin boards, email, and resource pages accessible via the internet 
3 IPJ: Weekly student writing assignments posted in a private WebCT discussion forum/journal, with each 
forum accessible only to the individual student and instructor 
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and 10-12; Deracination (DEC) or rubric-guided Peer Critique (CCC); First Course 
Essay; Final Course Essay; and Course Grade. Data analysis combined qualitative 
analysis of IPJ writing, deracinations, peer critiques, and essay writing. Quantitative 
analysis was applied to component parts of student writing and grade averages for the 
essays and the course. Evaluation criteria were drawn from the Del Mar College 
Expectations for Formal Written Work in College-Level Courses (see Appendix B). 
While the first essay submitted by both groups was evaluated by the researcher with 
knowledge of the students and to which group they belonged, to assist in objectivity the 
final essays were submitted “blind” and co-evaluated by the researcher and a third party 
instructor of English 1301/1302 at Del Mar who had used the same essay prompts for 
instruction.  
 First essay submissions were read critically and commentary was provided 
before assigning a grade of A, B, C, or Draft; in the case of the latter, students were 
invited to resubmit the assignment after revision. Final essays were read holistically 
without commentary, and assigned a final grade of A, B, C, D, or F. Incremental plus or 
minus signs were used to scale the degree of each letter grade before conversion to a 
percentage, as indicated in Table 1.3.  
 
Table 1.3 
Conversion of Letter Grades to Percentages 
 
Letter Grade + (%)  - (%) 
A 98 95 92 
B 88 85 82 
C 78 75 72 
D 68 65 62 
F - 50 - 
No essay 0   
 
For “blind” assessment, writing assignments were submitted electronically in a 
standardized MLA format, but before being downloaded for evaluation, each student’s 
name was omitted – along with identifying header fields – and the file saved under the 
student’s social security number. In cases where font face differed from a standard 
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Times New Roman 12 or where discrepancies in formatting occurred within a single 
document, both font and format were altered to provide uniformity. The final essays 
were pooled with those of the third-party instructor, resulting in the researcher not 
knowing which essay belonged to whom, from both the perspective of student writer or 
teacher’s class.  
 
1.4.3 Margin of Error, Bias, and Variables 
 The potential margin of error was calculated by comparing demographic data 
including age, gender, and – where applicable – test scores in reading and writing for 
English 1301 students (TASP, ASSET, Compass, ACT, SAT, TAAS), or previous 
course grade in English 1301 for English 1302 students.  A combination of constants and 
variables is apparent in this pilot study. The constants, or fixed elements, include 
identical texts, reading assignments, writing prompts/questions for both groups, and the 
use of WebCT for course readings and lecture notes, public/open discussion forums, and 
submission of private portfolio journal (IPJ) entries. A manipulated variable is the 
method of instruction, either teaching to the principles of Decritique (DEC) or the 
Concept of Critical Care (CCC).  Other variables include demographic differences, 
standardized college test scores, and grades earned in prior college English courses. 
 
1.4.4 The Null Hypothesis 
 In keeping with the principles of inferential statistics, at the beginning of the 
study I proposed a null hypothesis that: The application of Decritique (DEC), when 
compared with the Concept of Critical Care (CCC), in the first-year college English 
classroom makes no significant difference in students’ ability to produce analytical 
essays characterized by depth and sophistication of argument with evidence of critically 
reflective thought. The null hypothesis is represented in Figure 1.1. 
 
HO:  μ DEC =  μ CCC 
Fig. 1.1: Statistical Representation of Null Hypothesis 
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By the end of the study, I expected to be able to either reject the null hypothesis or 
concede that the null hypothesis could be neither accepted nor rejected. If the null 
hypothesis were rejected, further research into Decritique as an effective pedagogy for 
the first-year college English classroom is warranted; if it were neither accepted nor 
rejected, it would indicate a need for further research into alternative critical pedagogies 
for the first-year college English classroom.  
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Between the idea 
And the reality 
Between the motion 
And the act 
Falls the Shadow 
T.S. Eliot (“Hollow Men” ll. 72-76) 
 
 
 
2. Critical: The Muddy Adjective 
 
 The ability to “think critically” is consistently endorsed as a desirable outcome 
for college and university graduates in the 21st century, and a laudable commitment to 
this objective, concisely defined in the 1998 West Review’s Learning for Life: Final 
Report as “the capacity for critical, conceptual, and reflective thinking in all aspects of 
intellectual and practical activity” (47), has ensued from institutions of higher learning, 
governments, and private organizations. Yet, putting into practice what it might mean to 
“critically think,” let alone articulating how to teach it – or even if it can be taught – has 
resulted in a highly contested, muddy paradigm that, to borrow Robin Hoople’s eloquent 
analogy, is a “corpse-strewn critical landscape” (239). 
 In an apparent paradox between rampant twenty-first century individualism and 
globalization and the specter of Samuel Huntington’s predictions of global cultural 
clashes and ideological war, the “critical” landscape is disturbingly sanitized in its 
educational context as a manifesto of tolerance and respect for difference, one 
promulgated in the quotidian world of day-to-day college teaching.  As noted on a recent 
listserv exchange in regard to the teaching of first-year college English, the classroom 
“is not a battlefield or a place to harm others” (Mahan). The opening decade of the 
twenty-first century is making painfully apparent that indeed the classroom does not 
serve as a locus for brutal ideological conflict, but instead the “real” world is left to deal 
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with international and national politics, economics, and ongoing social issues of poverty, 
discrimination, and oppression; in short, social war happens “out there,” but not within 
the safe and sanctimoniously respectful, caring classroom. Why the distinction? 
 If the first-year college English classroom cannot extend past the artificial 
barriers of good taste, good conduct, and good feelings – underscored and reinforced by 
the undeniably desirable elements of human interaction such as respect and tolerance – 
then, to paraphrase Foucault, what difference does it make who is speaking? The roles of 
managed conflict, respect, and humility are circulating as part of a much larger 
conversation for contemporary teaching of first-year college English – a pedagogy that 
emphasizes the need for “critical thinking” as a core objective. Yet, if such classrooms 
are not places for battle or to harm others, we can conclude that they are, therefore, 
places of safety and pleasant cooperation. The binaries at work here serve a singular 
purpose: To oppress the potentially invasive, harmful, or inflammatory. I propose that 
such oppression is a fundamental and significant problem in the first-year college 
English classroom and that current teaching and learning methods falling under a broad 
banner of “critical thinking” are not critical at all; moreover, that a motley 
misapplication in regard to what constitutes “critical thinking” poses an inherent threat 
to educating college students through their first-year English studies about the 
complexities and constituencies of the world in which they live. Further, it marginalizes 
the politics of praxis, rendering the possibilities of real change to a safe, 
decontextualized, and anti-confrontational unreality.  
 To set some comparative margins, we might consider a parallel of this opening 
decade of the twenty-first century with the emergence of its predecessor, the twentieth.  
The birth of both the Modern Age and, as its contemporary equivalent, the Information 
Age is marked by a collective consciousness of fin de siécle and ennui – a response to 
impending and massive political and social upheaval. The end of the nineteenth and start 
of the twentieth century was a time of rapid industrial and technological change, 
reflecting the apex of imperialistic international conquest and colonial aggression by 
England, Belgium, France, and Germany. Interest in science was intense, with the 
profusion of new theories and inventions including the Wright brothers and Charles 
Lindberg’s flights, the Model-T Ford, fascination with the implications of Herbert 
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Spencer’s Social Darwinism, the rise of psychiatry as a branch of medicine, and the 
increasing reliance on machines and the mechanization of industry. Humanity had 
embarked on a quest of progress, and at the turn of the nineteenth century the human 
being was unstoppable. Similarly, the opening of the twenty-first century has seen the 
imperialistic actions of the United States as a singular world power implementing a 
peculiarly American version of a Western democratic ideal, global information networks 
have been underscored by the proliferation of the internet – the effects of which have 
promulgated the new capitalistic currency of premium-value information exchange to 
serve and maintain the interests of a world minority who holds power.  
 Modris Eksteins, describing the first world war, notes that traditional vocabulary 
and language were “grossly inadequate” to describe the experience: “Words like 
courage, let alone glory and heroism, with their classical and romantic connotations ... 
had lost all power to capture reality” (218).  When confronted with the social realities of 
the twenty-first century, we see the same ardent but ultimately empty descriptions of 
ideological action: Heroism, democracy, and freedom are shackled with false notions of 
respect, humility, and caring – often with devastating consequences, such as the barbaric 
acts of American military personnel in the Iraqi prison of Abu Ghraib. The horrors of 
such incongruity are reflected in the words of Wilfred Owen, whose poem “Anthem for 
Doomed Youth” expresses the irreconcilable differences between a world caught up in 
sanctimonious heroism and unmitigated barbarity:  
  What passing-bells for these who die as cattle? 
  Only the monstrous anger of the guns. 
  Only the stuttering rifles’ rapid rattle 
  Can patter out their hasty orisons. 
  No mockeries now for them; no prayers nor bells, 
  Nor any voice of mourning save the choirs, –  
  The shrill, demented choirs of wailing shells; 
  And bugles calling for them from sad shires. 
  What candles may be held to speed them all? 
  Not in the hands of boys, but in their eyes 
  Shall shine the holy glimmers of good-byes. 
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  The pallor of girls’ brows shall be their pall; 
  Their flowers the tenderness of patient minds, 
  And each slow dusk a drawing-down of blinds. (832) 
 Owen’s “Anthem” may have been written for another time, another century, and 
yet the essence of the poem reflects a tragic metaphorical death for the thinking mind in 
the twenty-first century: the critical, reflective, self-examining mind that seeks not 
cohesion and empty words of freedom, democracy, and the privileging of a Western 
democratic ideal, nor allows itself to fall into a calculated mosaic of impassioned 
blandness, but a barbed, critically thinking populace of minds not afraid to be caught on 
the shards of incongruity. In Owen’s words we see a Western democratic process of 
world-thinking redolent of a cattle-crush of inherent mindlessness, of a population 
increasingly fattened on gluttonous excesses of mass consumption, sated by the 
ideological bliss of mediocrity. The monstrous anger that might arise if reality were 
exposed is tamed and lulled, paradoxically silenced by the rapid rattle of dangerous 
rhetorical platitudes endorsing the unexamined (mis)placement of idealism and heroism. 
The potential voices of mourning, those lamenting the unequivocal refusal to 
acknowledge that a sanctioned ideology may indeed be wrong – whether that ideology 
manifests itself in worship of a higher deity, a capitalistic ideal, or delusional and 
simplistic faith in democracy as representing the voice of the people – are castigated as 
shrill, demented choirs, and the potential for their voices to be heard is hushed at day’s 
end by the drawing down of insipid blinds of respect, consensus, and unity.  
 Within this imagery the critic is relegated as an outsider, an irksome and 
pejorative Other whose positing of an anthem for doomed humanity is condemned as a 
plague of negativity threatening the security and certitude that is found in the positivity 
of being inherently and sanctimoniously right.  The critic is caged, cautioned, and 
castigated; fed the colorless scraps of a languid collective mindset that increasingly 
fortifies the bars of its own ideological prisons and blunders on with a fixed and happy 
smile sutured in place by the deft, silken threads of tolerance and the unending mantra of 
the unanswered question: Why can’t we all just get along? Rather than a pervasive – 
although perhaps perverse is a better word – and decontextualized “war on terror,” “war 
on drugs” or “war on poverty,” critical thought is a war on ideology; a war on the 
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inherent rightness of self, a war within our own minds and at once within our own 
societies’ ways of thought, a war on the banal, the pedestrian, and the inane.  
 What I am proposing is a war on the means and modes that shape our collective 
thinking – one that is assaulted by a tide of mediocrity and conformity, delivered to a 
populace enthralled with reality television game shows and fantasized concepts of 
democracy that distort and debase the possibilities of the human mind, fragmenting it 
into easily manageable parts that can be refashioned into a socially conditioned whole: 
Every fragment is valued and afforded the same respect, provided the collective mosaic 
reflects the angle of light that shines the correct prism of social truth. Considering the 
ideological manifestations hidden beneath the term “critical thinking,” Noam 
Chomsky’s call to arms – whether in terms of revolutionizing a dullard and lumbering 
education system, or in providing our students with cognitive and ideological tools of 
self-defense – is a far deeper and more insidious barrier to overcome than we might first 
imagine.  
 
2.1 Critical Thinking 
 Disconcertingly, to “think critically” has emerged in contemporary application as 
an ultimately meaningless trope – a synecdochical stand-in for a universally desirable 
outcome that, like being in favor of clean water or world peace, ranks highly in rhetoric 
but falls devastatingly short in practice.  Although there are many attempts to engender 
“critical thinking” in the first-year English classroom, the misuse and misunderstanding 
of this term results in a shadow of obscurity. While there is little disagreement that 
students in first-year college English classrooms should actively engage in critical 
thinking, analysis, expression, and evaluation of their own and others’ writing, misuse of 
what constitutes “the critical” dilutes these vaunted ideals.  
 Historically, the parameters for what constitutes critical thinking have remained 
elusive and constantly changing. In 1873, William Torrey Harris endorsed thinking as a 
tangible goal of education, defining it as “self-alienation” or “the learned ability to step 
away from one’s immediate experience and view it with a critical perspective” (632-33, 
qtd. in Ravitch 36). By 1892, Charles W. Eliot was cultivating “the power to think, 
reason, observe, and describe” (31), although by 1908 Eliot reversed his position to 
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instead favor a vocational focus in order to sort students “by their evident or probable 
destinies” (86-87; Eliot [1908]). In 1910, John Dewey called for “reflective thought” in 
his text How We Think, giving rise to the 1920s Progressive Movement that challenged 
the rationale of vocational categorization. Marked by Intelligent Quotient (I.Q.) and 
Eugenics testing, this movement endorsed a scientific approach to thinking that justified 
“natural selection” through a series of intelligence tests. Touted as the “science of 
thinking,” emphasis was placed on the formal logic of enthymemes and syllogisms 
complemented by the informal logic of fallacy and non-sequitur argument as a means to 
both ensure that students were learning “how to think” and providing scientific methods 
of assessing it (Ravitch).  
 In the 1930s and 1940s, likely in reaction to global depression and world war, the 
educational pendulum swung back to preparing students vocationally rather than 
academically – a situation that again fell from favor in the 1950s with the publication of 
Rudolf Flesch’s “Why Johnny Can’t Read” in 1955. Shadowed by the political realities 
of the Cold War and fanatical anti-communist McCarthyism, the educational system was 
deemed to reflect a “national crisis in literacy” (Ravitch 354). In response, test-taking 
returned to shadow critical thinking, with the 1961 publication The Central Purpose of 
American Education promoting the need for a “back-to-basics” test-score approach 
(EPC).  
 The 1970s and 1980s turned again, this time lauding the value of the individual 
and giving rise to the Self-Esteem Movement, but this was followed by a revival of 
basics once it was determined that focusing on self-esteem had not fulfilled its promise 
of a liberating and equitable education, but instead “accentuated narcissistic themes” in 
an environment of hedonism and socio-cultural anarchy (Ravitch 406-07).  By 1983 the 
United States was allegedly a Nation at Risk, with a report of the same name warning 
that “the educational foundations of our society are presently being eroded by a rising 
tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future as a Nation and a people” (qtd. in 
Ravitch 412; NCEE). To this, Theodore R. Sizer endorsed the teaching of students “to 
use their minds well and to think seriously about what they had learned” (418), echoed 
by the 1990 call of the American Philosophical Association (APA) to steep the “post-
secondary curricula with critical thinking” (Blattner and Frazier 47; APA).  The 
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consensus was that despite increased attention to instruction in critical thought, the 
tangible nature of teaching critical thinking, especially in terms of its assessment, had 
been woefully neglected (Ravitch).   
 What remains consistent throughout this historical path, particularly in the latter 
half of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, is the proliferation of 
governmental and institutional statements on the need for critical thinking skills in 
college and university graduates. In the 1960s, the National Education Association 
asserted that “the purpose which runs through and strengthens all other educational 
purposes ... is the development of the ability to think” (Baron and Sternberg x; EPC); in 
the 1980s, the Rockefeller Commission on the Humanities and the Boyer Commission 
Report on Educating Undergraduates both emphasized the need for critical thinking; the 
California State University system specified “the study of critical thinking as a 
requirement for graduation”; the APA “urged philosophers to help with attempts to test 
for critical thinking” (Ennis, “Taxonomy” 9); and the Association for Supervision and 
Curriculum Development “made critical thinking skills its number one priority for 
educational development” (Baron and Sternberg x).  
 In the latest of a long tradition, the National Commission on Writing in 
America’s Schools and Colleges (NCWASC) seeks to address perceived tertiary 
education deficiencies in the United States, with its 2003 manifesto The Neglected “R” 
claiming that “[i]n this Commission’s view, the concept of educational reform must be 
expanded to include ideas; the ability of students to think, reason, and communicate” 
(9). This same committee, citing the National Assessment of Educational Progress 
(NAEP) 1999 Writing Report Card for the Nation and the States, also asserts that “when 
asked to think on paper, most students produce rudimentary and fairly run-of-the-mill 
prose. Writing at the basic level demonstrates only a limited grasp of the importance of 
extended or complex thought” (NCWASC 17). This point is reflected in George 
Hillocks’ call for the need to “avoid sterility ... in writing and the formulaic in thinking” 
(7), and the assertion from Ruth Stewart that “traditional methods of teaching critical 
thinking in first-year composition have had limited success” (163). Other critics, such as 
Noam Chomsky, allege that the educational notion of critical thinking is paradoxically 
part of an insidious drive indoctrinating students to a system of obedience. “Far from 
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creating independent thinkers,” Chomsky writes, “schools have always, throughout 
history, played an institutional role in a system of control and coercion” (16); moreover, 
and particularly in the United States, education “is not a system that encourages 
independent thought and critical thinking” but one fostering an “instrumental skills-
banking approach that often prevents the development of the kind of thinking that 
enables one to ‘read the world’ critically” (Macedo 3-4).   
 It is, therefore, not surprising that there is contention and disagreement over just 
what constitutes “critical thinking.” Recent scholarship on this question is extensive, 
ranging from critical thinking as the ability to recognize, analyze, and evaluate argument 
through research and inquiry (Schlect; Jones), to the need for self-correction and self-
reflection as components of good judgment (Lipman; Paul), to the critical thinker as “a 
kind of intellectual nit-picker” (Schlect), to reflective and perpetual skepticism (McPeck; 
Hillocks) or a self-reflexive critique of “permanent criticism” (McKerrow), to a cautious 
open-mindedness (Ennis, “Assessment”) and to promote “active discussion of ideas and 
language for continuing dialogue about meanings” (Hillocks 7). Others, such as Haithe 
Anderson, call for less well-defined interpretations of critical thinking, basing their 
objections that the stretching of thought “beyond local boundaries and normative 
constraints to respond to others’ points of view with the assurances of understanding ... 
would be the death of different ways of thinking” (213). While few oppose critical 
thinking as a concept, some feminist scholars see it as endorsing patriarchal linear 
thought, and as such reject the idea of dissent in favor of emphasizing consensus and 
sharing within a community of writers and thinkers (Ruggiero; H. Anderson; Bruffee). 
There are those, however, who warn that critical thinking has potentially “disastrous 
consequences” of destabilizing social order because “mundane life can proceed only 
when its vast tacit machinery remains by and large under wraps” (Atkinson 133). 
 What marks the recent movement into defining critical thought is increased 
awareness of its application in social, historical, and cultural contexts, paralleled by the 
dramatic rise of critical thinking resources in higher education, such as the Critical 
Thinking Consortium and Foundation for Critical Thinking at Sonoma State University, 
Washington State University’s WSU Critical Thinking Project, and San Jose State 
University’s Mission Critical – although it should be noted that the latter focuses on 
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applied logic rather than a broader, socio-cultural context. In short, by the late 1990s, 
critical thinking had generally moved from association with the science of analysis 
towards attitudes and dispositions of people and the factors that can impede or promote 
critical thought (Lazere; Giancarlo and Facione; Kytle; Perry; Gilligan; Meyers; 
Battersby). Timothy Crusius, as an outspoken critic of traditional uses of formal and 
informal logic, asserts that there cannot be apodictic – or absolute – truth “that attains 
certainty by a combination of strict, formal reasoning and empirical method ... [because] 
deduction is capable only of making explicit what is implicit in one’s premises; 
induction is capable, at best, of a warrantable assumption of high probability” (24, 26).  
Such a rationale has driven newer applications of logic, particularly in terms of 
distinction between “monologic” critical thinking as an applied informal logic and 
“dialogic” critical thinking, involving social awareness, dissent, struggle, and discord 
through a process of dialogue and the dialectic (Gieve; Benesch; Whiteley; Shermis; 
Brookfield and Preskill; Salibrici; Coe). Several scholars assert the need to recognize 
elements of creativity, imagination, and tolerance of ambiguity (Bailin; Shermis; 
Brookfield; Paul) – the latter addressing the concerns of Ivan Illich who writes of 
students who “no longer have to be put in their place, but put themselves in their 
assigned slots, squeeze themselves into the niche which they have been taught to seek, 
and, in the very process, put their fellows into their places, too, until everybody and 
everything fits” (58). The recurring characteristic of positions relating to defining just 
what critical thinking means is a multitude of competing – and even irreconcilable – 
perceptions (Wilhoit; Lipman, “Critical”; Beyer). 
 Critical thinking is a muddy paradigm, and much of its obscurity draws from 
what McPeck describes as “approaching the concept as though it were a self-evident 
slogan,” the precise constituent parts of which are “considered to be clear and self-
justifying” (Critical 2). McPeck’s critique is illustrated in one of the most ambitious – 
and disturbing – attempts to ascertain what constitutes critical thinking in a 1995 study 
of faculty at 38 public and 28 private Californian universities by Richard Paul, Linda 
Elder, and Ted Bartell. While 89 percent of respondents claimed that critical thinking is 
a primary objective of instruction, only 19 percent attempted to define what this might 
mean. Moreover, critical thinking was often associated with what the researchers 
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describe as “magic talisman” phrases such as “constructivism,” “process and inquiry” 
and “Bloom’s taxonomy” (5, 10, 18), with the majority of respondents “unable to 
intelligibly explain” any of them (5). The report concluded that “most faculty have not 
carefully thought through any concept of critical thinking” and are therefore “in no 
position to foster . . . [it] except to inculcate into their students the same vague views 
they have” (6).  McPeck concurs: “Commissions have strongly recommended that 
schools start teaching people to be critical thinkers, yet neither they nor the programs 
which they have spawned are at all clear about what kind of thing critical thinking is, nor 
what these initiatives are supposed to accomplish” (“Trivial” 298).  
 
2.1.1 Assessing Critical Thinking: The Rubric Approach 
 The assessment of critical thinking is frequently underscored by Benjamin 
Bloom’s taxonomical scale, especially the three upper levels of analysis, synthesis, and 
evaluation, as measurable standards to gauge degrees of critical thought in writing. As 
Ennis points out, however, the main problem with adapting Bloom’s principles is that 
critical thinking is not particularly hierarchical and does not necessarily follow such 
neatly ordered and sequential patterns; moreover, adherence to the taxonomy frequently 
overlooks the aspect of creativity when assessing critical thinking skill. In attempting to 
articulate what assessment of critical thinking might look like, Ennis offers a 10-point 
rubric that begins with measuring how well a student has judged the credibility of 
sources and identified conclusions, reasoning, assumptions, and argument in the writing 
he or she has produced, then works into a summative conclusion that is drawn “when 
warranted, but with caution” (“Assessment” 180).  The irony, of course, is that while on 
the one hand Ennis disregards use of Bloom’s taxonomical scale because it is too 
hierarchical and prescriptive, his 10-point rubric reflects the same characteristics.  What 
is particularly troubling about the use of rubrics such as that provided by Ennis, Bloom – 
or even the much-lauded Washington State University Critical Thinking Rubric (CTR) – 
is the inherent and a priori assumptions made within the structure of such instruments 
that students of Ennis, for example, already know how to “[j]udge the quality of an 
argument” and precisely what constitutes “appropriate clarifying questions” (180). 
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 The use of rubrics to measure degrees of critical thought is widespread, with 
many scholars reinforcing the need to assess how well students can identify and question 
the validity of assumptions, authorial bias, and the ethical dimensions of an issue 
(WSUCTR; Ennis; Facione and Facione; Giancarlo and Facione; Jones). Again, however, 
we see the problem of such analyses as self-contained: almost without exception the 
rubrics either limit analysis to information wholly within the situation or text, or require 
comparative judgment against pre-set criteria. Both result in evaluation that conforms to 
a pre-determined outcome. What is being measured is the product of thought, not the 
process that went into the production of that thinking. In a similar way, the ubiquitous 
critical thinking questions that often appear at the end of chapters in college readers 
carry the mistaken assumption that merely responding to such questions is a guarantee 
that thinking critically has occurred (Maiorana), something that Raymond Horn 
categorically rejects in his acerbic dismissal of both “critical thinking workshops and 
gurus who dispense graphic organizers” that allegedly teach students how to structure, 
compare, synthesize, and evaluate data (141).  
 The Washington State University CTR exemplifies the problematic nature of a 
priori assessment parameters. Offering a scale to ostensibly calculate whether critical 
thinking has taken place, the WSU rubric provides two comparative extremes for 
evaluation: Scant and Substantial. Beneath these headings are characteristics of what 
constitutes each, with the Scant column being the less contentious of the two in terms of 
assessing degrees of critical thought. The description of Scant writing is a fairly 
straightforward commentary of superficial analysis, such as addressing a single view or 
source, dealing with a single perspective,  failing to establish alternative critical 
distinctions, or discussing the problem “only in egocentric or sociocentric terms” (1-2). 
The Substantial characteristics, however, are deeply concerning for two reasons – with 
the first leading into the second: The wording is not only vague and non-specific, but it 
also reinforces the idea that students already understand the concepts that are offered as 
a measurable comparison. To demonstrate this objection, consider the hypothetical 
responses to excerpts from the Substantial column of the WSU rubric in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1 
Response to CTR Characteristics of “Substantial” Writing 
 
CTR: Substantial  Response 
Identifies main problem and subsidiary, 
embedded, or implicit aspects of the problem, 
and identifies them clearly, addressing their 
relationships to each other. Identifies not only 
the basics of the issue, but recognizes nuances 
of the issue 
 Essentially, a strong thesis. What is missing 
here reflects the concern that students will 
first often focus on writing a thesis before 
contemplating multi-faceted aspects of an 
issue; therefore, re-articulating belief(s) they 
already hold. 
Identifies, appropriately, one’s own position 
on the issue, drawing support from 
experience, and information not available 
from assigned sources 
 “[O]ne’s own position on the issue” is just 
one of many possibilities; indeed, it could be 
argued that one’s “own” position is the last 
place to begin analysis with regard to 
generating alternative perspectives 
Identifies and questions the validity of the 
assumptions and addresses the ethical 
dimensions that underlie the issue 
 Frequently, first-year students have little skill 
or experience in recognizing the assumptive 
elements of their “own position,” let alone 
underlying ethical dimensions 
Observes cause and effect and addresses 
existing or potential consequences 
 Cause and effect parameters require a priori 
constituent components; without 
acknowledgment of this, examining existing 
or potential consequences is critically flawed 
Analyzes the issue with a clear sense of scope 
and context, including an assessment of the 
audience of the analysis 
 Focus is on externalized, outward projection 
of ideas: How well does the message meet the 
expectations of the audience? Such a rationale 
may work well for advertising copy, but does 
not support critically reflective thought 
Objectively reflects upon their [students’] 
own assertions 
 A key component of critical thinking, yet the 
problem is that students lack skill in how to 
objectively reflect on their own assertions 
 
 The problematic elements of the rubric are apparent in the work of Ennis, known 
for the Cornell Critical Thinking Level Z and Ennis-Weir Critical Thinking Essay tests. 
In regard to the latter, Ennis claims that this instrument provides a valid way to measure 
degrees of critical thought. The test constitutes a hypothetical, argument-based letter to a 
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newspaper editor, where each of the numbered paragraphs contains built-in errors. 
Students appraise the degree of thinking in each, and then defend their appraisals. 
Graders, who must be “proficient in critical thinking in order to handle responses that 
differ from the standard,” assign a “certain number of possible points to the appraisal of 
each paragraph” (“Assessment” 185). There are a number of problems with Ennis’ 
rationale. First, we should question the a priori nomination of an “argumentative 
passage” and balk at the “built-in errors” – aspects that conjure up comical images of an 
omniscient instructor planting prizes in a garden-hunt that students need to locate. 
Moreover, that students are asked to “appraise the thinking in each paragraph and the 
passage as a whole” is vague: We might envisage telling our students with a flourishing 
gesture, “oh, just appraise the thinking of this piece that I have selected and to which I 
already know the answers and see how you do.” Finally, the scoring guide that assigns 
points for various aspects of the paragraph’s appraisal is tightly prescriptive, with the 
inherent focus on application of formal logic reminiscent of a “grammar-police” attitude 
of deducting three points for every comma splice, two for pronoun-antecedent 
agreement, and five for the cardinal sin of a sentence fragment. In his own defense, 
Ennis concedes that the structure of the essay test does not allow students much 
cognitive freedom, yet does provide teachers with firm diagnostic information (185). 
This last point exemplifies a contestable element of the rubric position in terms of 
critically reflective thought because all it measures, in this case, is a student’s ability to 
apply formal logic.  
 One of the fundamental issues overlooked in what I term the “rubric position” is 
that first-year college students do not have strong, refined critical tools of evaluation in 
their cognitive repertoire, and it is precisely this absence that needs to be addressed 
before implementing methods of assessment for critical thinking. The implicit binaries 
within rubrics like those of Ennis and the CTR offer exclusionary choices, prompting a 
series of “yes/no” responses from both student and instructor. Instead, it is when we 
endorse a “description of ‘what is,’ unfettered by predetermined notions of what ‘should 
be’,” that we can move into a position where it becomes possible to posit alternative 
perspectives (McKerrow 100, emphasis added). Moreover, as Raymie McKerrow 
argues, if our students “come to a system of discourse with an ideological grid already in 
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place and participate in terms of that grid’s determinative nature” (102), the questions 
we might ask ourselves is when, where and how can students develop the tools to disturb 
or disrupt such cognitive barriers? Is it through the time-consuming process of 
commenting on essays? And, how many of our students read these comments? 
Moreover, how many students actively work on addressing the concepts and problems 
that arise from such commentary? How much time does it take faculty members to 
engage in dialogue with and among students in terms of fostering such skill? How do 
we, in Chomsky’s words, “provide students with critical tools to unpack the ideological 
content of myths”? (34).  
 While these are questions that I address in the chapter that considers a 
reconceptualized application of critical thinking, at this point our concern should not be 
with establishing rubrics to assess critical thought, but of finding ways for our students 
to themselves internalize their own modes of thinking and to critically examine that 
supporting framework. It is then, when we have provided opportunity to be reflectively 
aware of the ways in which our own thoughts are generated, that we will have something 
significant to measure. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 (page 28) graphically represent the way such 
a revisioned process of assessment might look. The dividing line in Figure 2.1 represents 
a nominative point of contrast between the internalized process of thought that has 
produced the student’s text (on the left) and the product of that thought (the shaded 
section on the right). A rubric-based means of assessment focuses on the right-hand side, 
or the product already produced, and measures the degree to which critical thinking is 
allegedly evident in terms of what has already been thought. A comparative position – 
one that attempts to offer students the opportunity to themselves internalize their own 
modes of thinking, and then critically and reflectively examine the framework that 
supports it – eliminates the rubric, as shown in Figure 2.2. In this second model of 
assessment, rather than privileging a set of pre-conceived attributes announcing that a 
given set of students within a given context and in response to a given set of objectives 
“can critically think” – as in rubric based assessment – aims instead to allow students to 
decide what is a “good argument” and to then be assessed by his or her own evaluative 
parameters.  
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 The imposition of teacher-imposed rubric evaluation has, to a certain extent, 
been addressed by the use of peer critique, an activity widely endorsed in first-year 
college English classrooms, especially in relation to promoting student collaboration, 
investiture in their own writing, and the opportunity to read, like professional scholars 
and writers, the critical opinion of colleagues (Moffett; Dickson; R. Stewart; Petraglia; 
Brookfield and Preskill; Hillocks). Ideally, peer critique reinforces the call of Henry 
Giroux, James Berlin, and Virginia Anderson regarding opportunity for engaged 
criticism as an active search for contradictions in written thought. Theoretically, this can 
be achieved through collaborative revision of student writing by students.  In practice, 
however, the lauded promises of peer critique fall short of the much-touted mark. 
Whether due to embarrassment, fear of failure, or influence by the rules of social 
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discourse and etiquette, peer critique is often characterized by ultimately meaningless 
commentary such as “excellent job” or “this is really good,” more in keeping with 
sincere efforts to “be nice” than sincerely critical (B. Flores, “Deracination” 263).  
 The main problem with rubric-guided peer critique is not so much the inability of 
students to engage in critically reflective thought, but the relative inflexibility of the 
rubric’s parameters. As Stephen Wilhoit believes, promoting critical thought in our 
students involves more than guidance in spotting an inconsistency, authorial bias, or 
judging the merit of conclusions and assertions (127). As an example, consider a recent 
peer critique rubric and the responses it solicited from a first-year college English 
student (Paper Review): 
 
Table 2.2 
Peer Critique Rubric and Student Response 
 
Rubric Guide Student Response 
Did the entry begin with the required MLA formatting? Yes. 
Did the author objectively present the material and summarize the main 
points? 
Yes. She did a good job. 
Did the author find any fallacies in the material? No. 
Was the rhetorical context evaluated by the author? Was the audience 
well defined? Was the language audience appropriate? 
She said what she thought. 
Were the paragraphs well organized, unified, developed? Were examples 
provided throughout to exemplify the points?  
Yes. 
 
It should concern us that the number of words produced by the student is notably less 
than those in the rubric. Moreover, there is no evidence to indicate that the student 
providing the critique – nor its intended recipient – has had opportunity to seriously 
reflect on the text under review, nor engage in the type of collaborative exchange that 
many scholars suggest is a benchmark of critically reflective thought. Again, as in the 
CTR, we see an implicit set of “yes/no” binaries; furthermore, the rubric reinforces 
components of writing identified as valuable by the instructor: the “required MLA 
formatting”; the summarizing of main points; the defining of audience; the 
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exemplification of points. Here, we are proverbially one-step-away from the formulaic 
A, B, C construction of the much-maligned five-paragraph essay. Inherent within this 
framework is a question: Are we teaching our students how to write, or how to think?  
 
2.1.2 Critical Thinking Through Writing 
 If agreement among scholars can be found it is that critical thinking can be both 
articulated and evaluated through writing and the analysis of text, with a majority 
concurring that it develops most acutely in environments of verbal and written dialogue 
(Blattner and Frazier; Meyers; Jonassen; Brookfield; Paul; Shermis; Brookfield and 
Preskill; Moffett; Giroux; Aronowitz; Freire; Tingle; Benesch; Berthel; Chomsky; 
Coles; Yager; Delpit; France; Foucault; Horner; Hardin; Illich; Lipman). The 2003 
NCWASC Neglected “R” report not only emphasizes the importance of (w)riting in 
education, and identifies that “[o]f the three ‘Rs,’ writing is clearly the most neglected” 
(3), it also recommends that writing be the “centerpiece in the curriculum,” that “[t]he 
amount of time students spend writing ... should be at least doubled” (4), and that 
writing “is thought on paper ... a complex intellectual activity that requires students to 
stretch their minds, sharpen their analytical abilities, and make valid and accurate 
distinctions” (13). Yet, the study finds that “more than 50 percent of first-year college 
students are unable to produce papers relatively free of language errors” and that 
analysis of argument and synthesis of information is “also beyond the scope of most 
first-year students” (14). The 1998 Boyer Commission on Educating Undergraduates, a 
document that reinforces “the importance of undergraduate writing,” reports similar 
results (Bartlett 39).  Concern over such data is reflected in the move by several high-
profile universities in the United States, including Princeton, Duke, Columbia, and 
Brown, to either begin again with their first-year writing programs or make plans to do 
so. Thomas Bartlett, citing what he claims is a frequently stated concern of professors at 
such institutions, laments significant “writing-related shortcomings among students, 
most often their inability to construct the sort of lengthy, sophisticated research papers 
required in upper-division courses” (39). The objective in addressing this problem, 
Bartlett asserts, notably from the revamped first-year writing programs at Princeton and 
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Duke universities, is to “transform their students into more lucid, thoughtful writers” 
(39).  
 Recognition that student skill in writing and critical thinking is often below 
acceptable standards is not confined to the opening of the twenty-first century. In 1980, 
California State University’s (CSU) chancellor Glenn Dumke announced that instruction 
in critical thinking was to be a requirement throughout the nineteen campuses of CSU 
(Lazere 1). Moreover, that:  
Instruction in critical thinking is to be designed to achieve an 
understanding of the relationship of language to logic ... . The minimal 
competence ... should be the ability to distinguish fact from judgment, 
belief from knowledge, and skills in elementary inductive and deductive 
processes, including an understanding of the formal and informal 
fallacies of language and thought. (Dumke, qtd. in Lazere 1) 
As Donald Lazere points out, however, since the 1980s there has been a shift from the 
rigidity of prescribing formal instruction in deductive and inductive logic, asserting that 
the influence of philosophy on studies in critical thought has resulted in “a growing 
attention to the mental attitudes and emotional ‘dispositions’ that foster or impede 
critical thinking” (1). Drawing on the 1986 text of Ray Kytle, Lazere claims that a focus 
on dispositions and attitudes in critical thinking instruction “considers culturally 
conditioned assumptions, prejudice, ethnocentrism, primary certitude (absolutism), 
authoritarianism, and unconcretized abstractions” as barriers to critically reflective 
thought (2), a point reinforced in the later works of Richard Paul and Stephen D. 
Brookfield.  
 Contemporary approaches to critical thinking, therefore, endorse the concept that 
an essence of critically reflective thought involves searching for questions among many 
possibilities, and doing so through communication and open-ended discussion, whether 
in a group situation or through internalized self-dialogue, and often expressed through 
writing. Of concern, however, is some scholars who ascribe to the importance of shaping 
an externalized projection of thought, a point that relates back to the issues of rubric-
based assessment discussed in the previous section. Vincent Ruggiero, as an example, 
provides a definition of the problematic term “critical thinking” in the context of 
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teaching writing, which is the “reviewing of ideas we have produced, making a tentative 
decision about which action will best solve the problem or what belief about the issue is 
most reasonable and then evaluating and refining that situation or belief” (149). Yet, 
nowhere does Ruggiero suggest ways in which we might problematize this context – 
make it uncomfortable, and not so narrowly palatable – or even how it might operate as 
a site of resistance. What, for instance, is “most reasonable”? To whom? And, for what 
purpose? Moreover, Ruggiero’s call over the need for “self-dialogue” in terms of 
anticipating objections to received text falls squarely into the realm of persuasion: a 
means to an end rather than seeking an end to the means we take for granted. Ruggiero 
offers little more in his prescription for critical thinking and writing than a think-of-
alternatives paideia – alternatives that search for syncretic and democratic consensus; a 
Bruffeean ideal to provide an ultimately impossible and equally rhetorical answer to the 
rhetorical question of why-can’t-we-all-just-get-along?  
 In keeping with criticism of the narrow approach of Ruggiero, Heather Dubrow 
argues that current practices of teaching thesis-based writing works against the concept 
of providing opportunity for critically reflective thinking. As Dubrow asserts, many of 
her first-year students “have been trained to see only one side [of an argument], not only 
disregarding but also demonizing the opposition” (3). Describing the effects of thesis-
driven drafting and writing as both “a disease” and “pernicious,” Dubrow implicitly 
suggests that the problem is tied to an outcomes-based approach to writing; that is, 
students are concerned with the grade they will receive – one likely measured against a 
pre-determined rubric scale of assessment. She worries that her students “grasp an 
argument before they know the material well enough to decide whether it is valid. 
Persuaded that the success of their paper will rest on how well they support that 
argument, often they simply ignore anything that does not fit in, rather than rethink their 
thesis” (2). Marcia Dickson’s commentary reflects the concerns of Dubrow. Her 
students, as “novice readers and writers” (vii), “cannot write critically” because they “do 
not think or read critically for nuances, implications, or abstract notions” (viii). In 
response, Dickson calls for a mediation between acknowledging the personal world of 
subjective opinion and belief along with a sense of detachment from it – and a conscious 
awareness of this detachment. At the same time, however, Dickson points out problems 
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with focusing too hard on personalized narrative or autobiographical writing, because 
first-year students in particular tend to “take the words ‘personal experience’ seriously 
and literally and, because they are not ready, willing, or able to be objective about their 
experiences, the ‘personal essay’ can become problematic for both student and teacher” 
(5). 
 The struggle for meaningful ways to implement critical thinking in writing is not 
limited to discussion over the form such writing should take, but also in its assessment, 
with rubric-based evaluation examined earlier in this chapter. Another form of assessing 
degrees of critical thinking in student writing is commentary by instructors on student-
produced text. For one first-year college English class, despite asserting that “[u]pon 
successful completion of the course, students will be able to demonstrate skills in critical 
thinking” (J. M. Miller), the context of evaluation is based entirely on a set of 
numerically-linked commentary, or what Joyce Marie Miller describes as “revision 
symbols.” Numbers from 1 through 30 represent errors in critical judgment or writing 
skill, and on receipt of their evaluated essays, students locate the corresponding number 
to a short definition of the problem, such as: Weak progression of ideas/weak 
organization/weak topic sentences (1); Faulty logic (6); Ambiguous/unclear meaning 
(10); and Faulty parallel structure (14). Yet, the mere act of students comparing the 
alleged deficits of the writing with prescriptive remedies does not constitute critically 
reflective thought; on the contrary, it is another example of teacher-imposed judgmental 
standards to which students are merely expected to conform.  
 Other teachers claim to structure their course sequencing around the central tenet 
of promoting critical thinking – itself a laudable ideal, but again one that is weakly put 
into practice. Elena Stone Shiflet, as an example, asserts that the “intended by-product” 
of her pedagogical process is to “empower learners with the ability to form individual 
methods of knowing through critical thinking” (1), and yet her four-essay assignment 
sequencing that begins with students researching a potential “issue” and ends in a 
traditional “research essay” promotes more the skills of research and inquiry, not 
necessarily critically reflective thought at all. Moreover, while Shiflet posits that “the 
acquired powers of critical thinking will equip the student with the ability to examine 
issues through individual knowledge” and that “[t]his means that the student can 
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determine personal truth” (3-4), there is little in this pedagogy that affords opportunity 
for students to reflect on just what constitutes their personal truth, what contributed to 
such constitution, nor what that personal truth might mean as part of a wider social 
milieu.  
 Personal truth as ideology and the role it plays in critical thinking is an issue 
poorly addressed in Michael Scriven and Richard Paul’s draft statement on defining 
critical thinking for the National Council for Excellence in Critical Thinking Instruction. 
While Scriven and Paul attempt, in their four paragraphs, to provide some definitive 
parameters of what might constitute critical thinking, it is the parameters themselves that 
oddly enough reinforce a solipsistic mindset. To argue that critical thinking “is the 
intellectually disciplined process of actively and skillfully conceptualizing, applying, 
analyzing, synthesizing, and/or evaluating information gathered from, or generated by, 
observation, experience, reflection, reasoning, or communication, as a guide to belief 
and action” (1) is another way of articulating the threads contained in the word 
“ideology” – and by this I mean the fundamental ways in which ideologies function: We 
need to believe in ideologies and fortify that belief through systematic forms of 
justification in order for them to have power. Indeed, Scriven and Paul support this by 
acknowledging that thought can be unduly influenced by personal motivation or 
selfishness, with a resulting “skillful manipulation of ideas in service of one’s own, or 
one’s groups’, vested interests” (1).  Yet, to claim that critical thinking “is incorporated 
in a family of interwoven modes of thinking, among them: scientific thinking, 
mathematical thinking, historical thinking, anthropological thinking, economic thinking, 
moral thinking, and philosophical thinking” (1) is to intrinsically allege that the critical 
thinker – at least in Scriven and Paul’s interpretation – is steeped in the benefits of a 
broad and rigorous liberal arts education. This is hardly good news for the marginalized, 
ostracized, discriminated, and oppressed who are unlikely to have been exposed to such 
a privileged educational experience.  
 Of the terms that Scriven and Paul ascribe to critical thinking in its “exemplary 
form,” namely “clarity, accuracy, precision, consistency, relevance, sound evidence, 
good reason, depth, breadth, and fairness” (1), I would contest that depth and breadth, 
for their least tenuous links to ideological loading, are the most salient characteristics. 
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The others are drawn almost exclusively from a priori parameters – just what, for 
instance, constitutes clarity, accuracy, precision, sound evidence, good reason, and 
fairness? – or they hold questionable ideological loading, such as “relevance” and 
“consistency.” If I were to argue, for example, in favor of a point that is not relevant or 
one that deviates significantly from a previous line of thinking, could I then be accused 
of not thinking critically? If I were working with the definitions put forward by Scriven 
and Paul, regrettably I would have to answer “yes.” 
 Critical thinking is not about patriarchal discourse of argument, nor contested 
debate, nor about hierarchical thought processes, nor enthymemes of formal logic or the 
a priori assumptions of informal logic, nor even the authentication of a privileged, 
Western set of ideological values ascribed with the gloss of bona fide critical thought. 
Critical thinking has no desire to posit itself as better or superior, but is an act and 
process of critically reflective self-examination in relation and response to contextual 
parameters of a situation. As Alma Whiteley claims, learning about thinking is “the key 
to learning about meaning” (4), or re-cognition of the ways in which we, as individuals, 
conceptualize and articulate our own patterns of thought. When this occurs, critical 
thinkers are bothered by incongruity and take initiative to seek alternative perspectives 
in a process where they identify the borders of their own perceptions and are willing to 
temporarily suspend their belief in those borders.  
 
2.2 Critical Pedagogy 
 Less contested than critical thinking, the core of critical pedagogy is 
development of a critical social conscience (Giroux; Freire; McLaren; Aronowitz; Janks; 
Johnson; Luke and Freedbody). While its detractors tend to be derisive and suspicious, 
levying allegations of unduly Marxist leanings and, at times, marginally veiled claims of 
intentional proselytizing, more moderate charges acknowledge the objective of critical 
pedagogy – the raising of social consciousness over issues of inequality and oppression 
due to race, gender, class, and culture. Yet, awareness of social injustice does not 
unquestionably equate with self-reflective thought, nor in itself engender change 
(Welch; Illich); indeed, it can manifest as no more than exchanging one set of 
ideological beliefs for another (Petruzzi; Horner; Spigelman; S. Miller; Benesch; 
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Gallagher; V. Anderson; Ellsworth), often without attention to the marginalized and 
oppressed, such as women and minorities that it inherently claims to represent. 
 Consistently present, however, are terms associated with critical pedagogy, 
including empowerment and a rhetoric of emancipation. What is less consistent is how 
to put it into practice, with acts of reflection, recursivity and re-cognition notoriously 
interpretable within the arena of critical pedagogy. Freire’s term “conscientization,” as 
the conditions in which students are able to form critical consciousness and thereby 
create opportunity to identify, examine, and change oppressive forces, is often evoked 
(Freire; Giroux; McLaren; Aronowitz; Glenn; Petruzzi; Tingle; Burbules), as is near-
universal condemnation of what Freire calls the “banking concept” of education; that is, 
teacher as knowledge-holder deposits information into the passively receptive minds of 
students. The lack of delineation between teacher as power-holder and student as, in 
contrast, inherently powerless is a hallmark of critical pedagogy, underscoring the 
relatively recent trend towards student-centered learning environments and active 
endorsement of a more level field in terms of knowledge-brokering. The result for 
critical pedagogues has been to mark teaching with a recognized need for a 
circumspective humility (Benesch, Critical), and a willingness to reconceptualize values 
that have previously been taken for granted as truths (Petruzzi; Foucault).  Students and 
teachers are partners in learning, ideally dissolving one-sided structures of power within 
the classroom in order to promote equity in education and a wider, more authentic 
exchange of a multitude of individual voices. For the critical pedagogue, expression and 
articulation of “authentic voice” is a cornerstone of individual empowerment, 
particularly among members of social groups who have been historically silenced by 
exclusion.  
 Many scholars find the term empowerment problematic, one ironically resulting 
in quite the opposite effect of that which is intended, because of the risk that the 
instructor’s political lens or discourse will unduly influence student thinking and 
therefore exemplify the very banking concept against which Freire has argued so 
passionately. Moreover, empowerment positions the concept of power as a commodity. 
As Bruce Horner asserts, “the giver [of power] is ethically suspect for having power in 
the first place; and the giving [of] power itself is suspect for encouraging complicity 
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with the dominant power structure” (123). At the core of such allegations is the idea of 
simplistic binary oppositions that privilege one perspective against an opposing Other. 
The result is that one set of social values and beliefs are endorsed over competing ones, 
reflecting more the sociopolitical agenda of an instructor or institution than a genuine 
commitment to open dialectic (Giroux; Hardin; Weiler; Benesch; Gallagher; Ellsworth; 
D. Seitz). In the confines of such an argument, critical pedagogy in practice endorses 
both the status quo and paradoxically promotes non-critical thinking (Horn; S. Miller; 
Hardin). As Horn writes, “by not eliciting and challenging prior assumptions ... 
reinforces the disenfranchisement of viewpoints that are not part of the mainstream” 
(141). Against endorsement of what is “right” in a given classroom, any alternative 
argument deviating from a privileged center becomes inherently irrational, with 
proponents subjected to derision and ostracism (V. Anderson; Horn; Ellsworth). In this 
sense, critical pedagogy misappropriates the praxis envisaged by Freire, one of its 
original proponents. As Peter McLaren, drawing heavily from Giroux and Foucault, 
observes:  
A social critique of ideology that does not consider the complex and often 
conflicting structures of its own discursive premises does little to further 
the advancement of a critical pedagogy. In fact, just such a position can 
only reproduce the very strictures it is seeking to displace. (177) 
While the critical pedagogue in theory, according to Chris Gallagher, sees 
education as a “vehicle for individual empowerment and social reconstruction” (63), 
Gallagher’s criticism of its practice is sharp:  “Teachers cultivate, articulate, prepare, 
generate, receive, and use – while students respond” (65), reflecting a patronizing notion 
“that students are culturally blind, and that critical teachers can bring them sight.” In this 
light, critical pedagogy “defines and predetermines the pedagogical script, with 
uncritical students and critical teachers dutifully playing their prescribed roles” (66).  
Elizabeth Ellsworth is even more condemnatory of current practices in critical 
pedagogy, claiming that “student empowerment has been defined in the broadest 
possible humanist terms and becomes a ‘capacity to act effectively’ in a way that fails to 
challenge any identifiable social or political position, institution, or group” 
(“Empowering” 308). Empowerment, therefore, should not be about the giving of power 
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or even permission to speak, but instead power that circulates with a mission to 
articulate and retain the privilege of choice to rescind the inherent power ideologically 
contained in our own and others’ words, ideas, and actions.  
 The more radical critical pedagogues often use equally radical means to convey 
or, as its most vociferous critics argue, indoctrinate a message of social oppression, 
including in their curricula contemporary cultural taboos such as pornography or graphic 
depictions of violence (Glenn; B. Flores, “Sheep”). While the shock and discomfort 
caused by such media is undoubtedly one way to identify the serious and often tragic 
ramifications of social dysfunction, there is a concurrent risk that students may perceive 
such messages as a militant agenda, resulting in some being cognitively cornered in 
order to rationalize their beliefs and dismiss the threat (V. Anderson). Such a response 
almost entirely negates the self-claimed goal of critical pedagogy – to instigate and 
underscore change in what is ideally an affective praxis. As McLaren argues, the 
rejection of what is perceived by some students as suspect ideological indoctrination can 
serve to justify, legitimize and strengthen students’ existing truths, something that “in 
many ways is more dangerous” (56). Similarly, Joe Marshall Hardin posits the danger 
for students who “frequently choose to reject the authority of the teacher’s often liberal 
position,” instead expressing values that are more mainstream (6). Here, Hardin warns, 
are students who can see resistance and critique as a game to master, one that will “earn 
a different kind of academic approval” (54-55), particularly those who, already well-
acculturated through the primary and secondary educational system, may resist what 
they see as more of the same. Of greater concern, however, as Richard Miller observes, 
are students who silently collaborate in production of the desired social transcript but 
question it only outside the classroom or forget it altogether (19; Hardin).  
 Acknowledging the problematic elements in a rhetoric of empowerment, other 
scholars claim that examining the pedestrian workings of power is more critically 
effective; in short, it reveals the insidious workings of power and social norms precisely 
because the circulation of power is situated in a context that is non-radical and 
unquestioned as common-sense (Tingle; V. Anderson; McLaren; Hardin). McLaren in 
particular is interested in the mundane and the practical, and the ways in which “these 
domains become sanctified inside schools” (170). Reinscribing Freirean concepts of 
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critical consciousness, Anthony Petruzzi in turn calls for intervention in the passive 
acceptance of reality as an easily accessible, commonplace understanding of an 
individual’s “ways of being-in-the-world” (310). Such a “common-sense” critical 
pedagogy reflects the argument of Michel Foucault, who claims that criticism involves 
driving thought from hiding, attempting to change it, “showing that things are not as 
obvious as we might believe [and] doing it in such a way that what we accept as going 
without saying no longer goes without saying” (“Est-il donc” 34).  Edward Said concurs 
with the danger of unquestioned normality, asserting that “[w]e take home and language 
for granted; they become nature and their underlying assumptions recede into dogma 
and orthodoxy. ... Borders and barriers ... can also become prisons, and are often 
defended beyond reason or necessity” (365, qtd. in Giroux “Paulo Freire” 9-10). In a 
similar light, and paraphrasing Ira Shor, Linda Keesing-Styles suggests that students 
need guidance in separating themselves from accepting the conditions of their existence 
unconditionally, and that it is only by achieving a conscious state of separation that 
students can prepare themselves for a “critical re-entry into an examination of everyday 
life” (11-12).  
 Yet, even in a re-visioned placement of critical pedagogy within the quotidian 
realm of day-to-day classroom discourse, the argument of scholars such as Ellsworth 
condemns critical pedagogy to failure because “its claim of enforcing the ‘rules of 
reason in the classroom’ ... reproduce violence against all those ‘others’ traditionally 
excluded within its purview” (“Empowering” 305, qtd. in Giroux, “Pedagogy” 15). In 
effect, while the theoretical framework is sound, in practice something is going terribly 
wrong. Nicholas Burbules, acknowledging the potential of dialogue, asserts that 
conceding to the rules of discourse can be condescending and ultimately discriminatory. 
“We fully welcome your participation on these terms,” Burbules writes, exemplifying 
what he calls a pedagogy that reflects the “hegemony of reasonableness” (256). 
Precisely because of its apparent respect and inclusiveness for multiple points of view, it 
shifts fault and blame for a sense of exclusion from the conversation to the participants 
themselves: After all, “[w]ho could criticize or reject such a gesture [of inclusivity], 
except the ill-willed, the alienated, the recalcitrant?” (257, 267). 
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 Like its theoretical cousin critical thinking, critical pedagogy has not retained a 
set of static binary oppositions, a description that may better fit its emergence in the 
early to mid-1990s when it focused strongly on dichotomies between students as social 
agents of change and students as cultural critics. The danger in the former is transference 
of teacher-driven political leanings onto passively receptive students; in the latter, 
privileging one set of collective and dominant cultural discourses over others. At the 
core of such criticism is the concept of student agency, and questionable ideological 
influences on its narration. In simultaneously negating the potentially persuasive nature 
of ideologically-driven instructors, and asserting that student agency is a utopian dream 
anyway, David Seitz argues that “[i]n reality, teachers never can or will have control 
over what is internally persuasive to each individual student, regardless of their 
[teachers’] pedagogical strategies” (504). Instead, he alleges that internal persuasion is at 
its most forceful when placed in the hands of students and their peers (505), and this 
latter characteristic is apparent in what Seitz claims is a generative shift of critical 
pedagogy into a more student-centered focus since the mid-1990s.  
 Reflecting a postmodern character, recent critical pedagogies have operated as 
more effective sites of resistance, reinscribed as borders to be transgressed. Drawing on 
the work of Abdul JanMohammed, Giroux emphasizes the idea of displacement by using 
the terms home and homelessness; the former a social formation and cultural space that 
is “safe by virtue of its repressive exclusions” and the latter “a shifting site of identity, 
resistance, and opposition” (“Paulo Freire” 4). Critical pedagogues, Giroux argues, 
should be homeless “border crossers” – ones who “take leave of the cultural, theoretical, 
and ideological borders that enclose them” (2). Such a “trope of homelessness” (4) 
reflects a postmodern lack of closure, and “no relief from the incessant tensions and 
contradictions that inform one’s own identity, ideological struggles, and project of 
possibility” (9). Freire, too – particularly in his later work – endorses leaving one’s 
home-self in order to gain a more critically distant and reflective position: “It was by 
being confronted with another self,” he writes, “that I discovered more easily my own 
identity” (Freire and Faundez 13). For Giroux, the goal of critical pedagogy is clear: 
“Animated by a spirit of critique and possibility [it] attempts to provoke students to 
deliberate, resist, and ... move beyond the world they already know” through dialectic 
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engagement in “a public space where they can learn, debate, and engage critical 
traditions in order to imagine” (“Pedagogy” 20, 24). For critics of critical pedagogy like 
Ellsworth, however, such articulations reflect little more than participants united against 
an ostracized Other, still maintaining the binary of “us” against “them” (“Empowering” 
314-15), one that cannot be reconciled, no matter how glossy the rhetoric of 
empowerment or freedom. Ellsworth’s point is also reflected in the work of Sarah 
Benesch who, in critiquing the writing of Freire, invokes Kathleen Weiler’s assertion 
that critical pedagogy undermines “‘the specificity of people’s lives,’ including ways 
that they can be oppressed in one situation and privileged in another” (Weiler, qtd. in 
Benesch, Critical 57). In this way, Freirean critical pedagogy “dichotomizes oppression, 
allowing for only two possibilities: oppressor and oppressed” (57).  Inherently, such a 
perspective casts a shadow on Giroux’s eloquent promise of “situating pedagogy as a 
political practice grounded in a notion of hope” (“Pedagogy” 3).  
As Ellsworth argues, the terms of dialogue, empowerment, student voice, and 
even “critical” remain as “repressive myths that perpetuate relations of domination” 
(“Empowering” 301), and her allegations underscore an inherent flaw in the critical 
pedagogy of Freire, Shor, McLaren, and Giroux: Pushing so hard for an objective of 
social reform paradoxically inverts the power balance, privileging the voice of the 
oppressed over others. We cannot so readily – and rationally – identify a singular 
category of oppression for our identities when “who we are” can be cast so widely 
across multitudinal and fluid boundaries.  Yet, one of Ellsworth’s main contentions is 
that argument and discussion as currently practiced in college classrooms is grounded in 
rationality: “that students and teachers can and should engage each other in the 
classroom as fully rational subjects” (303). The problem, as Ellsworth points out, is that 
“[r]ational argument has operated in ways that set up as its opposite an irrational Other. 
... [R]ational deliberation, reflection, and considering of all viewpoints has become a 
vehicle for regulating conflict and the power to speak” (303). Moreover, “strategies such 
as student empowerment and dialogue give the illusion of equality while in fact leaving 
the authoritarian nature of the teacher/student relationship intact” (307). Empowerment 
and student voice frequently muddy the critical water because it is glossed over with a 
veneer that everyone has the right to speak and the words of everyone will be respected 
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in an environment of sharing, yet simultaneously delivered with the authoritarian rules 
of engagement set by the privileged and knowledge-holding power of the academy – 
ironically the one thing critical pedagogy consistently claims to dissolve. 
 The contestations contained in critical pedagogy underscore the question of what 
are its fundamental flaws. Hardin asserts that critical pedagogy needs to move beyond 
seeing itself “as the emancipator of students” (5) and instead focus on what Graff has 
termed “teaching the conflicts” in order to actively engender discomfort, dissensus, and 
even incoherence so that students come to understand that conventions of academic 
discourse are dynamic, incomplete, and unstable (Hardin 46-47).  Keesing-Styles, 
acknowledging the work of Jennifer Gore, emphasizes the lack of applicability in critical 
pedagogy, condemning it as too theoretical, with abstract concepts of empowerment 
promoted at the expense of tangible guidance for putting it into practice (6). Certainly, 
while the charges levied at critical pedagogy in regard to suspicion over proselytizing 
may have prompted a recent shift towards concepts of “respect” in the classroom, token 
tolerance and respect are problematic in themselves. As Kimberly Gunter discusses, it’s 
difficult to be in a classroom setting and endorse respect for a view that, as an example, 
all homosexuals are evil and corrupt and should be burned in hell under “God’s” laws. 
As Gunter asserts, the politics of dissensus and humanistic outrage demand that such a 
mindset be quashed; the politics of tolerance and respect equally demand that they do 
not. At what point is the fulcrum of negotiation? Or, does negotiation even become a 
factor in the equation with such a narrow, hate-driven, and prejudiced dialogue? 
 History provides us with ample evidence as to why such perspectives should not 
be tolerated, let alone encouraged, in a humane society, and yet denying such individuals 
the option to articulate their beliefs is a transgression on the right for others to hold 
opinions that may be intolerably different from our own. It all becomes, then, a question 
over aspects of ideological workings and the degrees of influence that construct social 
identification within a referential framework of dominance. At some point we need to 
consider our own complicity in constructing ideological frames of reference and the 
degree, in turn, to which ideological frames of reference construct our identity. In either 
case, ascribing an ideology involves buying into what in many cases is a pre-packaged, 
logical, relevant, righteous, and rationalized set of systematic beliefs that is self-
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justifying and therefore entirely tenable. Such a perspective dislodges the mainstay of 
argument presented against critical pedagogy as one of misplaced angst; a failure, in 
McLaren’s words, to “explore the various factors which constitute truth’s regulating 
gaze” (162). One concept least addressed in the literature over critical pedagogy is that 
unsubscribed ideologies are ethically neutral; that is, the power of the ideology depends 
on our belief in it. I will give further consideration to such an allegation in Chapter Four 
that deals with a reconceptualization of the critical.  
 
2.3 Critical Literacy 
 While critical literacy shares with critical pedagogy a concern for examining the 
interactions of power in social frameworks, there is a greater focus on language as 
arbiter of social relations, particularly in regard to constructs of gender, race, and culture 
(Degener; Luke and Freedbody; Patterson; Threadgold; Johnson). Critical literacy is 
especially interested in social transformation through multi-literate interpretation – 
reading the world through texts and media – manifested by students identifying and 
critiquing social forces of oppression through reading and writing about their world, or 
what Greer Johnson describes as a “social justice perspective of language in use” (49). 
We might consider critical literacy, therefore, as an application of critical pedagogy that 
confronts the ways oppression exists within a literate society through Freirean 
dichotomies of “us versus otherness” and “superiority versus inferiority” as circulating 
forces in a culture to position us “as a classed, raced, and gendered subject” (Carlson 
241). In practice, critical literacy programs promote literacy as a tool to critically 
analyze social place, to understand the ways in which cultural biases and assumptions 
put us at risk, to learn about challenging the status quo and to “accept and validate the 
different kinds of cultural capital that influence the way students make meaning of their 
learning” (Degener 27, 34). While critical literacy as practiced in the English classroom 
ranges from traditional research-and-inquiry based writing assignments (Lankshear and 
Knobel) to Carlson’s advice that “students become aware of the sources of their anger 
through discussion and autobiographical writing,” the overriding purpose is for students 
to experience through literate practice the ways in which a variety of discourses diverge 
and intersect (Pinar et al. 261).  
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One key to critical literacy in practice is making evident those connections that 
extend beyond the classroom hypothetical; that is, to situate critical literacy in “real” 
contexts (Street).  Whether implemented through service learning or writing assignments 
that call for skill in research and inquiry, emphasis is on establishing meaningful 
connections between the student’s individual context and that of an externalized social 
world, where the social “is defined as a practical site characterized by contestations over 
resources, representation, and difference” (Luke and Freedbody 3). In framing an 
articulated social practice for what they term a “New Times Discourse,” Colin 
Lankshear and Michele Knobel endorse active questioning of existing power relations in 
order to determine alternatives that will foster appreciation of “the radically plural and 
discursive character of literacy” (95). As an example, Lankshear and Knobel nominate 
the oppressive workings of institutions that have made little adjustment in terms of child 
care, despite “the near complete entry of women into the paid workforce” (103), 
intrinsically inviting students to consider the anomalies that can undermine white, 
Western, patriarchal modes of power. Curiously, however, Lankshear and Knobel at no 
point attempt to address what is perhaps a far more radical position in such a discourse: 
Why is child care seen exclusively as a woman’s issue?  Moreover, and as a challenge to 
dominant ideological perceptions of what constitutes womanhood and femininity by 
those who live it, to what degree are women themselves promoting such a position? 
Without examination of the ideologies that underwrite critical literacy itself, in practice 
it is little more than the same old rhetoric with a different name.  
 The conceptual framework of critical literacy focuses too hard on the centrality 
of existing social ritual (Illich 54) – on what is – at the expense of engaging alternative 
perspectives. Social ritual in the case of Lankshear and Knobel positions women as the 
nurturers and caregivers of children. Here, the teacher provides existing “knowledge” to 
which students are then asked – after the fact – to identify and critique the oppressive 
forces of institutional power that prevent access to childcare. Asking students to merely 
observe and report the existing parameters of a “social issue” without seeking to 
transcend its contextual borderlines can, as James Seitz asserts, “encourage the 
production of a highly restricted, conventionally political discourse: arrogant, repetitive, 
predictable, banal, and ultimately oppressively boring” (7-8, qtd. in Horner 126), what 
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François Tochon derides as “declarative knowledge,” or what Ruth Stewart laments as 
energetic, yet trite, “proclamations about abortion, gun control [and] capital punishment 
... interspersed with poorly integrated, often only marginally relevant quotations from 
students’ research” (163). Doug Sweet and Deborah Swanson are even more direct: 
[S]tudents effect their own erasure of the “political” from their thinking 
under the guise of being “critically” aware: they have, then, no access to 
matters of “consequence” to them except in a judging capacity, after the 
fact. From such a position, we could hardly expect our students to take us 
seriously when we utter platitudes about empowering their thinking. (52, 
emphasis added) 
If the purpose of critical literacy is to promote social change, it is not so much a question 
of how to enlighten our students to the workings of oppressive forces of power and then 
asking them to articulate their understanding of it through literate analysis. Instead, it is 
to foster a deep sense of ambivalence or dissatisfaction within themselves in relation to 
identifying the incongruities of existing ideological frameworks; to recognize that 
“[i]ndividual consciousness is not the architect of the ideological superstructure, but 
only a tenant lodging in the social edifice of ideological signs” (Vološinov 13). 
Enlightening students about difference does not alone translate into the 
confidence, skill, or desire to put that knowledge into practice. Moreover, 
“empowerment” is a notoriously sweeping term, even when attempts are made to tie it 
firmly to the constructs of language as an ideological system of restraint and oppression 
with the goal of liberating students from that hold. Rarely is it put well into practice, for 
its very predilection is steeped within already-situated rhetorical contexts, the agendas of 
which are pre-determined to persuade and agitate for social change within those 
boundaries.  But social change for whose ends? We might argue that in a liberal 
democracy the voix populaire is the harbinger of social equity and justice, and the 
ubiquitous freedom of speech and opinion-holding will guarantee its implementation. 
Yet, clearly this is a fallacy if we consider that the freedom of expression for voice alone 
– and the means to do so – is far more likely to endorse Norman Fairclough’s model of 
common sense analysis, one that depends on “logical reasoning and argument in relation 
to evidence in both text and context” rather than examining the territory that lies beyond 
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reason (Janks 9). As Hilary Janks contends, existing models of critical discourse analysis 
ostensibly “preaches to the converted” (21), with those who remain outside the 
sanctioned social discourse relegated to a place of exclusion and ostracism – again, the 
discursive concepts that critical literacy positions itself to redress.  
 The efficacy of critical literacy in practice outside the classroom is also a point of 
considerable concern. While students can be taught to examine words for political 
meaning, and to criticize the values that lie beneath the text to expose underlying 
assumptions and exclusions, the risk is that students are trained to produce a reasoned 
critique that is neither individually transformative nor brings change in student 
aspirations or practices (Janks; Horner; J. Seitz; Graff).  As Janks argues, there is a need 
to go beyond concepts of social injustice as concepts; that is, students may be able to 
write about cultural, gendered, or racial injustice and oppression, but to what degree – if 
any – are students integrating these ideas into their own ideological practices, 
frameworks, and cognitive processes? Without critically reflective examination of the 
ideological ties that restrain and shape our articulation of thought and belief, the likely 
outcome of both collective and individual voice is a cacophony of silence. A radically 
critical pedagogy aims instead for what Nick Tingle, drawing on the work of Giroux, 
asserts is “a critical self-consciousness with respect to the impact of ideology ... [and] the 
ways in which ideology may suppress, repress, or generally determine their own wants 
and needs” (2; Giroux, Theory and Resistance 150).  While James Moffett calls for 
individual soliloquy in response to the voices of such a heteroglossic world, we might 
instead assert that what is needed is a colloquy of selves – or, as Crusius terms it, “the 
interaction of all the voices we internalize” (48).  
 One of the most consistent critiques of critical literacy comes in the form of a 
challenge to whose purpose is being served in its application, ironically using one of the 
tenets of critical literacy to further such an objection: That teaching to-an-agenda, 
whether feminist, environmental, or even social justice merely replaces a formerly 
privileged center with a previously marginalized Other.  The risk here is not so much 
opportunity to critique dominant social forms of power, but the very lack of it. As Brian 
Street asserts, such an approach is markedly vulnerable to manipulation by those 
“imbued with ideological fervour” who, driven so strongly by the concept of 
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empowerment for “‘ignorant’ peasants” that they cannot see the political and cultural 
domination they are, in turn, reinforcing (138). Annette Patterson, in deciding that she 
could not let her students choose texts for themselves, exemplifies the intrinsic danger of 
which Street writes. Patterson asks, in all sincerity, “what if they [the students] chose an 
inappropriate reading ... or chose not to support say, the antiracist reading but chose 
instead to construct a racist reading?” (340). Inherently, the uncomfortable question 
being posited is how to ensure that the student conforms to the correct, antiracist 
interpretation of text – a point that is startlingly irreconcilable with the liberatory 
rhetoric of critical literacy.  
 What is so troubling about critical literacy is not its focus on translating, 
interpreting, and understanding the way power and language are implicitly connected, 
nor its promoting a critical survey of texts to help students unravel the ideological 
threads preventing wide and equitable access to social power and resources, but that it 
lacks a means whereby students can critically examine their own selves within a 
complex inter-linguistic web. Critical positions are constructed from an a priori base 
rather than an internalized and critical reflection on what constitutes self – an 
examination by our students in relation to who they are, who they are not, and who they 
might possibly consider becoming. Instead, we see a sequence of pre-articulated notions 
of what constitutes “race,” “gender” and “culture,” and consideration for the ways in 
which students already fit into such categorical inclusions, ironically reifying a culture 
of exclusion by omitting to acknowledge our own and others’ complicity in the 
construction of our selves and the multiple, fluid, fragmentary aspects of those selves.  
While we might well say that the term critical literacy “is concerned with social critique 
of the dominant forms of school knowledge and with a project of cultural rewriting” 
(Alison Lee 411), this is essentially an externalized projection or mapping of a socio-
cultural landscape that already exists, and not an internalized critical reflection of what 
has not yet become. We are not asked, for instance, to consider an “anti-gender” reading 
nor a “racist reading” on the basis that this does not reflect current understandings and 
doctrines about the workings of power within collective social constructs we have 
chosen to label “gender” or “racist.” Moreover, while we can educate students to read 
and write cultural narratives as reclaimed space for collective cultural, racial, or 
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gendered identity – and indeed they may be able to do this well – it does not address the 
social reality that gender oppression, racist oppression, and cultural discrimination still 
exist, and even raises the possibility of denial from students about its existence at all, 
wrought from those who are either unwilling or unable to reflect on a retracted imagery 
that exposes the self and the selves within that self amidst a self-constructed ideological 
trope.  
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3. Uncritical Pedagogy: The Concept of Critical Care 
 
 The title of this chapter nominates the characteristics of “critical care” as un/non-
critical in the sense that such approaches to teaching English in the first-year college 
classroom align the word “critical” with negative overtones. Uncritical pedagogy 
promotes positivity, focusing on perceived strengths rather than weaknesses, 
encouragement as opposed to discouragement, and even reflects a “feminized” rather 
than “masculinized” approach to instruction. My description – and resulting critique – is 
not intended to cast “uncritical pedagogy” in a pejorative light, but to consider the tenets 
of what I term “critical care,” and discuss its impact on the potential for critically 
reflective thought. 
 Critical care endorses respect and empowerment in classroom interactions, 
including discussion, dialogue, and written commentary on student writing. Some 
scholars ascribe to a “whole student approach” drawn from Nel Noddings’ metaphor of 
student-as-infant/teacher-as-mother to promote a nurturing environment of warmth and 
care in keeping with idealized Western cultural images of a mother caring for a newborn 
(Noddings; Gilligan; White). Such a perspective considers that “the ethic of care is as 
old as the experience of women in relating to themselves, to one another, and to the 
world” and that “caring is rooted in the more feminine attributes of ‘receptivity, 
relatedness, and responsiveness’” (Noddings 2, qtd. in White 301). Others maintain 
focus on the primacy of individual voice and opportunity for its expression by promoting 
classroom interactions within a safe space of sharing that exudes support, trust, and the 
avoidance of “disrespectful” conflict (Heydenberk and Heydenberk; Rubin; Morand; 
Murray; Elbow; DeBlase). In particular, responses to student writing are frequently 
framed by the call for constructive as opposed to destructive criticism, with notions of 
respect often requiring that teachers ask permission before commenting on student-
produced work. Use of a red pen – or red font if responding electronically – is strongly 
discouraged, partly due to a stereotypical association with “high school horror-stories” 
of picky, pedantic teachers striking at every comma splice and sentence fragment, and 
partly due to a metaphorical association with bleeding and images of slaughter.  
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 The overriding premise, however, remains one of care – caring for the student as 
an individual writer and thinker. The voice of each student in a concept of critical care is 
a key element in the collective environment of sharing and knowledge-exchange. 
Critical care also reflects vestiges of the 1980s Self-Esteem Movement, an educational 
directive marked at its high point in 1986 with the establishment of the California Task 
Force to Promote Self Esteem and Personal and Social Responsibility, the rationale of 
which alleged that “low-performing students would achieve more if they had higher self-
esteem” (Ravitch 426). Sociologists and psychologists who criticized the Self-Esteem 
movement reported the dangers of sycophantic ego-boosting, warning that a strategy of 
false ploys through promoting self-esteem “in the absence of any concrete 
accomplishments, may [lead people to] develop narcissistic attitudes based on nothing 
but the desire to feel superior” (429), ironically undermining the principles of inclusivity 
and tolerance for difference espoused in both the Self-Esteem movement and, I would 
argue, the concept of critical care. Moreover, and disturbingly, The Social Importance of 
Self Esteem, a text resulting from the California Task Force’s inquiry, reveals little 
evidence of a link between self-esteem and academic achievement. Even the 
introduction to that text admits that “[o]ne of the disappointing aspects of every chapter 
... is how low the associations between self-esteem and its consequences are in research 
to date” (Smelser 15, qtd. in Shokraii 3; Mecca, Smelser, and Vasconcellos).  
 Applied in the contemporary college English classroom, the critical care 
instructor considers that students with poor prior experiences in the study of English are 
traumatized; they neither feel good about themselves as subjects, nor the object of their 
study. Attempting to change such perspectives, expressivistic discourse such as 
autobiographical narratives, especially ones concerning literacies-of-self, are highly 
valued to authenticate individual voice, permission-to-speak, and equal respect for all 
voices that do so. Avoidance of open conflict is evident, reflecting the pedagogy of 
theorists such as Donald Murray and Peter Elbow, who “emphasize that student writing 
[should be] centered on subjectivity and self-discovery,” and that the teacher’s goal in 
such a strategy is to “nurture students in this process” by way of “validating student 
experience and avoiding conflict” (DeBlase 368). The critical care classroom, therefore, 
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seeks to nurture the unique qualities or strengths that each student brings to the discourse 
community. As one first-year writing program policy describes it: 
[W]e do NOT want to fall victim to a “weakness-based” approach, one 
that is far too common in education. We do not see students as deficient, 
as “weak” in certain areas/skills, as needing diagnoses and remediations 
of various sorts. We do not see students primarily as lacking ... . Nor do 
we see them as hapless apprentices or followers, waiting for us to lead 
them into learning. (Blalock 1)  
 Attempts to ensure inclusion for all, however, can devolve into a form of 
quietism where the primary focus is the right to speak and feel good about doing it, even 
if nobody can hear what is being said in the cacophony of competing voices. Moreover, 
as early as 1985, psychologist Barbara Lerner wrote that the “ideology of ‘feel-good-
now self esteem’ produced students who were narcissistic and egotistical and responded 
only to the pleasure principle” (qtd. in Ravitch 427; see also Aronowitz; Benesch, 
Critical). By 1996, Lerner’s work was reprinted in the American Federation of 
Teachers’ magazine, the editor of which posited that “[w]ell-intentioned and misguided 
notions about self esteem ... constitute one of the most serious threats to the movement 
to raise academic and disciplinary standards and improve the learning opportunities and 
life chances of our nation’s children” (qtd. in Ravitch 429). Lerner’s warning of 
egocentrism is salient, for an egocentric mindset is a barrier to critically reflective 
thought. As Paul claims, “egocentric adults assimilate everything they hear or 
experience to their own point of view. ... But when there is conflict, they ‘enter’ them 
only to negate or refute. They never genuinely leave their own mind set” (138). Jean 
Piaget concurs: “Many adults are still egocentric in their ways of thinking. Such people 
interpose between themselves and reality an imaginary or mystical world, and they 
reduce everything to this individual point of view” (209, qtd. in Paul 137).  Focusing on 
the primacy of the ego-driven individual results in perceptions of the world that fit 
within a singular, monochromic framework. That which does not fit is justifiably 
rejected as not belonging to a particular paradigm of “how things should be” (Weil 3). 
While feelings of self-esteem are integral to social achievement, a situation characterized 
by pleasant conversational exchange and where potentially contestable issues are 
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avoided or minimized, the concern of academia is intellectual advancement, not 
etiquette.  
 Despite – or perhaps because of – an emphatic endorsement of positivity and 
strength versus negativity and weakness, ground rules of communication are common in 
the critical care classroom, frequently drawn from student-led interaction. Students and 
instructor generate guidelines for respectful discussion, inherently endorsing a 
democratic ideal of consensus through respectful resolution of difference and 
conciliatory movements of compromise. Such rules of dialogue, as Ellsworth observes, 
is a pedagogical strategy to guide interaction through language, and assumes “that all 
members have equal opportunity to speak, all members respect other members’ rights to 
speak and feel safe to speak, and [that] all ideas are tolerated and subjected to rational 
critical assessment against fundamental judgments and moral principles” 
(“Empowering” 314). Respect, a key word, underscores communication in an ambitious 
attempt to democratize thought, speech, and writing. Students are treated “in the manner 
... advocate[d] that the culture treat all its citizens, [and that is] respectfully, honorably, 
and seriously” (Gunter 56), replicating an idealized informed, democratic discourse 
within a tolerant and respectful community of sharing.  
 Like its critical counterparts, problematic elements in critical care pivot on a core 
question of mediating exchange involving the articulation of different viewpoints 
without “squelch[ing] the ‘vulnerable inner center’ of youthful creativity” (Laird; 
Spigelman, “Argument” 124), or what Lois Rubin describes as the “delicate nature of 
the critique situation” (390). Here, the critical care practitioner is challenged in terms of 
how to facilitate disagreement between and among individuals, yet still maintain civility, 
tolerance, and respect for others. The ways, however, in which such pedagogy intersects 
with attempts made by students to subvert consensus needs consideration. As Gunter 
posits: 
[I]f indeed I am a feminist teacher who respects difference, should I not 
then respect [anti-feminist] difference of opinion and allow such speech 
to stand in my classrooms? If I squelch such hate speech, am I heaving 
my feminist principles just to prescribe beliefs that I hold, like some kind 
of patriarchal thought police? Do I subvert my own liberatory teaching 
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theory when I judge what is ethically acceptable speech from my students 
and what is not? (57) 
Gunter’s dilemma is reminiscent of that facing T. S. Eliot’s Prufrock who, when 
formulated, sprawled, pinned, and wriggling, rhetorically asks “how should I begin / ... 
And how should I presume?” (ll. 57-61). Indeed, criticism easily risks being perceived 
as presumptuous (Morand; Rubin) in that it can position one set of beliefs as more 
accurate or valid than another, just as Gunter recognizes when her liberatory, feminist 
beliefs are juxtaposed against what she considers – or presumes – to be an invective of 
dissent that she describes as “hate speech” (57).  
 While there is much evidence to support the assertion that critically reflective 
thinking needs exposure to diverse and even opposing viewpoints through accessible 
interaction and group discussion, the drive for consensus is strong within the collective. 
While Brookfield agrees that students need to engage in “identifying and challenging 
assumptions, and exploring alternative ways of thinking and acting,” if groups are to 
operate effectively, there needs to be “some form of artificial resolution” (71). The 
process of conciliation requires a sequence of facilitation from the instructor, reminding 
students of the need for respectful interaction as they negotiate through dissent. One 
component of such navigation is, as Morand claims, reinforcement of civility and 
politeness, elements that can be “useful in buffering and mediating the emotional 
contingencies” of group discussion (246, qtd. in Rubin 391). Yet, this in turn creates its 
own ideological framework: that discussion takes place within a social context of 
discourse and exchange of ideas. It also links the ownership of ideas with emotional 
attachment, resonant of an exchange of capital that seeks profit from its own investiture 
– what Horner defines as a commodification of pedagogy. The medium of exchange is 
personal belief inscribed with “expressivist assumptions about the ‘self’ and about the 
nature of personal experience” (France 147).  A non-commodified concept of pedagogy, 
Horner suggests, does not endorse the primacy of individual voice and reinforce its right 
to speak within a context of supportive nurturing, but instead recognizes that “students’ 
difficulty in speaking, however painful, is inescapable, [and] something to be directly 
confronted” rather than eased into being, “[u]nlike the view of pedagogy as a 
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commodity, in which teaching and learning must be pain-free and must feel ‘good’ to 
all” (134).  
 If there is risk of presumption in the critical care classroom, it is not presuming 
the intrinsic rightness of one set of ideological beliefs over another, but the silent 
acceptance that we have the unfettered and absolute right to hold and express opinion. 
And, what is more problematic is refusal to examine the facets of what constitutes 
opinion. Many students have great difficulty identifying any incongruity between the 
ideas they produce and what they really think in both verbal and text-based discussion. It 
is as though the written text is truth and the articulated belief a hallowed component of 
being; neither are candidates for de(con)struction. Moreover, the egocentrism inherent in 
words such as “emotional fragility” and an intrinsic demand to maintain the social 
niceties of civil discourse creates an almost insurmountable barrier to critically reflective 
thought. While dissensus (Bercovitch; Graff; Burke), is encouraged in terms of process, 
it is not endorsed as outcome – and the alleged need to suppress conflict leads ultimately 
to consensus. The teacher who negotiates a path through conflict to consensus not only 
fails to acknowledge the complexities of dissent, but poses an artificial and contrived 
solution to the problem of why-can’t-we-all-just-get-along. Conflict exists because of 
difference (DeBlase 377). If we innocently give credence to the opinions of all, our guilt 
is ignorance; it is “the incapacity – or the refusal – to acknowledge one’s own 
implication in the information” (Felman, qtd. in Giroux, “Pedagogy” 26). The act of 
negating disparate points of view beneath a patina of tolerance and respect does little to 
counter, challenge, and question our own rationale for such perception, but instead 
reflects what Alan France calls a “ready-made epistemology: an egocentric humanism” 
where the student is positioned as “artist manqué,” accompanied by the tragedy of what 
might have been, but what is not (147).  
 Reinforcing the expression of self, however, within the parameters of an 
uncritical, accepting pedagogy of complicity and compassion might allow for freer 
articulation of thought from students – even promoting an environment where all feel 
empowered to speak without fear of failure or embarrassment. The latter reaction is 
common for many students whose previous exposure to education has resembled what 
Jane Tompkins describes as the “performance model,” where fear is a driving force for 
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“being shown up for what you are: a fraud, stupid, ignorant, a clod, a dolt, a sap, a 
weakling, someone who can’t cut the mustard” (654). Critical thinking can be a fearful 
and intimidating request for those who are not practiced at it. As Brookfield states, if our 
students are intimidated or even insulted when asked questions that are critically 
insightful, or are the recipients of “devastating critique of generally accepted 
assumptions,” there seems little point in exercising such critical acuity (74). Brookfield 
argues that the solution is to create an environment where perceived failure can be risked 
without students experiencing a sense of failure (75), and this is precisely what the 
critical care classroom attempts to provide. The point remains, however, that in such a 
system of incalculable rightness and positivity, anything remotely critical is perceived as 
negative and unwelcome. Within such a system, as Donaldo Macedo argues, “students 
are rewarded to the degree that they become complicit with their own stupidification” 
(5), or what Stanley Aronowitz describes as a misappropriation of Freirean pedagogy: 
“What is taught is unproblematic; the only issue is how to teach on the basis of caring” 
(8).  
 It is for these reasons that concepts of respect and tolerance sit uneasily in the 
critical pedagogue’s repertoire. We might, for example, advocate the need for respecting 
difference in the rhetoric of our course syllabi, yet at the same time be confronted with 
our own explanations a few paragraphs down that personal email use or non-academic 
internet searching or even plagiarism will “not be tolerated.” Tolerance, then, becomes 
contestable: we are tolerant in some situations, but not in others – and the incongruity 
invites risky opportunity for recalcitrance. From another perspective, tolerant discursive 
interjection from instructors, in an attempt to privilege the veracity of individual 
expression, can negate the concept of dialectical engagement in favor of tolerating 
difference solely in the name of inclusivity and respect (Lorde; Ellsworth). In this light, 
tolerance is too easily cast as a banal and insipid commentary that parodies respect, 
exemplified in the following hypothetical exchange between a first-year college English 
teacher and her students. The context is dialogue within a multicultural writing 
classroom underscored by concepts of respect and tolerance for difference. The students 
are discussing a writing assignment in which they have been asked to document their 
socio-cultural experiences through personal narrative: 
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Teacher: Thanks for that great insight, Tan. It’s wonderful to hear the Asian-
American perspective. We all respect your struggle. Now, let’s hear from 
Barbara about the African-American cultural viewpoint. 
 Barbara responds with appropriately African-American clichés, no doubt after 
being “educated” about what constitutes the African-American experience. She makes 
liberal use of the copula “I been.” 
Teacher: Thanks for that great insight, Barbara. It’s wonderful to hear the African-
American perspective. We all respect your struggle. Now, let’s hear from 
Tiatra about the European-American cultural viewpoint. 
 Tiatra responds with appropriately European-American clichés, no doubt after 
being “educated” about what constitutes the European-American experience. She ends 
her sentences with an inflection. 
Teacher: Thanks for that great insight, Tiatra. It’s wonderful to hear the European-
American perspective. We all respect your struggle, especially the 
difficulties you have staying in shape for the school dance team. Now, 
let’s hear from Vince about the Hispanic cultural viewpoint.  
 Vince responds with appropriately Hispanic clichés, no doubt after being 
“educated” about what constitutes the Hispanic experience. He speaks openly about the 
barrios and the associated culture of low-rider gang affiliation. He frequently ends his 
sentences with the word “man.” 
Teacher: Thanks for that great insight, Vince. It’s wonderful to hear the Hispanic 
perspective. We all respect your struggle. And, the high cost of gasoline 
must be hitting you pretty hard. Now, let’s hear from Hedony about the 
Lesbian Female Lifestyle Choice viewpoint. 
 Hedony, who chose the name herself – and the appellation is welcomed in the 
spirit of individual authentication – lashes out with a diatribe that speaks of pseudo, 
trendy, and superficial acceptance measured against mainstream social values that is 
nothing but a tarnished veneer for ugly homophobia lurking below the collective social 
conscience. She speaks of the damning and condemnatory social stereotypes in regard to 
what constitutes “cultural experience,” and argues articulately about the shortcomings of 
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an educational system that measures difference against a standardized, sanitized 
multicultural normality. The students are enthralled by this voice of dissent.  
Teacher:  Thanks for that great insight, Hedony. It’s wonderful to hear the Lesbian 
Female Lifestyle Choice viewpoint. We all respect your struggle. 
 Teacher pauses, unsure how to respond to Hedony’s inflammatory remarks. 
Moreover, she senses potential revolt in the surreptitious eye-exchanges among the other 
students. Remembering, however, that reflective response time is the mark of a good, 
caring instructor, teacher silently counts to ten before speaking again. Adds another five 
counts for further credibility, then ends the class period with an unconvincing 
affirmation that the students have learned to allow all voices to speak and to afford each 
one the respect it deserves. 
 With the possible exception of Hedony, what the students have in fact learned is 
that giving teachers what they want to hear is a key to success – at least in this 
classroom. Hedony, on the other hand, is authenticated through silence, condemned both 
for her expression of exclusion and for endowing the environment with complicated and 
uncomfortable dissent. Despite Hedony’s passionate pleas, the teacher responds with a 
deadpan formula, a blithe barrage of bland platitudes that pay token reverence to 
inclusivity, but in action endorse a prescribed and artificial social idealism that smacks 
of delusion. Dialogue is not neutral, nor transparent, nor scripted. Nor is it necessarily 
logical or reasoned – how can it be when opinion and belief are so indelibly colored by 
ideological drive? As Burbules asserts, replacing the concept of difference with 
tolerance “leaves dominant beliefs and values largely unquestioned – indeed, even 
insulated from challenge and change – because they are shielded within the comforting 
self-conception of openness and inclusivity” (258). Instead, the dissentious classroom 
environment is one where ideologies are embraced as being imbued with ideology 
because they are ideological. Agitation, examination, argument, deflection are all 
components of alternative perspectives – and within it is the inherent luxury of students 
given a choice to argue something they may not even necessarily believe.  
 Allowing students to transgress boundaries that have strong ideological roots – if 
they so desire – can simultaneously allow them to examine and bring out what they 
believe they believe and, in turn, enable others to respect them enough to show 
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disrespect for current or conventional views knowing that, at least in such an 
environment, by the time the end of class arrives, everyone can leave exactly the same 
way as he or she walked in, or walk out significantly changed, or anywhere in between 
these two extremes. On the inverse, endorsing a consensus of neutrality does not 
promote critically reflective thought; rather, as Linda LaDuc points out, it “suggests that 
all views are equal” and that “students already hunkered down in the ‘everybody-has-a-
right-to-an-opinion’ foxhole may dig even deeper into a solipsistic rejection of new 
voices and ideas” (qtd. in V. Anderson 198). Enabling an environment that provokes 
deeper, more critically articulated ideas carries with it a freedom of thought that most 
strongly counters the risk of indoctrination or oppressive silencing.  
 Making a distinction between discursive contexts – the social and the intellectual 
– is critical. As Trish Roberts-Miller observes, there is a realm of uncertainty when 
attempting to define what constitutes successful discourse, with many ascribing to little 
more than a “vague sense of people remaining cordial” (538). Seen within the 
parameters of social discursivity, those who do engage in confrontation and argument 
violate the principles of civility, with condemnation or ostracism as the cost of such 
transgressions. Although Roberts-Miller concedes that evasion of conflict affords social 
harmony and, “as long as the disagreements are relatively minor,” may even contribute 
to an efficient system of discourse, her concern is the exclusion of those who are “deeply 
unhappy with the system itself” (552).  While we may accept that governance of social 
discourse prevents us from saying what we really think, let alone critically examining 
what we say, the goals of social conversation are complaisance and complacency, not 
critically reflective thought and attempts to promote disequilibria of the status quo. 
Effective social discourse relies on a sense of ultimate seamlessness, an integration of 
ideas that while initially may be disparate – even diametrical – eventually, through a 
systemized process of conciliation and mediation, merge to represent a consensual, 
communal whole. The maintenance of conflicting ideas is a threat to community, the 
unified premise of which cannot tolerate sustained discord and therefore relies on the 
eventual dissolution of any fragmentation. 
 The value of consensus, particularly in the expressivist writing classroom, is 
touted as an ideal precisely because it establishes an environment in which students can 
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express their thoughts in a safe and tolerant discourse community. Yet, some bluntly 
dismiss the core of such a pedagogy, asserting that it is a “mistake of traditional 
education thinking ... that schools and colleges have to resolve disagreements in order to 
teach effectively” and that if there is no consensus, the classroom will be confused and 
chaotic (Graff 52). Erroneously, Graff argues, the consensus approach reinforces the 
idealistic and hopelessly inadequate notion that there is some common ground for us all 
to share based on unitary values and truths, particularly when the question of whose 
culture is determining that common ground is not examined (52). Describing the drive 
for consensus as “prescription for paralysis” (53), Graff argues that the consensual 
classroom exemplifies a “cafeteria-culture,” one that is stretched so far in order to 
accommodate a multitude of methods, interests, and minority cultures that attempts to 
represent every nuance of being ironically leads to the representation of no-one (53). 
Instead, Graff endorses the idea of confronting conflict in the classroom, embracing 
what is irreconcilable as a primary objective of discourse rather than seeking to 
minimize the painful effects such analysis can incur. Graff pejoratively analogizes 
consensus as a family, one in which conflicts are hidden from children by well-meaning 
parents in order to protect young minds. And, while acknowledging the “uncomfortably 
paternalistic” nuances in his analogy, Graff’s defense counters with the “infantilizing 
effects” of evading conflict (55).  
 Associations of dependency and helplessness with the words “infant” or “child” 
is a frequently cited objection to Noddings’ notion of caring. With a teacher positioned 
as maternalistic carer and the student as infant/child-recipient, the intrinsic and 
“dangerous powerlessness” of the cared-for in such a relationship becomes problematic 
(White 296), especially in light of calls for empowering students through independent 
and creative, critical thought. The incongruity in the carer/cared-for dichotomy is that 
where we presume the right to grant authentic opportunity for empowerment, it is 
tempered by a conduit of authority. Ironically, a position of power stereotypically 
characterized as masculine is internally dichotomized against the feminine traits of 
nurture and care. Moreover, if caring is not reciprocated from the student, as even 
Noddings concedes, the teacher has little choice but to withdraw the care, leaving some 
students who are cared for and others who are not (White). To extend Noddings’ 
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mother-infant analogy, the classroom acts as home – a place to shield students from 
outside threats and provide the comfort of familial protection in a communal place of 
safety to grow and learn (Heydenberk and Heydenberk). Yet, as Virginia Anderson 
suggests, it is an environment of seductive illusion, one that promises the security of 
anchored stability in the face of potential disruption. Such a supportive structure allows 
students to feel at home with their own belief systems, and to rationalize alternative 
perspectives as belonging “out there” and not “in here.” Rather than harnessing critical 
insight to challenge those who are most likely to resist it, the classroom as home-
community is imbued with efforts to maintain the harmony of the status quo.  
 The concept of home is a contestable one for Giroux who aligns the word 
“home” almost exclusively with “those cultural spaces and social formations which 
work hegemonically,” creating a place that exudes safety by nature of what it excludes 
(“Paulo Freire” 3-4; JanMohammed). In order to transgress those constricting 
ideological boundaries and explore cognitive possibilities, Giroux instead advocates a 
“trope of homelessness” as a “shifting site of identity, resistance, and opposition that 
enables conditions of self and social formation” (4). For those students who do seek to 
articulate opposition to consensual communities of care, the choice may be one of 
recalcitrance – or even attempts at radical subversion of the dominant discourse. As an 
exemplification, consider the situation Michael Wranowsky confronted in his first-year 
college classroom, one working with a pedagogy of self-esteem that focused on and 
celebrated individual strength as opposed to perceived weakness. The assignment 
required submission of a writing portfolio and “reflective overview” essay discussing 
personal strengths and how students were applying them in their daily interactions with 
colleagues and family. Using a publicly-accessible internet discussion forum, students 
were asked to publish their writing as a hyperlinked document to share with the class. 
One student chose instead to edit the assignment homepage, indelibly – although 
anonymously – registering cynical and caustic dissatisfaction with the communal goals 
by parodying the step-by-step sequencing of the portfolio assignment: 
Overview. 
Overview summary. 
Overview of the overview summary 
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Misc. Touchy-Feely Crap 
Take a picture of you giving yourself a hug. 
Tell yourself you are special 
Be very descriptive 
Make everyone else in your family who you didnt [sic] interview the first 
time listen to your “Strengths” 
Be sure to bring a bag for them to throw up into. 
Bring one for yourself as well. 
Include a sample of the vomit in your portfolio 
Scotch tape your eyes open and repeat your strengths to yourself over and 
over for a whole weekend 
Write a 25 page essay about the experience. (1). 
Here, the instructor teaching within a discourse community of care is confronted with 
dilemma: As the student’s post appeared on the assignment’s homepage, it was the first 
thing others in the class would see when publishing their own work, thereby challenging 
the validity of the assignment and leaving all with the uncomfortable question of how to 
acknowledge the dissent: Endorsement? Ostracism? Ignorance? Wranowsky’s response 
was to remove the offending material and turn to his colleagues for counsel in what 
became a series of email listserv exchanges almost uniformly condemning the student’s 
apparent inability to understand the concept of a “strengths-based approach”4 to teaching 
and learning. Such “privileging of a happy community,” as Roberts-Miller writes, 
“means that dissenters are the problem. When they criticize the status quo, it appears 
that everyone was happy until the malcontents started stirring things up” (552). In this 
instance, the mechanisms of community actively worked to oppress its critics and to 
rationalize incongruent behavior as ignorance – a dangerous hegemony that effectively 
silenced a voice of opposition by means of reinforcing consensus at the expense of 
dissent.  
 The potential for silencing is not restricted to consensual oppression, but can 
manifest in ways of inauthentic approval, often masked under the guise of support. 
While comments designed to make us feel good can certainly bolster self-esteem, they 
                                                 
4 For more on a “strengths-based” approach to teaching and learning, see Clifton and Anderson. 
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can also project a sense of overdone sentimentality (Brookfield and Preskill), going so 
far as to border on the gratuitous or even obsequious. As Massey, Scott, and Dornbush 
note, “under the pressures of teaching, and with all intentions of ‘being nice’ ... 
‘oppression can arise out of warmth, friendliness, and concern” (qtd. in Delpit 45). 
Furthermore, and particularly in response to student writing, comments that focus almost 
exclusively on positive encouragement risk providing students with an unfair assessment 
of their abilities, even denying them the opportunity to extend their understanding 
through challenge and critique. Justification for rejecting the alleged negativity of 
criticism is, however, well-founded: Because it is common for student writers to 
consider their words as representations of themselves (Hillocks), they often perceive 
critical commentary as personal attack (Paul; Brookfield; Lipman; Brookfield and 
Preskill; LaDuc; V. Anderson; Weil; Janks).  As Dickson points out, students become so 
“constricted by the personal” and their “commitment to what they know becomes so 
tenuous that they protect it vigorously” (13), reflecting what Tingle describes as 
“narcissistic vulnerability” (6, 9).  Caring, positive commentary, therefore, attempts to 
bypass the potential for offense or embarrassment by eliminating comments that could 
be perceived this way.  What can be located beneath this text of caring, however, is an 
insidious and imperialistic form of control: As Chomsky asserts, using a phrase from 
Walter Lippman, it operates to “keep the ‘bewildered herd’ – the naïve simpleton – from 
being bothered with the complexity of real problems that they couldn’t solve anyway” 
(25).  
 Overwhelmingly, teachers use positive commentary in the spirit of a genuine 
commitment of care. As Amy Lee notes, most of her students are reluctant to engage in 
criticism that they perceive entirely as negative. Writing in the context of providing 
parameters for peer review, and in a dialogue with herself, Lee claims that “I felt a need 
initially to protect the [student] writers (from what? from whom?) from evaluative 
feedback because I did not distinguish between critical feedback and negative feedback” 
(230). This place of apprehension and misunderstanding of what the term “critical” 
means takes us back to considering “critical” as a muddy adjective. When inextricably 
linked with negativity, critical thinking is a loaded assumption, “a form of social or 
educational bad taste,” with those who think critically parodied as “disgruntled and bitter 
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subversives or as elitist mockers of others’ well-meant efforts” (Brookfield 35).  To 
think critically and articulate that critical thought, therefore, is equivalent to harming 
people’s self-esteem and damaging the psyche – even irreparably – particularly when we 
hear about students who have been allegedly traumatized by prior experiences of 
inadequacy in the English classroom, and I emphasize “English” here as representing the 
context of studying a language, its texts, and the ideas that underscore those texts. 
Writing, and expressing thinking through writing, is by its nature a personalized 
articulation of experience, one that draws from the interpretive parameters of what we 
know and believe – an egocentrism that may well promote the possibility of a true 
introspection. Yet, while conceding that “there is a way of living in oneself that develops 
a great wealth of ... personal images and schemas,” Piaget argues that “at the same time 
it impoverishes analysis and consciousness of self” (209, qtd. in Paul 138). And, it is not 
just students who grapple with what Ellsworth describes as “moments of desire, fear, 
horror, pleasure, power, and unintelligibility” – emotions that are an integral part of 
discussing, analyzing, and writing about text, but that these are, paradoxically, “exactly 
what most educators sweat over trying to prevent, foreclose, deny, ignore, close down” 
(Teaching 46). 
 Although the premise behind critical care is one of concern for students and 
reflects commitment and sensitivity from those who practice it, there are contentious 
elements that can result in a very different outcome than first envisaged. What is 
important to consider is that if we were to posit an alternative to the concept of critical 
care, it should not be a binary opposition of uncaring, but instead a reinscribed 
understanding of caring critically. I will discuss just such a reconceptualization of this 
problematic term “critical care” in Chapter Four. 
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4. Reconceptualizing the Critical 
 
 Various applications of the term “critical” leave an array of approaches ranging 
from formal logic to multiple intelligences to multi/critical literacies and pedagogies. 
My reconceptualization of the critical begins with an amalgamated critique, recasting its 
present parameters beyond existing borders in order to re-vision the possibilities of/into 
de critique. Theoretically, the concept of critical care dominates first-year college 
English pedagogy. An approach characterized by what Moacir Gadotti terms 
“institutionalized pedagogy,” it not only “proposes congruency, empathy, reflection, and 
respect for the other,” but is inherently marked with the problematic mantra that “if 
expressing oneself is all that matters, then all opinions are true” (Paul 60, 68). Yet, as 
Paul points out, students are well-versed in believing what they already believe, what 
serves and preserves their interests, and what minimizes inconsistency and ambiguity in, 
to borrow Danny Weil’s phrase, a “grotesquely individualistic culture” marked by 
“consequent attachments to ego-centric belief systems, prejudices, biases, and 
misconceptions” (2-3). Reconceptualizing the critical, therefore, is primarily concerned 
with ways to challenge students’ thinking and the writing such thought produces by 
circumventing what Moffett describes as “that censorious monomaniac, the ego” 
(Coming 178). This does not mean casting all that is critical into a distant – and, I would 
argue, unattainable – idealized objectivity or disinterestedness; rather, it begins with 
accepting the subjective state, recognizing the phenomenon of individuality as a social 
construction of self (Vološinov; Graff; Castricano), and seeking ways to temporarily 
rescind its ideological manacles. In this light, Paul emphasizes the role of passion in 
terms of ardent commitment, tempered by Brookfield’s advocacy for humility and 
sincerity, and Rosalie Colie’s “profoundly self-critical” re-visioning of self as a paradox 
where, in the process of thinking, the self “turns back on itself to see how it got stuck 
upon the paradox” in order to generate a self-referential reflection. This, in turn, 
constitutes a threat to self of a re-created self (7, 356, qtd. in Berthel 5, 35).  
 For many, particularly those steeped in a pedagogy of care, criticality is 
threatening, even terrifying (Rorty; Colie; Shermis). Yet, opening the possibilities of 
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change – of individual praxis – depends on transcending the borders of who we are and 
what we do. Sigmund Freud, in asserting that perception is filtered through the 
conscious mind and tangibly shaped by the ideological structure of that filtering, argues 
that it is trauma, or the traumatic experience, that can break the protective shield of the 
conscious and subconscious self. As Jacques Derrida posits, once it becomes possible to 
re-vision that self as containing many traces of otherness, many possibilities of centers 
and re-centers that are sometimes reconcilable and sometimes not (“Structure”), change 
becomes genuinely possible. In practice, critical thought seeks disturbance of belief 
systems we take for granted, and to engage in “permanent criticism” (McKerrow; 
Foucault), contradiction and disorientation (Crusius; Shermis), and skepticism that is 
“active yet detached” (Berthel), but also “reflective” (Dewey; McPeck; Meyers; 
Brookfield) as a means to reinscribe discourse as internalized inquiry turning in on itself 
and out again (McKerrow; Castricano; France; Eagleton; Hardin). Critically reflective 
thinking is, therefore, a phenomenological act of critically perceiving ourselves critically 
perceiving, reifying the possibilities of active, individual change. And, it is the 
possibility of change rather than the transformation itself that needs exploring in 
pedagogical application for the first-year college English classroom. 
 
4.1 The Contemporary First-Year College English Classroom 
 In the United States, most colleges and universities mandate either a one or two-
semester first-year English program as part of an undergraduate degree, frequently 
emphasizing writing and analysis that is commonly termed rhetoric and composition. At 
its core is the study of text, whether that text is traditional literature or multi-literate 
“readings” of cultural media. Recent trends have favored writing communities that 
include portfolio assessment and collaborative teaching/learning projects across the 
curriculum. As a majority of students are required to take the course in their first year, 
the college English class is well-placed as a fulcrum to promote skill in critical thought 
and written expression across disciplines. While the goals of first-year college English 
courses depend on the educational philosophy of those who teach them and, to a lesser 
extent, the philosophy of the institution, the objectives of many first-year writing 
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programs reflect characteristics of Radical, Progressive-Humanist, or Liberal-
Conservative philosophies, as in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1 
Pedagogical Philosophies in First-Year Writing Programs 
 
Radical Progressive-Humanist Liberal-Conservative 
Politically motivated Politically pluralist Politically neutral 
Focus: Ideology Focus: Student centered Focus: Teacher centered 
Change social order Enhance social order Maintain social order 
Marxist: Social reality Existential: My reality Essential: Reality of truth 
Critical consciousness Individual contribution Knowledge consumption 
Praxis Constructivism; discovery Direct instruction 
Problem posing Problem solving Problem minimizing 
Radical learning Facilitated learning Mastery learning 
 
Source: Adapted from Sheritt, Caroline. “Education Philosophy.” (Corpus Christi, TAMU-CC, 2004). 
 
Given the discussion of “critical” in the preceding chapters, I posit that critical thinking, 
critical pedagogy, critical literacy, and the concept of critical care are represented within 
this pedagogical framework in the following way: 
 
 Progressive-Humanist Liberal Conservative Radical 
 
Concept of 
Critical Care Decritique? 
Critical Literacy 
Critical Pedagogy 
Critical Thinking 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Fig. 4.1: Characteristics of “Critical” Across Three Conceptual Frameworks 
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Critical thinking, when its focus is on formal and informal logic, use of syllogism and 
enthymeme, positioning of teacher as transmitter of knowledge, establishing objective 
truth through systematic analysis, and adherence to political neutrality reflects a liberal-
conservative5 – or, as many would argue, a traditional – approach to teaching English in 
the college classroom. The concept of critical care, with its pluralist acceptance of 
multiple perspectives, student-centeredness, emphasis on collaborative sharing, 
consensual problem solving, promoting an individualized existential reality, and teacher 
as facilitator is well-situated within a Progressive-Humanist philosophy. Critical 
pedagogy and critical literacy, focusing on political motivation and praxis, 
consciousness of ideologies and their function in a social reality, objectives to change 
the social order, greater interest in problem posing than problem solving, and radical 
teaching and learning techniques bridge a divide between Radical and Progressive-
Humanist teaching, with critical pedagogy slightly more to the left than critical literacy, 
due to the wider applicative scope of the former. The question arises, therefore, as to 
where a reconceptualized critical pedagogy fits in relation to its phenomenological and 
critically self-reflexive goals. Before responding to this question, I will discuss recent 
scholarship that addresses the issue of revising “the critical,” and do so under four sub-
headings: Respect and Empowerment – Critical Writing, Critical Voice; Disequilibria 
and the Egocentric; Reinscribing Caring; and Exile from Self, then discuss these four 
components within a revised framework of writing and thinking in the first-year college 
English classroom.  Finally, and drawn from this discussion, I will outline a 
reconceptualization of the critical as a pedagogy I am calling Decritique. 
  
4.2 Respect and Empowerment – Critical Writing, Critical Voice 
 Reflecting the tenets of a broad-based liberal education, the study of English in 
first-year college classes lends itself to political and socio-cultural awareness, where 
truths, powers, and individual rights circulate within a complex, globalized world. 
Within this milieu, the place of critical discourse is one of intersection in an interactive 
                                                 
5 Here, I make the distinction of “liberal-conservative” to reflect a right-leaning political perspective rather 
than the term “liberal” as a left-leaning position, as in the United States. 
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network (McKerrow 98), where Foucault’s concept of “power, right, [and] truth” plays 
an integral interpretive role. The right to speak leads to truth that leads to power; power 
then leads back to truth or the right to speak, which grants power to individual voice. 
This discursive premise is neatly self-contained, and supports the concept that we all 
have the right to speak and be empowered by our articulated thoughts, and as a right we 
are bound to respectfully grant it to all. Yet, such a triangle-of-righteousness can 
perpetuate as an unexamined privilege; a recursive pattern of justified self-fulfillment 
that is immune from questioning its own discourse as discourse. As Foucault observes, 
when discourse “transmits and produces power, it reinforces it, but also undermines and 
exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it” (Power 92-93, 100-01, 
qtd. in McKerrow 98). Pointing to the duality of discourse, Foucault posits that by 
articulating positions of self we stake a claim of power: the process of speaking or 
writing our thinking is an assertion of our selves and a reinforcement of our right to give 
voice to that thought. In so doing, however, we also open ourselves to confrontation with 
opposing discourse from those with an equal right to voice. The problem in such 
discursive junctions is the real possibility of irreconcilable differences that degenerate 
into disputes undermined by subjective and emotional ardor. The right of “my right to 
speak” becomes not what I am saying, but merely a defense of my right to say it – the 
clichéd and ultimately empty defense of everyone being entitled to an opinion. 
Participants in such a cognitive stalemate are left with little room to maneuver other than 
concede a diluted, respectful agreement to disagree.  
 In the essay “Liberating Inner Speech,” Moffett identifies the problem of 
promoting respect for individual voice. While accepting the right of everyone to hold an 
opinion, his concern is one of students falling into a cyclical trap of reiteration where the 
ideas and beliefs they already hold are processed through the acts of writing and 
speaking, reflecting what is already known and understood, and where “dominant 
emotions, motives, and fixed frameworks ... keep chaining or clustering [ideas] ... into 
the same trains or constellations of thought” (Coming 178). From this perspective, the 
act of thinking and its articulation both move outward from a fixed point of cognitive 
awareness – what I know or what I believe – rather than inward to reflectively examine 
from where such thought emerges. In Moffett’s words, the danger of such “redundant 
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inner speech” is that it serves to “maintain a whole world view of reality, a sort of 
sustained illusion” (176). The way to break recycling of thought, Moffett argues, is by 
consciously engaging alternative perspectives and to vision “a new thought coming 
completely from outside the [student’s] state of mind” in order to overcome “the self-
limiting situation of inner speech” (175). To achieve this, Moffett advocates the concept 
of development in composition – of writing, rewriting, and revising – in order to sustain 
a “line of thought far enough to allow combinations of inner material to occur that has 
not so combined before” (177).  
 Implementing Moffett’s act of re-writing, however, falls short in its application 
when students remain focused on audience and reception. Thinking about meeting the 
expectations of another set of readers does little to promote reflective and critical self-
examination. Instead, we see the practice of tailoring ideas to achieve certain rhetorical 
effects for a specified, pre-determined rhetorical context. This triangulation of 
Audience-Purpose-Rhetorical Effect concentrates on reconciling potential tensions 
between writer and reader, but does not involve the self as observer or reflector, a 
distinction noted by Roland Barthes. Where the self-as-observer is the focus, the writer 
becomes, in effect, an observer of the interaction between writer and reader-recipient 
self – a phenomenological crossing of the borderlines or ridges between what is our 
conscious, constructed self and the possibility of that which is Other. Distinctions 
between the externalized projection of writing-to-audience and the internalized 
reflection of writing-to-self in relation to the Audience-Purpose-Rhetorical Effect 
(APRE) triangle are represented in Table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2 
Externalized Projection and Internalized Reflection: The APRE Triangle 
 
 Externalized Projection Internalized Reflection 
Audience The identified and intended recipients 
of our purpose 
We don’t “know” or recognize our possible 
selves, so in the process of trying to write our 
selves we attempt to know the self that is 
unknown to us 
Purpose Desire to express a set of ideas or 
beliefs to another to achieve a pre-
formulated goal or objective 
By not knowing another self we are limited in 
the rhetorical choices we make. We need to 
think about creating something that is not 
there, and yet is there 
Critical Possibilities  70 
Rhetorical 
Effect 
The word choices, structure, and argument 
we use to best convey our purpose 
The word choices, structure, and argument 
we use to best articulate a critical challenge to 
our thinking 
Why Write? To express our ideas or beliefs To open opportunity for critical reflection on 
our ideas and beliefs 
To Whom? An identified recipient of those ideas and 
beliefs 
An unidentified self-recipient of those ideas 
and beliefs 
For What 
Result? 
To have our ideas and beliefs registered 
and recognized by another; to achieve 
a goal of change or modification to 
serve our own ends or those of a group we 
claim to represent 
To have our ideas and beliefs registered and 
considered by another self; to achieve a goal 
of change or modification that may serve our 
own ends, those of a group we claim to 
represent, or those of a group (or set of ideas 
and beliefs) with whom representation or 
linkage has not before occurred to us 
 
While Moffett confidently claims that awareness of audience and rhetorical effect 
enables students to “truly think for that audience ... [and to] think like that audience” 
(Coming 178), a critically reflective pedagogy is more interested in students recognizing 
how to think for themselves and to reflect on the ideological structures on which their 
own thought rests – a point curiously in keeping with Moffett’s later assertion that “[t]he 
self-incarcerated can liberate themselves if shown how they maintain the walls 
themselves” (180).  To question our thinking is not so much a case of tailoring that 
thought to persuade an audience or fit a rhetorical context as it is imagining ourselves in 
a series of positions that interrogate each other: to seriously consider the possible 
veracity of alternative truths within a shadow-world of shifting possibilities that have not 
yet been realized; to detach ourselves from the privileged belief-system of “our opinion” 
long enough to reflect on and analyze its validity in light of what we learn.  
 This brings us back to the likelihood of dissent, conflicting viewpoints, and 
opposing discursive premises.  If we consider agreeing-to-disagree as an artificially 
imposed stalemate that only reinforces the right to hold opinion, we are left with a 
question of critical direction: Where to go next? Raymie McKerrow claims that critique 
is not impersonal and detached, but rather that the subject, when offering critique, holds 
as its object something that it is against (92). The essence of critique, at least for 
McKerrow, is a fulcrum of dissent, a context where we do not agree to disagree, but 
instead take active steps to show cause for our disagreement – to argue for what we are 
against by looking for difference rather than similarity (96). The dilemma comes when 
our disagreements are bound by social mores of what it means to be respectful and when 
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we are urged to find “structures/plans/policies ... to ensure that teammates ‘play nicely 
with others’” (Wolff-Murphy 1) that our seeking of difference is, by default, cast on 
careful ground. Cognitive attack, therefore, must not be seen as such; instead, respect 
demands that we be mindful of feelings and the reception of our words. Again, we see 
reinforcement of Moffett’s concern with audience and the rhetorical context of 
reception.  
 Citing Robert Hariman, McKerrow states that a “critical rhetoric must be 
grounded on a reconstitution of the concept of doxa” (103), a point that relates not just to 
literal translations of the word as opinion or belief in contrast with episteme as logical 
knowledge and understanding, but in the context of comparison with alethia – literally, a 
truth of “unhiddenness” (104). The praxis of a critically reflective pedagogy is not 
merely about stating opinion or belief, but the stating of opinion or belief in relation to 
what is said and what is not said; a repositioning of alternative opinion and belief as 
momentary truth. As Hariman asserts, the “dynamic of concealment and unconcealment 
(truth) – of authorizing and marginalizing – is the means by which we determine what 
we believe, what we know, and what we believe to be true” (49-50, qtd. in McKerrow 
104) in what Pierre Bourdieu calls a realm of the “undiscussed” (qtd. in McKerrow 104). 
If we accept that our identities are made through interaction with social ideology and 
cultural practice, examination of that identity represents a tension between our 
constructed selves – our what is – and that which drives us internally through our 
psyches – the what was that we repress, or that doesn’t even occur to us could exist. The 
drive for destruction of self that may come from critical examination of the self 
represents a metaphorical death, a process involving attempts to reconcile an identity 
that is with an identity that was along with an identity that could be. To engage in such 
critical self-reflection demands a sense of detachment, a skepticism that who we are is 
not an a priori and self-evidential being, but one shaped by ideological forces we have 
confronted in the process of becoming. If we can momentarily suspend our self-evident 
truths from the tenacious hold of what “I” believe, we can open the possibility for new 
action and thought (Rajchman; McKerrow).  
 Social change, as Illich argues, comes from “neither ideological criticism nor 
social action,” but through “disenchantment with and detachment from the central social 
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ritual” (54). The concepts of disenchantment, disengagement, and detachment are 
imperative in fostering critical discourse rather than respect, inclusivity, and consensus 
that are characteristic of social discourse. Moreover, adhering to the principle that 
everyone is entitled to an opinion denigrates the reality that genuine differences do exist, 
and instead endorses the idea that realities merely need reporting, not argument – a 
perspective that, as Hillocks claims, “undercut[s] the idea of critical thinking” (95). If 
we are dealing with students who are already indoctrinated to a social norm-of-self 
constructed by family, society, and education, then there is little point in acknowledging 
the right to voice that self. Instead, the criticality of discourse is better served by 
reinforcing the importance of critical recursivity back on the self to examine from where 
that voice emerges. Because of this, it is difficult to reconcile calls for absolute respect 
in regard to the opinions of others when it is questionable that we should even respect 
our own.  For critical discourse, it is not a case of tailoring our message and structure of 
meaning for reception by an audience, but of providing a method of analysis that 
promotes “serious intellectual inquiry into the formation of self as well as the 
articulation of selfhood,” and of requiring students to critically examine and reflect on 
their own subject positions “that helped determine their responses in the first place” 
(France 163, 161).  
 While a sense of ownership of ideas lends degrees of subjectivity and sensitivity, 
we need to avoid dichotomizing critically reflective examination of those ideas as an 
objective act that is devoid of personal opinion. Rather, it becomes an act of recasting 
the parameters of objectivity to mean critical examination of our own opinion through 
and by dialogical exchange – with others and ourselves. Borrowing from Hillocks, we 
define our self by what we write, and our construction of that self governs what we 
write. In the first-year college English classroom, a critically reflective pedagogy 
requires that writing assist in the “invention and reinvention of self” (22-23).  If serious 
critique is denied to student writing, even with the best intentions of fostering the 
freedom to speak unfettered by what is dismissed as “destructive” and potentially hurtful 
criticism, we are mired in ground demanding that our commentary is mindful of 
feelings, helpfully considerate, and cautiously “constructive.” To exemplify the 
problematic nature of the latter point, consider the following metaphor: For the student, 
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an essay is a feat of engineering, with walls, windows, door, and roof.  Through 
constructive criticism, we aim to point out problems with design or structure, how a 
loose joist might be tightened or a crack could be patched; that is, working with what is 
already-in-place, the essay is a site of construction and razing the edifice is not an 
option. Yet, the building may be so functionally flawed and so poorly assembled that it 
does not stand up to the scrutiny of critical inspection. Alternatively, it may be so bland 
in content and design that it becomes yet another cubicle in a mass-produced, industrial 
housing complex, devoid of character, substance, and even attempts at originality. 
 Sweet and Swanson see much of the problem with bland and formulaic essay 
writing coming from criteria set by instructors, claiming that asking students to construct 
a “‘well-developed central argument’ (only one argument per writer will persuade) with 
‘significant logical or persuasive evidence’ (logic as ‘rules-based’ and evidence as 
‘objective’) ... beg important epistemic questions” (41). Moreover, the assumption is 
made too frequently that thinking critically involves students looking at “the other side” 
of their own values, beliefs, and opinions (42). This, Sweet and Swanson claim, often 
results in the contrived rhetorical tactic of arguing one way through part of the essay and 
then switching half-way through to argue “the other side,” usually with the ubiquitous 
transitional phrase on the other hand – one that “pops up to neutralize, to balance, to 
adjudicate” (44), but offers little scope for creative and critical thought – the process of 
which is not particularly interested in whether an argument is balanced, fair, reasonable 
or consensual. And, as Tingle argues, it is the conclusions of their thinking that students 
tend to give in their written work, rather than the process through which those 
conclusions have emerged (2). Moreover, and drawing from the work of Eric Carton, 
Tingle posits that such thinking represents a dogmatic and relatively shallow conception 
of self (13). 
 Lamenting what she describes as student essays consisting of “trite if energetic 
proclamations about abortion, gun control [and] capital punishment ... interspersed with 
poorly integrated, often only marginally relevant quotations,” Ruth Stewart calls for a 
revisioned pedagogy with the concept of struggle and frustration at its core (163). The 
“toughest phase” of Stewart’s assignment sequencing is not a polite exchange of 
“weigh[ing] the pros and cons of an issue,” but when students “are confronted by 
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opposing arguments strong enough to make them question the validity of their own” 
(168), executed with, as Paul claims, “the ability to frame dialogical exchanges” (129). 
Rather than seeing the essay-as-product to be constructively reinforced and made 
stronger, both Paul and Stewart emphasize ideas-as-process, or an act of becoming. The 
essay as a document of production is, therefore, not the focus at all; instead, focus shifts 
to the ways in which students engage in the ideas that might – or might not – end up as 
an essay. Within such a revisioned perspective it is not only possible to conceive that the 
metaphorical building-essay needs to be razed, but that the planned ground on which it 
was to be built has not even been cleared of its previous structure.  
 Yet, like the incongruities between Moffett’s assertions and methods-in-practice, 
there is a disconcerting anomaly in the application of Richard Paul’s theoretical premise. 
Paul, in conjunction with Linda Elder and the Foundation for Critical Thinking, has 
produced a “thinker’s guide” to essay writing, claiming that poor writers are not 
incapable of writing well, but instead lack intellectual discipline and the strategies 
needed for improvement.  This problem can allegedly be rectified by providing “a theory 
that links substantive writing and thinking with the acquisition of knowledge” and an 
“awareness of how to design writing assignments that do not require one-on-one 
instructor-student feedback” (Introduction). While impressionistic writing is problematic 
in regards to fostering critical thought because, as the authors point out, our impressions 
and opinions are inherently justified as insightful and right because it is we who hold 
them (3), in practice Paul and Elder’s text falls into the same patina of audience and 
rhetorical effect proposed by Moffett: Writing for a particular purpose, designed to 
achieve a particular effect, for reception by a particular audience.  At best, the result is a 
piece of writing that achieves these goals; at worst, the writing is nothing short of 
advertising copy – the function of which is to sell ideas-as-product for popular and 
palatable consumption.  
 As an initial step in critical essay writing, Paul and Elder advise that first 
understanding the material about which we write is crucial. Given that our ideas need a 
contextual framework in order to make sense to ourselves and those who read them, this 
is a reasonable assertion. Advocating, however, that student writers achieve this 
understanding by paraphrasing is an ineffective strategy. Many students find it dull to 
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rewrite the ideas of others, seeing it as irksome busywork.  Such an attitude not only 
makes it difficult to engage students passionately and critically about their thinking, but 
is one that students are warranted in holding. Consider a radical deconstruction over the 
idea of beginning from contextual understanding: What we are asking students to do is 
not work with their ideas and their understanding of a text – as they have read and 
interpreted it – but to start their thinking process by working exclusively with the ideas 
of someone else.  Only once they have “grasped” what the text is “really” trying to say 
are students then considered in a position to respond. What is being taught here is little 
more than an effective way to measure – or perhaps validate – our comprehension. To 
extend this argument, consider a “model paraphrase” provided by Paul and Elder in 
response to the following quote from Martin Luther King, Jr: “He who passively accepts 
evil is as much involved in it as he who helps to perpetuate it.” The student paraphrases 
King’s quote as: “People who see unethical things being done to others but who fail to 
intervene (when they are able to intervene) are as unethical as those who are causing 
harm in the first place” (15). 
 The student’s paraphrase exhibits good comprehension of King’s quotation, and 
if this – comprehension – were the objective of the writing and thinking assignment, 
then it has been admirably reached. Now, compare a different response, one drawn from 
a student who has engaged with the ideas in a more critically spontaneous way: 
I have a real problem with the references to “he” and this idea of 
passively accepting evil. Why are women excluded – yet again – from 
any state of social power? I suppose women don’t accept evil, whether 
passively or actively. Moreover, what constitutes passive acceptance of 
evil, anyway? And, what is evil? As defined by whom? Is Ken Lay from 
Enron evil? He doesn’t think so – he just defends his actions as ignorance 
and that ignorance isn’t a crime. Yet, if we turn this around and think of 
passive acceptance, as King asserts, as evil, then this starts to weaken 
Lay’s defense, too. But, is Lay really evil anyway? And what are the 
distinctions between what he did in terms of how I perceive it – like, 
getting his grubby, greedy little hands on everything he could take from 
that company and lining his own pockets at the expense of, referring to 
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those tapes of Enron phone conversations, “grandmothers in California” – 
or how he perceives it, as an error of judgment in not knowing more 
about what was going on in HIS company. This brings me back to the 
idea of his company ... I wonder if women would be any different or if 
there’s truth in the concept of that quote (who wrote that?) about absolute 
power corrupting absolutely? ...  
What I have tried to demonstrate is a distinction between formulaic “comprehension” of 
text and critical, subjective spontaneity. Not only is the student able to write her 
thoughts, but at the same time open a means for further dialogue. The student’s 
reference to Kenneth Lay and mismanagement of the Texas-based energy company 
Enron raises many questions in regard to the concept of “ethics” – yet it is an intrinsic 
connection drawn from the student’s own thinking about those experiences, not the 
arbitrary act of “defining what ethics means” in a dry and ostensibly meaningless – at 
least to the student – paraphrase of King’s words.  
 From a 60-page text, Paul and Elder devote 23 pages to paraphrasing, clearly 
endorsing its value as an exemplary tool of, as they term it, “[t]he art of substantive 
writing.”  The latter part of the book focuses on exploration of conflicting ideas, drawn 
from the work on paraphrasing that precedes it. The fundamental problem that persists, 
however, is that such exploration is still working from an a priori point of departure: It 
has not asked students to shift recursively into their own underlying ideas and responses, 
but instead moves outwards from ideas that belong to someone else.  As Shermis asserts, 
the unexamined premises we hold begin a deductive process that systematically informs 
our conclusions, yet if the assumptions are unexamined, “the product of thought is 
undisciplined, random, and disconnected” (9). The concept of an unexamined premise is 
especially problematic when Paul and Elder, towards the end of the book, instruct 
students to analyze the reasoning behind the writing produced by others. Here, we are 
left in a cognitive blind alley, asked to critically analyze the author’s purpose, the 
questions addressed by the author, the “most important information” – there’s no 
reference to the “least” important information, which, on critical analysis, may in fact 
prove to be important after all – the implications of the author’s viewpoint and 
speculation on possible authorial bias. Such a rubric-like checklist does not promote 
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internalized self-critical analysis. Instead, it operates as a self-contained rationale to 
assure ourselves that we have been “thinking critically” provided we answer the 
questions appropriately. The point that remains startlingly unanswered by Paul and Elder 
is thinking critically about whose perspective? Ours, or the authorial intent and 
effectiveness of its delivery? We are back to the Audience-Purpose-Rhetorical Effect 
triangulation. 
 Finally, Paul and Elder’s text presents strategies for instructors to assist students 
in assessing their own and others’ writing through peer critique, a strategy that allegedly 
frees the instructor from being “burdened by extensive grading of papers” (58). Any 
criticism that is offered, the authors state, “must be constructive, indicating where and 
how each paper could be improved” (58), a comment that invokes the metaphor of 
essay-as-building that I discuss earlier in this chapter. Further, it is recommended that 
once peer revision is complete, the students nominate several essays as candidates for 
“best paper of the day” – a process that, under the instructor’s facilitation, is guided by 
“explicit intellectual standards in the assessment” (58). What such practice endorses is 
reification not only of how well a student has comprehended the ideas of another, how 
well that student can paraphrase those ideas, and to what degree the student can then 
mold those ideas into a coherent prose piece, but which student most closely matches the 
already-determined academic matrices established for comparison. With every step 
outlined as a sequential, non-recursive pathway, dependent on the parameters set by that 
pathway and allowing little room for deviation, Paul and Elder’s applicative theory 
reflects many characteristics of “critical thinking” in the way I’ve defined it; that is, use 
of analytical logic, teacher as transmitter of knowledge, establishing objective-truth 
through systematic analysis, and adherence to political neutrality – in effect, a liberal-
conservative framework for the teaching of English in the college classroom. Students 
are not positioned as agents provocateur of their own and others’ thinking, respect is 
maintained for the authority of the text in regard to both its interpretation and further 
application, and empowerment, in this model, is neither individually transformative nor 
radical.  
 The promise of empowerment in a framework marred by urgent social problems 
of race, gender, and cultural conflict is an ambitions aim, one that seeks to enlighten 
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students about social silencing and reinforcing individual voice within a radically 
revisioned society. Touted as a liberatory rhetoric, empowerment can instead operate as 
a hidden curricula of oppression, one based on “a network of assumptions that, when 
internalized by students, establishes the boundaries of legitimacy … since at no time are 
the assumptions articulated or questioned” (Apple 99; see also Pinar et al.). Within this 
context, notions of empowerment become, to use Roger Simon’s term, “woefully 
insufficient” (374). Protected by its alluring promise of liberation, empowerment is 
trapped within its own ideological framework. Simon is a vociferous critic in his 
condemnation of empowerment. First, however, he outlines the way this concept is 
frequently viewed: 
When we hear the word empowerment used in education, it is usually 
being employed in the spirit of critique. Its referent is the identification of 
oppressive and unjust relations within which there is an unwarranted 
limitation placed on human action, feeling, and thought. Such limitation 
is seen as constraining a person from the opportunity to participate on 
equal terms with other members of a group or community ... . To 
empower in this perspective is to counter the power of some people or 
groups to make others "mute." To empower is to enable those who have 
been silenced to speak. It is to enable the self-affirming expression of 
experiences mediated by one's history, language, and traditions. It is to 
enable those who have been marginalized economically and culturally to 
claim in both respects a status as full participating members of a 
community. (374) 
The inadequacy of the rhetoric, as Simon asks, is “empowerment for what?” Instead, and 
drawing from the work of Ernst Bloch, he posits an alternative prescriptive, one that 
“empowers for possibility” and is linked with “educating students to take risks, to 
struggle with ongoing relations of power, to critically appropriate forms of knowledge 
that exist outside of their immediate experience.” This, Simon argues, creates the 
possibility for students “to envisage versions of a world which is ‘not yet’” and, in turn, 
“be able to alter the grounds upon which life is lived” (375).  
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 It is through self-reflective and critical examination that we can begin to address 
the often painful truths that confront us in "taken-for-granted ways of thinking which 
justify war, racism, and indifference to human suffering" (377; Corrigan). Simon 
emphasizes the need for counterdiscourse to open the possibility of new voices for 
students to define and interrogate their own and others’ experiences (378-79). The issue 
for critical pedagogues, therefore, is not one of revealing injustice or oppression – as if 
students are nothing more than unenlightened members of the masses – but to question 
existing truths and consider alternative perspectives we may never have thought 
possible, involving “a serious dialogue (perhaps even a struggle) over assigned meaning, 
over the interpretation of experience, and possible versions of ‘self’” (379). 
  
4.3 Disequilibria and the Egocentric 
 The concept of disequilibria is fundamental to all four “criticals” – thinking, 
pedagogy, literacy, and care – although the applications are distinct. For critical thinking 
within a liberal-conservative framework, disequilibria cannot be tolerated in regards to 
formal and informal logic and is, therefore, systematically eradicated when striving to 
arrive at a logical truth. For critical pedagogy and critical literacy, disequilibrium are 
contentious fulcrums serving as points from which oppressive social forces can be 
identified and challenged, reflecting a pedagogy that aims to instigate praxis. In critical 
care, however, with its Progressive-Humanist principles of respect for multiple 
perspectives, emphasis on collaboration, consensual problem solving, and focus on 
individual reality, disequilibria is a threat that needs defusing through facilitated 
discussion. And, it is because disequilibria is potentially so problematic in critical care 
that I will focus on it here.  
 At the core of critical care is respect for and authentication of individual voice. 
Opinions in the critical care classroom are equally valid, and ground-rules for discussion 
set early in the semester serve to guarantee such transactions. The environment is one of 
nurturing, sharing, and hospitality – a place where students feel comfortable and at-ease 
participating in the respectful exchange of ideas. Disagreement, although not 
discouraged, needs to be phrased carefully and with consideration of the recipient’s 
feelings. Rules governing interaction with colleagues, therefore, involve a commitment 
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to “take turns [in] speaking and listening, always with courtesy and respect” with a 
distinction made between “offering criticism that proves helpful in the revision process 
and making disparaging comments” (Carstensen 1). When disagreement occurs, there is 
an acute awareness that critique can be taken personally, and even equated as attack 
(Paul). The concept of critical care works to negate the possibilities of such contextual 
reception, and it does so by an ardent and unfettered commitment to individual respect. 
 It is not so different to expect the same kind of tolerance and hospitality in 
settings of social exchange. Even the concept of hospitality invokes images of guest and 
host, with the accompanying rules of social engagement determined by a culture 
generally understood by both parties. We listen politely to views that may be different 
from our own, and when we choose to disagree it is enacted in a way that minimizes or, 
preferably, eliminates the possibility of offense.  Yet, given such a framework of 
exchange, people still tend to consider criticality “as a form of hostile interrogation” and 
“come to believe that those who question their ideas and points of view are ... attempting 
to undermine their very being” (Weil 11). Indeed, many students equate critique as 
something negative. The pejorative adjectival semantics of “critical” has construed it as 
“a form of social or educational bad taste. Being critical is seen to have harmful 
consequences, such as destroying others’ motivation or causing irreparable harm to their 
self-image” (Brookfield 35). Other condemnations of criticality are justified by claims 
that “overly critical, overly zealous demands too often result in defensiveness and 
resistance” (Spigelman. “Argument” 81), or that it is a form of “toxic shame” that causes 
students to “suffer from such a negative self-image” that interactions take place in a 
polluted context of self-hate and self-abasement (Bradshaw; Scheff 398; Yager 58). 
Certainly, such environments are not conducive to learning, and therefore we can readily 
understand an emphasis on the need for respect, tolerance, and even the non-judgmental 
in written and spoken interactions. As such, students often actively seek the affirming 
power of saying something – anything – positive in the active pursuit of tolerance. 
However, as Audrey Lorde asserts, “[d]ifference must not be merely tolerated, but seen 
as a fund of necessary polarities between which our creativity can spark like a dialectic. 
Only then does the necessity for interdependence become unthreatening” (112, qtd. in 
Ellsworth, “Empowering” 318). 
Critical Possibilities  81 
 Reducing the perceived threat of criticism in peer critique is a point Rubin 
addresses when she writes of her students “sandwiching” critical commentary between 
positive remarks. What is interesting about Rubin’s approach is that it exemplifies the 
strong place of social discourse in critical care. The tone taken by Rubin’s students is 
conversational and friendly, in peer critiques that average 140 words apiece and 
allegedly identify insufficient explanation and lack of development in the writing of 
their colleagues (383). Rubin claims that 77 percent of the reviews are “couched in 
polite language,” making it “easier for the writer to accept” criticism (386, 385). Given 
the 140-word average, this leaves only 32 words of critique – hardly impressive when 
we consider it is about the same number of words that are in this sentence.  Curiously, 
Rubin also refers to the concept of detachment in her classroom, yet it is more a 
detachment from personal responsibility than the subjectivity of taking criticism 
personally. As she writes, at times her students turn to absolving themselves of 
responsibility for the content of their critiques by appealing to the teacher’s authority, 
such as a student writing “it seems as though we are supposed to have some sort of 
reflective paragraph ... so you might want to add what you learned or got from this 
interview” or “I’m pretty sure that the paper has to be 2 pages long. So she [the teacher] 
might not give you full credit” (386-87). Absolving responsibility, however, is a 
contentious claim if we are to recognize the importance of encouraging students’ 
authority over their own texts and the words and ideas that produce those texts. While 
the social niceties of bolstering confidence and not-being-too-negative are apparent in 
Rubin’s classroom, the result that students feel good about both giving and receiving 
critiques is ultimately only a victory for self-esteem.  
 The dilemma, therefore, is clear: How can students reach a desirable point of 
cognitive struggle and confusion that, in turn, leads to discovery and learning without 
feeling the pain that criticism undoubtedly delivers? This apparent incongruity is a 
further point of contention when we consider that if all those in an academic community 
“should be accorded opportunities to express their views openly, without fear,” it is not 
unreasonable to expect that in such an environment “all viewpoints will be and should 
be critically interrogated” (MLA 159). I emphasize the phrase “academic community” 
because there is a tendency to misalign the tenets of social discourse with that of 
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academia, or what William Coles describes as “clichés about classroom etiquette, that 
code of good manners that can freeze intellectual inquiry” (“Response” 78).  In this 
context, dissent becomes a privilege rather than a place to promote a sense of “academic 
quest and endemic unrest” (Illich 49, 51). Ironically, although driven by a sincere desire 
to not cause offense or tension, what we posit to be sincerity in social situations is often 
inauthentic and actively seeks to evade dissent. For the academic environment, however, 
it is precisely these difficulties and tensions that underscore the development and 
analysis of thought – the learning that Alma Whiteley describes as part of an iceberg 
below the surface that can’t be seen, the “portion that comes through struggle, debate, 
discussion, and thinking” – a part that is not always legitimized by the student (1).  At 
issue is the world of the egocentric and perceptions of its fragility. This raises questions 
about the existence of an ostensibly impenetrable barrier between perception and 
consciousness, something that Freud posits can only be broken through traumatic 
experiences that pierce our protective internal shield of psychical consciousness.  
 As William Coles asserts, it is the trauma of acerbic honesty in criticism that can 
provide impetus to challenge the manacles of personal belief. With an open and 
confrontational style of criticism, Coles exemplifies terse, radical written commentary as 
a way to “shame” students from complacency and to avoid giving false platitudes. Coles 
articulates what many instructors of first-year English courses often see: Student writing 
where “[n]o observation was too trivial to escape oratorical pronouncement; no moral 
stance too obvious to assume” and essays that are “triumphs of self-obliteration ... as 
much a bore to read as they must have been to write” (Coles, qtd. in Yager 66). For 
students to accept a sense of shame is a difficult issue, and “learning to question our own 
belief systems relative to another point of view, and learning to substitute self-
questioning for self-righteousness is ... an often downright threatening process” (Weil 2). 
Conditioned to the mantra of social discourse that mandates the gilt-edged rule of saying 
nothing if we can’t say something “nice,” receiving honestly critical criticism can be a 
crushing experience. Yet, a radical pedagogy inherently carries disequilibria as an 
internal principle of change (Phelps; Salibrici), seeking transformation in learning that 
does not reward students for thinking a certain way, but promotes, as Tingle points out, 
“real psychological resistance – anger, depression, and despair [as] the painful 
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consequences of that narcissistic wounding which must occur as students seek to realize 
and confront their own limitations” (19). These signs of narcissistic wounding should 
not be seen as regression or irrationality from the student, but understood as “the painful 
effects of self-fragmentation” (14-15). 
 Bernard Meltzer and Gil Musolf advance the concepts of shame and narcissism 
into a distinction between two forms of response termed resentment and ressentiment. 
The former is “a feeling of displeasure induced by being insulted, offended, or deprived” 
and the latter “a consequence of explicit or implicit adverse judgments by others” (241).  
Ressentiment, it is argued, is the source with the greatest potential for both individual 
and collective action that in turn leads to social change (251). Foucault, too, emphasizes 
the need to create possibility for transformative change, as opposed to the superficial and 
self-deceiving platitudes that can beguile us into thinking we have been transformed. 
Transformation, Foucault posits, “is never anything but the result of a process in which 
there is conflict, confrontation, struggle, resistance,” and when we reach the stage where 
it is no longer possible to think the way we usually do, transformation of our selves 
“becomes simultaneously very urgent, very difficult, and altogether possible” (“Est-il 
donc” 34). Virginia Anderson, citing Dale Bauer and Kenneth Burke, asserts that Bauer 
believes it is “only where there is division, with its concomitant dissonance and 
instability, can movement or change take place,” while for Burke it is “only when a 
rhetor persuades one of his [or her] own dissident selves can real conversion take place” 
(389, 39, qtd. in Anderson 200). Here is the challenge for the critical pedagogue. 
Questioning the existence of the self can be terrifying, threatening what Tingle cites as 
“ontological security” in the sense of an “elemental doubt concerning the right to exist” 
(Laing, qtd. in Tingle 6). And, in light of challenges to the security of being comes the 
intrinsic need to argue for that being’s beliefs, of arguing for the right to one’s own 
existence (6). 
  
4.4 Reinscribing Caring 
 It is apparent that enacting a radical and potentially transformational critical 
pedagogy is very much concerned with students as individuals – concerned with what 
they think, what they write, and how they reflect on that writing and thinking in active 
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ways. When I care enough to be honest with my students, I take the time to tell them, 
through writing, what I honestly and critically think about their points, ideas, and words. 
It would be easy to siphon off the pile of papers before me with a few check marks, an 
encouraging word or two, and perhaps a line about the need to revise sentence 
fragments. Yet, to do this means that I am disengaging from my students’ writing at the 
same time that I am emphasizing the need for them to become engaged with it. As a 
critical pedagogue, this is an irony I cannot reconcile. What does, however, call for 
reconciliation is how to enact such critical honesty, yet avoid students perceiving it as 
personal attack. Extending Coles’ concept of shaming – an approach also apparent in the 
work of Socrates, Nietzsche, Sartre and Marcuse (Yager; Coles) – many scholars 
endorse the concept of playfulness (Bakhtin; Janks; Derrida; Oakeshott; D. Seitz; 
Giroux; Kenway and Bullen) to foster the type of disequilibria that is characteristic of 
critically reflective thought (Phelps; Salibrici; Roberts-Miller; Shermis; Paul; Ellsworth). 
Others, drawing on the application of disequilibria as a form of exile, see it as a way for 
individuals to move beyond self-imposed ideological barriers and to explore alternative 
cognitive worlds, reflected in the scholarship of Giroux, Piaget, Derrida, Said, Foucault, 
Tingle, and Freire.  In attempting to revision what it is to care, the authenticity of such 
self-inscribed borders is problematic because without critical, self-reflective examination 
of such cognitive frameworks, a priori validation of thought is maintained. Learning is 
not pain-free and should not “feel ‘good’ to all” (Horner 134; Goffman; Lewis; Scheff; 
Ellsworth; Tompkins; Shermis). Engagement in critical thought requires us to move 
beyond who and what we know, and even be willing to see ourselves “in the unflattering 
light of another’s angry gaze” (Delpit 46-47). 
 David Seitz asserts that humor and parody are potentially students’ strongest 
critical tools (507), in keeping with the idea that humor – particularly satire and irony – 
is effective because those who identify with what is humorous, satirical, and ironic do so 
because they understand the framework of comparison within which the points are 
made. To recognize irony, we must see where incongruity is apparent and why it is 
incongruous; for satire, we need to first know the deeper implications of a situation; for 
humor, we need to at least be able to draw parallels with our lived experiences and 
recognize our own investiture in what is constituted as humorous: Simply, we must get 
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the joke. Humor can also offer acerbic social commentary, and this relates to Seitz’ 
qualification of the potential for parody and humor to be strong critical tools. Satire, as 
Hillocks claims, is the key to an “ambience of renewal ... . It offers resources that 
encourage, perhaps demand, seeing in different ways ... [with] all the tools of the satirist 
– diatribe, exaggeration, understatement, symbolism, irony, travesty, and parody” (131). 
Yet, unless we are willing to turn the humor on ourselves, the potential power of this 
tool locates the humorous as a distant Other at which we can laugh or even shake our 
heads in disquieted sobriety at the way things “ought to be,” but are not. If we are to 
engender the possibility of real social change, such concern needs to be internally 
directed as the painful pleasure of examining and reflecting on the way we “ought” to be 
ourselves. 
 The pleasure of consternation in a revisioned critical pedagogy comes from 
investiture by each student. Rather than requiring students to analyze the writing of 
others, this can be better achieved through critical examination of the student’s own 
ideas. The objective is to assist students to move into a cognitive state of being that 
makes a reinvention of self possible, or what Graff describes as a means by which to 
divide ourselves from the text of self; “to generate a second, third, or fourth self to see 
what is written from the outside” (qtd. in Hillocks 7). Moffett calls for recognizing that 
the mind and self “are social artifacts, and [as] the constituents of the self mirror the 
constituents of society, [critical] thought involves ... addressing oneself internally as one 
would address another externally” (Teaching 67, qtd. in Crusius 56). I posit that not only 
are such tools under-used in the critical care classroom, but are actively, if 
unintentionally, prevented from reaching their critical potential by the need to be 
mindful about critique and to whom it is directed. Moreover, clear distinctions are drawn 
between what constitutes private and public spaces. Political satirists, for example, are 
free to caricature politicians by the nature of public life; offer a satirical critique of the 
individual in private life and we may well confront allegations of slander or libel. Yet, 
the pedagogy of critical care, with its referents of warmth, nurture, and home exude, 
endorse, and ultimately privilege a space of private sphere safety. 
 The concept of space and its role in a critically reflective pedagogy is addressed 
by Janks who suggests that critical thought can be granted the interpretive and analytical 
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complexity it demands when we actively move into territories of self-identification, 
desire, the transgressive and the taboo. It has also been described as engagement in the 
profane (Kenway and Bullen), as “disturbing pleasures” (Giroux), and giving students 
“permission to be other than sensible and serious” (Comber, qtd. in Janks 9). Endorsing 
the use of irreverence as “a rebellion against authority and how to transgress the 
restraints of political correctness” (11), Janks claims that “joke work” is effective 
because it operates at a level beneath the consciousness-of-self that can function as a 
barrier to expression of thought. Moreover, it may directly or even indirectly challenge 
the accepted truths of the status quo (12). It opens a means by which we can deviate 
from “discursive policing,” or what Janks describes as offering an invitation to 
transgress the organized “field of the sayable” (13), engaging in what Erving Goffman 
claims is an embarrassment that can be “exquisitely painful” (qtd. in Scheff 397). 
Hillocks alludes that it is the teacher’s role to extend such an invitation by way of asking 
questions “that push at the edges of student ideas” (65), yet I would argue that while a 
teacher may facilitate – or even model – such transgression, the deeper investiture comes 
when it is students themselves who forge new transgressive paths. As Ivan Illich argues, 
such avenues for “real learning” occur when students challenge the ideas of other 
students through exposure to confrontation and criticism, guided “by an experienced 
elder who really cares” (109). Similarly, and describing a constituent point where 
“learning happens,” Ellsworth describes “an ellipse, rather than a circle. Learning 
happens when the very question we asked in order to seek a learning has been displaced 
by the return of a difference, a surprising, unexpected, interfering encounter” (Teaching 
147). 
 I posit that one of the characteristics of a revisioned concept of caring is radically 
honest critique, delivered and motivated by sincere interest in and genuine care for each 
student.  Coles takes a similar position when contending with formulaic student essay 
writing. It is not unusual for Coles to offer commentary that asks the student if the essay 
is “only intended to be another god-damned paper for another god-damned English 
course” (Plural 31), or “[c]ome clean now – didn’t writing this bore [the] hell out of 
you?” (19). Working with concepts of shame, humor, and critical honesty, Coles seeks 
to defamiliarize the cognitive space of an essay and, by extension, the ideas of the 
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student who has produced it. Further, his objective is to radically alter the perceptual 
framework of many students in regard to their education. As Coles writes: 
The students behaved like Students. What I heard from was not 
individuals but The Committee, The Perfect Student, Mr. Corporate 
Identity, which informed me that he had come to college to be Educated: 
to be guided, steered, directed, formed, shaped, molded, and so on by 
teachers (that is, by Teachers) whose sympathy, tolerance, understanding, 
and unfailing goodwill he was sure he could be depended upon to throw 
the switch that would painlessly complete the circuit of knowledge. (I 
was also assured, however, but with no sense of the contradiction 
involved, that of course it was the Students’ responsibility to “digest” or 
“incorporate” his Knowledge into his Own Life, thereby learning to 
Think for Himself. (8) 
The troubling concept in Coles’ caricature of the typical student, however, is the belief 
that teachers are sympathetic, tolerant, understanding; in short, teachers care. To 
rearticulate such caring, if we first consider the binary opposites of these words we can 
then begin to examine their ideological loadings: unsympathetic, intolerant, 
misunderstanding; teacher does not care.  Yet, what constitutes a lack of sympathy, 
tolerance, and understanding depends very much on the contextual framework in which 
it is placed. As a critical pedagogue, for example, I cannot sympathize with nor tolerate 
– and find it very difficult to understand – perceptions of racism or homophobia. An 
intellectualized response, within that critical pedagogy, calls for one of critical 
challenge, argument, and dislocation. In this context, I am not sympathetic, nor tolerant, 
and I will articulate my inability to understand the oppression of another human being 
based on color of skin or sexual orientation. I will care enough about the circulation of 
hatred and social injustice in the society of which I am a part to argue critically and 
fiercely – yet expect the same in return. Such an exchange is not particularly one of 
sharing and in most cases will not reflect the pleasantries of a Sunday afternoon 
barbeque, but entertaining revered visitors is not my purpose as a critical pedagogue; 
critiquing and opening ideas and their ideologies for analysis is.  
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 A radically revisioned critical pedagogue cares deeply for her students and the 
social conditions in which all play a part as members of a society, whether that society is 
beyond the classroom or within its walls. In this light, critically reflective thought and 
the extension of its argument is creative, subjective, and passionate. Such re-visioning 
works against traditional concepts of what constitutes “logical” and “critical” thinking, 
with the associated belief that to be objective is to provide a faithful and balanced 
reproduction of “both sides” of an issue and, moreover, that reason is the antithesis of 
emotion. As Paul writes: 
[W]e must challenge the reason-versus-emotion stereotype, which fosters 
the view that a rational person is cold, unfeeling, and generally without 
passion, whereas an irrational person is passionate but unintellectual. A 
false dichotomy is set up between reason and passion, and we are forced 
to choose between the two as incompatible opposites. (141) 
The synthesis of creativity, passion, and subjectivity, as Crusius observes, achieves 
something that the logic of literal synthesis rejects as illogical; that is, the 
accommodation of contradictions (109). Moreover, as Brookfield claims, “[m]ost 
significant advances in people’s ability to think critically arise out of periods of 
frustration and struggle” (234). Inherent in such struggle are emotions such as anxiety, 
stress, tension, uncertainty, and discomfort (7), reflecting Tingle’s call for “a position 
that is anti-narcissistic, which posits as its notion of maturity the uprooting of 
narcissism” (13).  My reinscription of what it means to care is, therefore, committed to 
the concepts of dissonance, discrepancy, and disequilibria (Brookfield 31). It is not my 
intention to measure success in terms of how many students take on my ideological view 
of the world at the expense of theirs, but that the process of teaching critically reflective 
thinking might make it clear that I care about the possibility of them reconsidering their 
own.  
 
4.5 Exile From Self 
 Subjecting our selves to Delpit’s “angry gaze” of our own construction can be a 
painful act of cognition. One way to alleviate it is to enact an exile from self, of moving 
beyond self-imposed ideological borders to explore alternative cognitive worlds. As 
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Brookfield posits, “[a]ttempting to understand our frameworks of understanding ... is 
like trying to step outside of our physical body so that we can see how a new coat or 
dress looks like from behind” (29). Applied to the college English writing classroom, 
such exploration constitutes a “meta-discursive writing pedagogy” that seeks to examine 
“a position based on personal experience [and] yet transcending it – bridging the 
phenomenological gap” or chasm of the “dialectic between self and culture” (France 
155, 149); an act of venturing out and then coming back to where we began (Eagleton 
48). By way of exile from self, it is possible to see, as France claims, that “our deepest 
aversions may not really be ‘ours’ at all; they may be culturally constituted” in a 
“dialectic of selfhood and subjectivity” (155-56). Critically reflective thinking, then, is 
not an externalized projection of what we are and who we know, but an internalized 
reflection on what we acknowledge our selves as being, with the genuine possibility of 
being something very different.  
 Places of territory can be represented by images of cognitive space, a map of the 
mind that marks the points of our own belief systems with a borderland surrounding that 
space delineated by ridges we do not usually cross. Whatever lies beyond those ridges of 
cognition is an unknown landscape, and there lies the possibilities of alternative spaces 
our thoughts might occupy. When investigating these unknown spaces, we may find a 
self that is a stranger to us, or in Ellsworth’s words, “a loss of the self thought to be here 
and a finding of the self elsewhere, caught up in the different patterns of relations to self 
and others” (Teaching 59). If in light of juxtaposition with our own systems of belief we 
discover an irreconcilable incongruity, we may find it is no longer possible to think in 
ways we have done previously. Part of the self dies and yet, simultaneously, a 
reconstituted part of our selves comes into being. Crossing the ridges or borders of our 
own ideological selves, and subjecting our beliefs to the “considerable strain and 
buffeting” of dialectic movement, represents a journey of adventure, one that resembles 
“the mythic pattern of death and rebirth” (Tingle 6). 
 The importance of the self as an individual undertaking this movement beyond 
its own cognitive and ideological borders is crucial in terms of fostering genuine 
opportunity for change. As Tingle asserts, “critical consciousness requires critical self-
consciousness” (10). Drawing on the work of Giroux, Tingle claims it is not enough for 
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a liberatory pedagogy to merely demonstrate through text and lecture that “the thought 
of our society is ideologically informed,” but that students need active engagement in a 
“critical self-consciousness with respect to the impact of ideology upon their ‘inner’ 
lives,” or what constitutes their own ideology of knowing (Giroux 150; Tingle 2). Tingle 
endorses the concept that once his students “have understood their interpretations as the 
expression of beliefs, they will [then] examine their beliefs in a way that allows for yet 
another return to the text at an even deeper level of complexity” (2). As Burbules posits, 
encounters “with a radically different, unreconciled, and unreconcilable point of view, 
value, voice, or belief can ... cause us to question the horizons of our own assumptions, 
to explore within ourselves ... the possibility of a radically different way of approaching 
the world” (260). Yet, as Aronowitz observes, individuals often resist change, and by 
default invest in the maintenance of their own oppression, because “they recoil at taking 
risk” (9). Critical self-consciousness, however, requires an individual precisely to risk 
losing part of the self, to stand back from his or her own established beliefs about what 
constitutes that self, and be committed to seeing that self as potentially problematic. As a 
phenomenological act, the process of critical self-reflection is a means by which the 
individual positions his or her self/being as alienated, intangible, and unknown.  
 Giroux, focusing on what he sees as a misappropriation of Paulo Freire’s work, 
writes of “border crossers,” those who recognize their own ideological borders and 
transgress them as an intellectual component of the “discourse of invention and 
construction” as opposed to a “discourse of recognition whose aim is reduced to 
revealing and transmitting universal truths” (“Paulo Freire” 2). Mikhail Bakhtin, too, 
asserts that “language, for the individual consciousness, lies on the borderline between 
oneself and the other” (“Discourse” 293). Some, however, find it difficult to accept that 
we are capable of transcending our own ideological borders, claiming that 
disengagement is not only a painful process that will be deeply resented by students, but 
also a prescription for martyrdom (Hoth 1). Moreover, “[m]any students won’t even 
have enough mental energy to maintain a ‘personal belief,’ much less the need to 
‘disengage’ from one, and those who have a ‘personal belief’ aren’t likely to embrace 
the trauma of treating it as a construct” (1). And yet, as Edward Soja presents, the ability 
to separate from and objectify the world is a constituent part of being human: 
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This process of objectification defines the human situation and predicates 
it upon spatiality, on the capacity for detachment made possible by 
distancing, by being spatial to begin with. ... Objectification, detachment, 
and distancing, however, are but one existential dimension of 
consciousness, the basis for only a minimal definition of being. To be 
human is not only to create distances but to attempt to cross them. ... 
Thus, as [Martin] Buber argues, human consciousness arises from the 
interplay ... of distancing and relation. (132-33) 
While the student writer may well distance herself through internalized questioning and 
raise objections to her own ideas, the emphasis is “within the boundaries of his [or her] 
own utterance” (Bakhtin, “Speech” 72). The more critical question is how does one ask, 
guide, or assist a student to see beyond those boundaries; that those boundaries are, 
indeed, an ideological framework drawn from a “very complexly organized chain of 
other utterances” (69). These internalized boundaries are manifestations of individuality 
– yet paradoxically an individuality that has more to do with the influence of others than 
the individual – and it is this “imprint of individuality marking the work [that] also 
creates special internal boundaries” (75). Bakhtin writes of borders as “junctures and 
points of intersection” (“Text” 103), rhetorically asking “[h]ow are the firm boundaries 
of the utterance determined?” As he replies to himself, “[b]y metalinguistic forces” 
(114). It is not, therefore, the linguistic elements of sentence structure that create the 
boundaries of utterance, but the cognate process of joining and rejoining different sets of 
linguistic forces into a coherent whole, and that the whole has meaning, whereas the 
parts on their own do not. Critical thought focuses on a shifting frame of reference; the 
points where boundaries overlap and are, therefore, in a constant state of definition and 
redefinition (Bailin 26). 
 In practice, many students are not equipped to confront such radical concepts. 
Frequently the products of an educational system that rewards memorization and re-
articulation of knowledge for reproduction on standardized tests, first-year college 
students are, in Patricia Braswell’s words, often “reasonably happy and content” when 
they get what they expect: to come to class, to sit, and to absorb (66). When Braswell 
radically altered her teaching in one semester, providing students with the latitude to 
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lead their own learning through critical initiatives, those in the critical control group 
were frustrated with “this ‘new stuff’”:  
They felt that they were having to do too much; they were ... reluctant to 
lead discussions and present workshop findings. In short, they were 
threatened by the whole idea of assuming the responsibility for their own 
learning, of looking through different eyes, of realizing that often there is 
not a “right” answer. ... They were shocked, and – at the outset – quite 
miserable. They got what they did not expect. Rather than sitting and 
absorbing, they came, they thought, and they talked. (69, 68)  
It is not surprising that Braswell’s students were uncomfortable. As Salibrici has 
observed, the constitutive normality of the Western classroom lends itself to students 
who “want to know the truth, any truth, and they want me to tell them”; and, when such 
answers are not forthcoming, students “become confused and disconcerted” (635). Yet, 
although Shermis asserts that some degree of puzzlement, confusion, disorientation, or 
bewilderment is an integral component of self-reflective thinking (30), ironically many 
teachers fear “the prospect of a classroom of students expressing themselves 
vehemently, disagreeing with one another, and ultimately refusing to accept the teacher-
approved and authoritative version of truth” (30-31). Knowledge, however, at least from 
Giroux’s perspective, emerges from “an ongoing process of struggle and negotiation” 
(“Pedagogy” 10), and the role of education as provisional place to engage in knowledge-
building should also be “a place to resist hegemonic authority, unsettle strategies of 
domination ... from a position of engaged self-criticism and as a critical object of 
classroom analysis” (14-15). While Zygmunt Bauman claims that “[t]he trouble with our 
civilization is that it has stopped questioning itself” (6-7, qtd. in Giroux 1), I would posit 
that the real root of the problem is not so much the questioning of civilization, but the 
civility in which we surround our questioning, the primacy we afford to privileging 
veracity of individual truth, and a near-refusal to acknowledge the implication of our 
selves in the ignorance of its cognitively dangerous design. 
 
 
  
Critical Possibilities  93 
4.6 Decritique: The Critical Reconceptualized 
 Opening this chapter, I asked where a re-visioned pedagogy of critique might fit 
in regard to thinking and writing in the first-year college classroom, and outlined my 
discussion in terms of Respect and Empowerment, Disequilibria and the Egocentric, a 
Reinscription of Caring, and Exile From Self. The result is a reconceptualized and 
radical pedagogy I call Decritique, in which respect and empowerment are recast as 
agents provocateur of disrespect and disempowerment: The primacy of self is de-
centered through seeking disequilibria of the egocentric; the concept of care is 
revisioned as caring enough to critique critically; and the individual actively seeks 
temporary exile from the borders of self. Decritique aims to move students towards 
thinking critically not only about their writing, but the thinking that produces the 
writing. The two componential aspects of such critical writing and thinking are 
Deracination and the Detached Intellectualized Space (D.I.S).  
 Deracination stems from the French word déraciner, meaning to uproot from an 
environment geographically or socially, though in the context of Decritique it means to 
uproot cognitively: to criticize, problematize, and complicate points of view in order to 
expose and disrupt their verbal motifs (Bakhtin, “Discourse” 353). The objective is not 
an artificial binary of a both-sides argument that is characteristic of debate: There is no 
two-sided issue, no declared winner, and no presentation of an issue from position-Y or 
position-X. Deracination is more concerned with the process of argument than the 
outcome; indeed, establishing something about which to argue is part of the thinking 
involved. To deracinate is to take a consciously critical stance as a deracinator, whose 
task is to act as agent provocateur in critiquing the expression of thought, and engage in 
a dialogue of deconstructive rather than constructive criticism. Such critique comes from 
both teacher and students (see fig. 4.2). In the teacher-to-student model, instructors 
engage with students by way of critical commentary; students respond by writing back a 
re-visioned work in what is an ongoing process of cognitive advance and retreat. In the 
student-to-student model, students take the role of deracinator, critiquing a student-
colleague’s writing. The student recipient then responds with a counter-deracination to 
further deconstruct the developing dialogue. While the examples given here of student 
deracination and counter-deracination constitute what I call a “deracination set,” such 
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dialogue could continue ad infinitum. Absolved of the need to say something positive 
merely for the sake of it, deracination is a movement of critical recursivity, providing a 
means for students to re-vision their ideas in a process of struggle for meaning and 
“engaged self-criticism,” even when the target of satire is writing they have produced 
themselves (Giroux, “Pedagogy” 14-15; V. Anderson; B. Flores). In deracination, 
everyone gets the point of parody because all have been part of its construction. From 
the instructor comes a refusal to see students as anything less than scholars-in-training, 
as learners who need to recognize the parameters of their own knowledge and to 
experience the exquisite pain of creating possible change. 
 A crucial accompaniment to deracination is willingness from students and 
instructor to operate in what I have termed the Detached Intellectualized Space (D.I.S). 
Because many students perceive the nature of critical inquiry to be hurtful, deracination 
requires a conscious decision to desensitize our responses; an agreement to not take 
criticism personally. It involves asking students to momentarily assume a different self, 
aligning with the Vygotskian ideal of “an imaginary space in which the self attempts 
new identities” (Yager 59; Vygotsky), and to step into an unreal world of the Bakhtinian 
carnivalesque, a “sociolinguistic fun fair” (Richter 725) where there is a sense of 
flouting prevailing truths and authorities (Bakhtin, Rabelais 11). Within the D.I.S, points 
and contentions can be quite literally pulled up by the roots – deracinated – and because 
there is a conscious commitment to operate within this detached space, critical 
examination occurs without the perception of it as personal attack. Within the D.I.S we 
can anesthetize the potential pain of critique to our selves. We are free to write 
something that is not nice, and we agree to evaluate the merits of what is written without 
allowing slighted feelings to color the words we choose. No longer do we need to be 
mindful of the standardized rules of social discourse. We need not concern ourselves 
with the idea that if we cannot say something nice, we ought to say nothing at all. The 
D.I.S is interpellation of self into a public area of carnival, where rules are free to be 
transgressed. And yet, it is an intellectualized space: name-calling or obscenity is 
regarded as ungrounded in intellectual inquiry. To use Derrida’s term, the D.I.S is a 
“borderless” space in which we are free to temporarily rescind our ideological truths 
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without fear of consequence. It is a place of Bakhtinian “publicistic discourse,” a shared 
space of critical possibilities.  
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 Fig. 4.2: Model of Decritique: Deracination and the D.I.S. 
4.6.1 Implementing Decritique 
 When walking into a Decritique classroom on the first day of semester, one of 
the first concepts I introduce to my students is that “confusion is good,” a statement that 
often results in quizzical expressions and sometimes laughter. It is good, I emphasize, 
because if we have no confusion then we are perfectly clear about an issue or situation 
and therefore have no need to learn more about it. Confusion, however, comes in 
different guises, from mildly disconcerted doubt that something just doesn’t seem right, 
to total bewilderment, or anywhere in between. I reinforce the idea that what we do with 
this confusion constitutes the parameters of our own critical thought: We recognize a 
need for change and take the initiative to consider alternatives as genuine possibilities. 
Recognizing the need for change involves giving credibility to our confusion, 
acknowledging it as though a puzzle piece were missing or that the piece we have in 
place does not fit after all. Inspiration to implement change, once recognized, is also 
grounds for confusion – for as learners we can be unsure about how to modify our 
understanding. In short, because we haven’t cognitively “been there,” we don’t even 
know what “there” looks like. I tell my Decritique students things I would not ordinarily 
consider saying: That their class will be a critical one, that they will find me acerbic and 
direct, that I have no interest in knowing about internet down-time, grandmothers who 
are dying, issues, problems, work schedules, or tyrannical bosses. Typically, the 
response of students is a stultified silence that momentarily leaves me with a sense of 
dread, and inevitably I ask myself what is it that I’m trying to achieve? My answer is 
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that I’m trying not to take the pallid and colorless “you’ll be fine” with plenty-of-
encouragement route, and that my critical commentary is in keeping with the degree of 
criticality that I posit is effective. Still, initial meetings with my Decritique students 
carry an inherent sense of fear that I’m walking on the edge of an abyss. 
 There are four applications of criticality through writing in the Decritique 
classroom: The two primary forms focus on critical responses made by teacher and 
students to formal essays, with the more traditionally accepted terms for teacher 
commentary being “grading,” “evaluation,” or “marking,” and for students “peer 
review” or “peer critique.” The secondary application is used in less formal writing, for 
this study delivered through use of asynchronous electronic discussion forums – both 
“open” and “private” – within the educational software package WebCT.  The concepts 
of “public” and “private” are important in Decritique, and characteristic of both the 
primary and secondary forms of its application. As Brookfield asserts, a crucial tenet of 
critically reflective thought involves “alternating phases of analysis and action” (23), or 
what I term “advance and retreat.” The rationale behind public, open advance and 
private, reflective retreat seeks to exemplify a concrete re-cognition of the difference 
between our public and private thoughts (see fig. 4.3). Because student perceptions of 
self are often cast into immutable frameworks of “what I believe,” it can be initially 
difficult for them to re-cast their conceptual views of the world into discrete private and 
public spheres.  
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Fig. 4.3: Four Applications of Criticality Through Writing in the Decritique Classroom 
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Here, Stephen Brookfield and Stephen Preskill offer a useful semantic comparison that 
assists students with this transition, making a distinction between “discussion” and 
“conversation.” Discussion, they claim, “is a way of talking that emphasizes the 
inclusion of the widest variety of perspectives and a self-critical willingness to change 
what we believe if convinced by the arguments of others” (xv). Alternatively, and 
drawing on the work of Matthew Lipman, conversation “seeks equilibrium, with each 
person in turn taking opportunities to speak and then listen but where little or no 
movement occurs” and the exchange of thought takes place in an atmosphere of 
prevailing genial cooperation (4). Discussion does not seek consensus, but rather 
disequilibria. It is a risky and unpredictable process whereby “each argument evokes a 
counterargument that pushes itself beyond the other and pushes the other beyond itself” 
(Lipman, Thinking 232, qtd. in Brookfield and Preskill 5). The classroom where 
distinction is not made between discussion and conversation risks a misplaced 
understanding of what constitutes critical discourse, one with only “some vague sense of 
people remaining cordial” (Roberts-Miller 538). 
 The precept of cordiality, characteristic of critical care, focuses on public space 
at the expense of private reflection. Moreover, it is a public space construed by the rules 
of social discourse. Here, Brookfield and Preskill warn of inauthenticity lapsing into 
bland tolerance that, because almost any comment is acceptable, leads to “the 
meandering classroom conversation” that is devoid of developmental depth (16). Those 
who challenge the niceties of conversational exchange are considered argumentative and 
frequently condemned for violating the rules of engagement. Alleged perpetrators are 
silenced, either through public beration or silent ostracism (Roberts-Miller 552). To 
circumvent the quashing of dissent a model of teaching is needed “that makes conflict 
not simply a preliminary step toward consensus but a ‘public space where students can 
begin to form their own voices as writers and intellectuals’” (Harris 116, qtd. in Roberts-
Miller 555). Such a model also needs to act as “a public space in which people do not 
simply speak to each other but one in which they listen. And one in which they argue” 
(555). While attaining consensus may provide a sense of closure, expecting an outcome 
of neat resolution is unrealistic and unnecessary in critically reflective thinking and for 
Decritique. While disagreement runs the risk of exacerbating inequalities and 
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differences, the alternative is to accept the ongoing inequity of the status quo 
(Brookfield and Preskill 28).  
 Consensual endorsement of the status quo is not, however, eliminated merely by 
the presence of dissent. Equally, there is risk of impasse where dissidents merely agree 
to disagree. The importance of private space retreat is apparent when dissenters cannot 
be accommodated; moreover, students inexperienced in critical argument can feel deeply 
threatened by challenges to their beliefs and resort to belligerent claims about the 
validity of “my opinion,” or even seek refuge in a disaffected silence. Neither is 
desirable.  As Brookfield points out, there is little purpose in “practicing a devastating 
critique ... if people are insulted or intimidated in the process” (72). While responses that 
dissolve analysis into a defensive mechanism of subjectified name-calling or 
personalized attack offer little in terms of the possibility for critical self-analysis, a 
response of silence holds promise in harnessing the essence of personal opinion within 
the safety of retreat as a place to “consider the different – the other – and to ponder the 
fragility of our own identities and our own ideals” (Brookfield and Preskill 20). 
Removed from the fear of exposure to ridicule or condemnation through public 
performance, students in private retreat can reflect on issues and contentions that 
challenge their own perceptual and cognitive frameworks, safe in the sense that their 
deliberations are removed from the potential hostility of a critical, public gaze. In such a 
space, students can risk failing “without feeling that in doing so they have actually 
failed” (Brookfield 74-75). Public and private spaces are, therefore, complementary 
aspects of critically reflective thought, where it becomes possible for one to both 
participate as a member of a discourse community and also risk alienation from its 
boundaries (Petruzzi 324). Movement between the public and the private spheres of 
discourse are, in Jamie Beth Berthel’s words, a paradox of self-effacement and 
confirmation where the subject seeks to both affirm and extinguish itself (8). 
 In terms of responses to student writing in the Decritique classroom, public space 
criticism comes by way of deracination in which all participate; the dialogue of private 
space critique is restricted to the instructor and each individual student. Yet, regardless 
of whether public deracination or private evaluation of student writing, critical 
commentary is driven entirely by a focus on what students have written, just as if a 
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spoken conversation were taking place. Students, in turn, respond to the commentary, 
contributing to the development of critical dialogue. This interactivity minimizes 
measurement solely against pre-determined criteria and links discourse directly to the 
teaching and assessing of writing (Huot). The expression of thought, therefore, is not 
condemned to meeting the parameters of a rubric; instead, students engage in 
“rethinking cherished assumptions and ... subjecting those assumptions to a continuous 
round of questioning, argument, and counterargument” (Brookfield and Preskill 7). 
Critique is blunt, but contains a combination of sobriety and humor. Student assertions 
such as “racism is a problem and something has to be done about it” are likely met with 
a term borrowed from William Coles: “And who might take this issue on? The ‘Jolly 
Green Giant’? What about some critical interpretation on this issue?” Another example 
is in response to the pedantic this-essay-will-show proclamation: “Why state the 
obvious? Do we need the pre-emption here? What about some critical reflection on 
themes, symbolism, characterization, and interpretation of these rather than some bland 
announcement about something that will ultimately be evident – or should be.”   
 Clearly, students need to be prepared to accept such critical remarks, reinforcing 
the importance of agreement to operate in the D.I.S. Yet, there also needs to be 
commitment to the recursive practice of revision and rewriting, and it is for this reason 
that the first essay submissions in the Decritique classroom often receive a “non-grade” 
of Draft. Although students who are locked into the expectations of writing as a finite 
product find this frustrating – at times preferring the concrete failure of an F – assigning 
a draft status shifts the focus from measuring a piece of writing against a pre-determined 
standard to a statement about the writing as a work-in-progress. While the former 
ostensibly indicates hierarchical sorting of student ability, the latter is concerned with 
critically developing the thought that underscores the writing. The objective is to 
demand cognitive excellence from all, or what Brookfield and Preskill cite as “hold[ing] 
our students to a higher deliberative standard” – but one that can be risky if imposed too 
early (15). While eventually every assignment needs “a grade,” the process of 
establishing where that mark will fall initially needs to be fluid, undetermined, and open 
to the possibility of excellence. Through deracination, instructor commentary, student 
responses, and opportunity for revision, I want my students to engage in cognitive 
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possibilities and alternative modes of thinking that previously they may not have 
considered, underscored by the potential to initiate change on their own accord. 
The place of peer critique in the first-year college English classroom is widely 
endorsed, with its touted benefits ranging from collaboration and shared knowledge-
building among a community of learners, to students’ active engagement with their own 
writing and its assessment, to providing opportunity for critical dialogue, to lessening 
the burden of teacher-grading. As a concept, peer critique has merit. Encountering 
“equals who hold ‘inconvenient’ opinions” is a potentially powerful force: “We cannot 
skip or skim contrary views that are expressed by peers in the same way that we can skip 
a few paragraphs in a book or tune out parts of a lecture” (Brookfield and Preskill 23). 
Peer critique also provides opportunity for practice in assessing writing, a skill many 
first-year students lack. Entering college with “strict, text-based notions of how to judge 
writing,” students are “ill-equipped to make the kind of evaluative decisions ... that our 
pedagogy expects” (Huot 169). Indeed, even the most adventurous revisions tend to 
place superficial focus on correcting grammar and mechanics, as indicated by one 
Decritique student who was reflecting on her prior experiences with peer critique: “In 
our revisions and rewrites we paid attention to punctuation and word usage. Instead of 
giving the student ideas on more convincing arguments or better reasoning, we corrected 
their spelling errors.” The student’s observations reflect what Brian Huot asserts is a 
lack of “experience of instruction in ascertaining the value of one’s own work,” and that 
this is a “crucial missing element in most writing pedagogy” (169). 
 A major part of what drives superficial responses to peer critique is not so much 
an inability to critically comment on the work of others, but a genuine fear of delivering 
honest criticism in the belief that it may cause offense. As such, students experience a 
sense of restrained latitude about what is acceptable to write, especially if their names 
accompany the critical comments (Brookfield and Preskill 50). While the fear of 
providing such commentary could be circumvented by students remaining anonymous, 
anonymity clouds the authenticity of discourse – endorsing the need to hide; it is a form 
of deception that undermines the honesty of individual authority over ideas. There is no 
doubt, though, that such fear is genuine, as expressed by another Decritique student: 
“Every time I read critiques about my work, I feel my ego being put through great 
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torture ... feeling like I am falling from a skyscraper to my inevitable doom on the 
concrete sidewalk.” And yet, while Brookfield and Preskill claim that anonymity “means 
that participants can be as brutally honest and critically frank as they like, with no 
possibility of recrimination” (50), I would argue that an ideal critical context is one 
where brutal honesty and critical frankness are given and taken freely without fear.  
Underscoring critical exchanges with an understanding that all are working within a 
detached and intellectualized space is one way to minimize such fear. Moreover, it 
enables students to engage in dialogue that is authenticated with “public” use of their 
names in an environment where “[a]sking impertinent questions” becomes acceptable 
because all are doing it (Brookfield 116).  
 We should not, however, disengage entirely from the idea that fear, or even 
incertitude, is something to be avoided if it can be harnessed to motivate change. When 
students are encouraged to defend their ideas and disagree with others they attain a 
meaningful stakeholding in the classroom (Hillocks 65-66). Deracinations focus on 
writing that is both produced and critiqued by students. As a result, the students’ 
investiture and interest in the assignment is high, and they hold little deference to teacher 
authority. Through collaborative exchange it is the students, often to their initial dismay, 
who determine word length, content, direction, degree of argument, and veracity of their 
points, often in written critiques that produce 800-1000 words apiece – although there 
are no prescribed word-counts. Initially guided by one or two critical examples provided 
by their instructor, students see the painstaking attention to small incongruities, the 
presentation of “possible distorting factors in meticulous detail” (43), and are exposed to 
“the complex and frightening underbelly of the simple solutions and comfortable 
opinions they have entertained” (V. Anderson 210).  
When asked to “do deracination” students are active participants in examining 
their colleagues’ texts in ways that they determine are critically appropriate. As 
instructor, I do not provide students with a check-list of points against which to measure 
their critiques. Although I may, borrowing from Richard Coe, “advocate perspective by 
incongruity, it is not I [as teacher] who provides or generates the perspectives” (640). 
The only stipulation is that criticism is detached, which means that students write about 
a piece of writing, not to the author who has produced it, and so – as in conventional 
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scholarly criticism – the pronoun “you” is substituted by the author’s last name. I am 
also clear in drawing a distinction between deracination and the more traditional tenets 
of debate. Deracination is not, in Berthel’s words, “the superficial, practical difference 
of winning or losing. The residing sense of competition within that difference results in 
self-righteousness when we win arguments and alienation when we don’t, neither of 
which is appropriate in academic discourse, which should promote the detached 
skepticism of critical inquiry” (3). There are no declared winners and no remonstrated 
losers in deracination; the evaluative merits of critiques are discussed within their own 
contextual parameters, and assessed in turn through counter-deracinations. The 
arguments contained within such a deracination set constitute their own comparative 
bases where, by operating within the D.I.S, “the mind of the subject can be at once the 
investigator and the thing investigated” (4), or what Jodey Castricano describes as “the 
production of an uncanny imaginary space: of writing and reading the other writing and 
reading (the other)” (131). 
 For students used to giving their teachers precisely what is wanted in relation to 
clearly stated evaluative criteria, this is a liberating experience – and for many, a 
frightening one. Working in the D.I.S is designed to defuse and diffuse that fear. By 
operating within the D.I.S, students are free not to be themselves and, because it is 
accepted that the text is under analysis – not the writer of that text – then it is 
permissible and possible to consider ideas as fraudulent, weak, fallacious or even inane. 
As Foucault asserts, we need to “stop treating thought – this essential thing in human life 
and human relations – lightly” (“Est-il donc” 33), and instead create genuine possibility 
for transformative change. There is nothing easy about transforming oneself, and 
Foucault does not promise it. Yet, confronting this difficulty, dealing with it, examining 
it, and reflecting on it in an atmosphere “agitated by permanent criticism” is what makes 
genuine transformation possible (34).  
 Apart from formal essay assignments and deracinations, critical engagement with 
ideas in the Decritique classroom occurs with informal writing, both publicly and 
privately. In application, opportunities for such writing works effectively when using 
electronic, asynchronous discussion forum “posts” – or text-based messages – because it 
allows for both timely responses and a detachment from the reality of time, space, and 
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physicality that is characteristic of face-to-face discussions. In public forums, students 
are asked to participate in open discussion of ideas that emerge from the texts being 
studied in the classroom, and interact with one another through written responses that all 
can read and review. As such, public forum writing is a means by which students can 
advance their thinking and informally test its reception by an audience in a discourse 
that itself “stimulate[s] discussion rather than remain[ing] something to be graded” 
(Crusius 49). Yet, while the public forum offers a way for students to articulate their 
ideas and receive commentary from their teacher and peers, it also carries a sense of 
caution designed to disavow the fear of ridicule. Frequently, students will preface their 
open forum discussion posts with concessionary and apologetic comments that serve to 
unfairly excuse a lack of critical assertion, such as “this is only my opinion.”  As a 
critical pedagogue, I need to ask how I can validate that opinion as worthy of critical 
debate rather than one deserving conciliatory and even paternalistic tolerance.  
 I have found the answer in adapting the idea of a colleague at the college where I 
teach.  In many computerized educational programs, including WebCT, there is no limit 
on the number of discussion forums that can be constructed. Given this ability, my 
colleague created individual discussion forums that are designated as private; that is, 
each student has an individual forum accessible only by that student and the instructor, 
and he calls these private forums Individual Portfolio Journals, or IPJs. As a private 
space for discussion between teacher and student, the IPJ provides a place for retreat 
both from the rigors of critical commentary characteristic of deracinations, and from the 
inherent tentativeness of exploring and expanding opinion in the public forums. In the 
IPJ, I can bring out points made by a student on the open forum and, through 
questioning, seek to extend a critical analysis of such opinion – one that is separated 
from the scrutiny of public vision. As a place for critical reflection, the IPJ provides a 
means by which students can comfortably engage in minimizing the perceptual barriers 
of social discourse by way of respite from the uncomfortable nature of open, critical 
commentary.  
 A word of caution is needed here, however. As a re-visioned critical pedagogy, 
Decritique does not validate the authority of individual voice, or the “rhetoric of 
individualism ... [as] a search for the ‘true self’” (Benesch, Critical 71; Berlin). 
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Decritique emphasizes the possibility for exploring a “false” or “untrue” self – precisely 
the place where seeds for change can most fruitfully be sown. In the act of genuinely 
considering who we are not, we provide for ourselves a reflection of that which we are. 
The concept of possibilities is an internalized perspective in the sense that seeing 
through the lens of another’s perceptual framework allows us to look more closely at 
who we think we are. In this light, does it become possible for a left-leaning feminist to 
convincingly argue a right-wing misogynistic line of logic? Yes, it is possible. We may 
come away from such an experience with a slightly altered conceptualization of self, or a 
radically deviant one, or one that has not changed at all. The outcome is not a concern; 
the possibilities contained in the process is because it allows us to re-vision the 
framework on which our beliefs depend, and to recognize that the potency – or 
impotency – of those ideological parameters depends on where we choose to invest our 
ideas.  
 Decritique does not erase difference, but highlights it, explores it, examines it. It 
seeks not consensus, but dissensus; to bring to light the things that cannot be said, or that 
we believe cannot be said. In the process, we watch our selves as phenomena in action, 
interacting with other selves in a carnivalesque hall of mirrors where our selves are 
reflected as reflections we may never have seen before. And, while Decritique is 
concerned with elements of identity and how identities are influenced by constructs of 
race, culture, and gender, it is not so concerned with implementing real and radical 
externalized change to social relations as it is to focus on internalized reflections of the 
construction of identity. It pushes for individuals to recognize the possibility that they 
may want to change on their own volition. The critical core of Decritique is developing 
skill in cognitive fluidity, with the resulting ability to transcend and temporarily suspend 
established ideological belief. This latter point is the most contestable part of my 
hypothesis, with sharp criticism levied at both the possibility and even the desirability of 
students being able to transcend their own ideologies. The “cultural logic” of what 
makes sense to an individual in a self-contained and self-justifying way within cultural 
parameters is, my critics argue, an integral part of the freedom of individuality. The 
chapter that follows seeks to address such concerns, providing a theoretical explanation 
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and discussion of the possibilities for such a transcendental phenomena, and justification 
for its application in a radical, re-visioned critical pedagogy such as Decritique.  
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5. Theorizing Decritique: The S-Sense of All S Are P in the D.I.S. 
 
 The theory of Decritique rests on two principles: Deracination as an acutely 
critical form of inquiry that actively interrogates textual incongruity so as to destabilize 
what otherwise appears as a stable system of thought (de Beaugrande 554), and the 
Detached Intellectualized Space (D.I.S.), as a temporary attitude or moment of noetic 
reflection where truth is perception as much as perception is truth in order to concretely 
imagine the possibility of change. Drawn from Edmund Husserl’s pure phenomenology 
and Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction, within the theory are threads of paradoxical 
interplay as binaries expressed in the form of what Derrida would call an aporia: 
truth/fiction; stability/instability; concrete/imagined; identity/erasure; presence/absence. 
Unsure whether to take itself seriously or not, the dichotomous tensions are apparent in 
the intensity of conviction and certitude cast alongside the frustration of ambiguity and 
confusion that together constitutes logic in illogicality. It recognizes the real only to 
conceptualize the non-real, and in doing so disturbs the ground in which truth is 
firmly/tenuously planted.  At once both protagonist and antagonist, its own conflict 
comes in terms of deracination as brutal, ruthless agent provocateur and the D.I.S. as 
mediating conciliator. The essence of Decritique is, therefore, a spatiotemporal moment 
where sentience, sapience, perception, and paradox affirm the impossible possibility that 
indeed all S are P.   
 In light of such a theoretical framework, the relationship of deconstruction to 
deracination is apparent in the identification of incongruity, the binary oppositions, and 
the freeplay of ideas inherently situated within a stable system of thought. Theorizing 
the D.I.S, however, is problematic due to the tensions in Derrida’s reading of Husserl’s 
concept of the transcendental attitude. In keeping with deconstruction, such tensions do 
not need metaphysical resolution in the attempt to locate consensual ground, but are 
examined here in the sense that the premise/promise of Decritique is most animatedly 
illuminated in tracing the adumbrations between two contrasting perspectives. This 
moment of incongruity now (and) here is paradoxically one of nowhere: A question 
posited, but never answered, by Derrida to an issue never addressed by Husserl, 
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involving the essence of Husserlian pure phenomenology. The transcendental attitude, 
itself essential to the D.I.S., is a space where it is possible for the self (first person) to 
talk to the self (second person) about the self (third person). The third person, therefore, 
constitutes an objective presence of being, or, as Derrida claims on behalf of Husserl, a 
“pure and irreducible core of expression” as the essence of objective truth (Speech 73). 
Such a transcendental, objectified internal discourse constitutes the essence of 
Husserlian expression and, therefore, meaning. For Husserl, “expression” is not merely 
the act of “expressing oneself,” as one might expect to find in a psychological self-
analysis – of coming to discover a truth of intentionality – but of “expressing oneself 
about something” (Husserl Ideas I §7, qtd. in Derrida 73, emphasis added). While 
simultaneously critiquing what he sees as the inescapable metaphysical nature of 
Husserl’s own claim to anti-metaphysicality, Derrida deconstructs the syllogistic logic in 
the assertion – paradoxically through syllogistic logic of the universal affirmation that 
“all S are P.” 
 In this universal statement of logic, the term S refers to all things while P is the 
predicate that is affirmed or rejected in relation to S.  From this position, Derrida posits 
that Husserl’s transcendental reduction, of “talking to oneself” cannot be a “‘talking to 
oneself about oneself’ unless this can take the form of a telling oneself that S is p” (74).  
This, Derrida argues, constitutes an impossibility. S cannot be a person substituted by a 
personal pronoun because “in all real speech the personal pronoun has merely an 
indicating value” and, therefore, no truth value (73). In linguistic analysis of the verb “to 
be” in “all S are P,” the copula “are” – as representative of third person indicative – is 
not a statement of fact; thus, all S are not P.  From a perspective of logic, an argument is 
valid only if its truth value is affirmed; in the case of Husserl’s transcendental reduction, 
analysis by way of this universal statement shows that it is not. According to Derrida, 
then, the claim that the essential and objective presence of truth can exist – can be – in 
the transcendental attitude is negative.  
 Such tensions initially augur poorly for the possibility of the D.I.S. in Decritique.  
To salvage the possibility of a transcendental “I,” one that can re-present an objective 
truth to the subjective “I,” we must first consider Husserlian phenomenology as ontic, 
related to things, rather than ontological, related to being. In this way, it is possible to 
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alleviate Derrida’s critique of Husserl by showing the way Derridian différance and the 
traces of absence/presence complement Husserl’s concept of Verstellung, or the 
potential potency of faint, interwoven fragments located within what is and what is not. 
To begin, we will accept the first person copula of I am to the third person indicative, 
he/she/it/they are. What (the thing) I am is subjective; I know what it is this “I” sees, 
hears, smells, tastes, touches, and believes. I cannot say the same in terms of he, she, it, 
or they. Although I can observe the third person from a position of objectivity, I cannot 
reconstitute this as a re-perceived subjective truth for I have no way of knowing the third 
person other than through my first-person subjective lens. In terms of Husserl’s concept 
of “talking to myself,” I can say – in an accusatory and reprimanding second-person 
sense – “you did not mow the lawn yesterday.” But if I am speaking in third person, that 
“Becky did not mow the lawn yesterday,” inherently I am speaking about something/one 
that is not this I and that I can never know. I do not know a thing that I am not; therefore, 
a transcendental space and place of knowing that I can not perceive as truth is not truth.  
 Recalling Derrida’s assertion that in order for Husserlian transcendental meaning 
as essential truth to be true – that “I” can tell “myself” that “all S are P” – let us consider 
examining what I am not, that I am no/thing, in light of the universal statement as both 
graphic representation and syllogism: 
 
S P  
 
 
 Fig. 5.1: Graphic Representation of All S are P 
 
Graphically, Figure 5.1 represents the overlapping of S and P in a Venn diagram. 
Syllogistically, we can cast the following statements, then re-examine the representation 
in terms of its constituted truth/affirmation: 
 
 Nothing is both S and not P 
 No S is P 
 Nothing is both S and P 
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Logically, if nothing is S, then nothing constitutes the space of S. If nothing is not P, 
then nothing cannot constitute the space of P; therefore P is some thing. If no S is P, 
then P constitutes no thing of S. If nothing is both S and P, then no thing can constitute 
both S and P. 
 
P 
 
S 
 
 
 Fig. 5.2: Erasure/Absence of S and Affirmation of P 
 
The result of such reasoning is that the presence of S is erased (fig. 5.2). Because S 
cannot be constituted in the space of P, S shows its presence only through its absence. 
Can I tell my self, therefore, that all nothing is something? Patently, logically, I cannot: 
 
 Nothing is both I am not (S) and not I am (P) 
 No I am not (S) is I am (P) 
 Nothing is both I am not (S) and I am (P) 
 
Here, S signifies no thing/nothing in relation to the signified P, I am; in this case, it is 
not possible for me to know anything but a truth that is present to me as subjective 
knowing. Objective truth is absent. All that is possible from this Derridian critique of 
Husserl is truth cast as subjective idealism – a paradoxical placement of truth and 
meaning as an idealized fiction, and therefore not truthful or meaningful at all. The 
transcendental attitude, then, is one of intention rather than expression of meaning. The 
logos of truth cannot be affirmed in a space of absence/nothing; rather, truth is 
constituted in the presence of the word that can carry meaning. 
 True to Husserl’s exaltation of “to the things themselves,” if we perform an 
eidetic reduction on the last sentence of the paragraph above, we locate what things are 
through bracketing and essentialize all that is not. Therefore: 
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[The logos of truth] cannot [be affirmed] [in a space of] absence/nothing; 
[rather, truth is constituted] [in the presence of the word that can] carry 
meaning.  
Within the bracketing, the words “cannot,” “absence/nothing,” and “carry meaning” are 
negatives; they hold no meaning because there is no positive correlation to a positive 
conceptualization of actual being. “Cannot” and “absence/nothing” are the inverse of 
“can” and “presence/something,” and “carry meaning” is negative in the sense that it 
inherently requires something to carry before it can be. Conversely, “the logos of truth” 
is an affirmative statement, as is “be affirmed,” “in a space of,” “rather, truth is 
constituted,” and “in the presence of the word that can” – all active statements of being; 
that are.  What the eidetic reduction has attempted to achieve is an erasure of the essence 
of meaning, or what Derrida calls sous rature, not to determine a point of positive or 
negative metaphysical closure, but a mark of différance in the traces of otherness – of 
that which is not. Through an elemental eidetic reduction, we have opened the 
possibility of a transcendental attitude that can perceive the possibility of truth in the 
traces of an interplay that constitutes both presence and absence, both thing and no 
thing, in the form of a question that has not only brought us full circle to the unanswered 
question, but made it possible to transcend it as simultaneously both indicative statement 
and interrogative question: Absence/nothing cannot carry meaning; Cannot 
absence/nothing carry meaning?  
 Let us examine this in terms of the universal statement: Logically, if nothing is 
absence/nothing, then nothing constitutes the space of absence/nothing. If nothing is not 
meaning, then nothing cannot constitute the space of meaning; therefore meaning is 
some thing. If no absence/nothing is meaning, then meaning constitutes no thing of 
absence/nothing. If nothing is both absence/nothing and meaning, then no thing can 
constitute both absence/nothing and meaning. Yet, here in this syllogism we have 
established that meaning is some thing. Therefore, it is logically valid that some thing – 
in this case, meaning – CAN constitute both absence/nothing and meaning. The 
distinction here is between the indicative mood and the interrogative: The indicative 
indicates subject and verb as statement of positive fact; the interrogative as negative 
inverts subject and verb as question. 
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  Statement: Absence/nothing cannot carry meaning. 
  Question: Cannot absence/nothing carry meaning?  
 
It has already been established as logically valid that meaning can constitute both 
absence/nothing and meaning; therefore, the statement is invalid. Moreover, the question 
“cannot absence/nothing carry meaning” can be answered in the affirmative. Yes, 
meaning can be found in both absence/nothing and meaning. Yes, it is possible for me to 
not know a truth that is present to me as subjective knowing. Objective truth is present. 
Placement of truth and meaning is not an idealized fiction, but a realized possibility. 
Truth is not constituted in the presence of the word that can carry meaning. This 
deconstruction of the alleged unity contained in the perceptual truth of what constitutes 
“meaning” through an eidetic reduction evokes the real possibility of a transcendental 
alternative substitution, whereby the presence of meaning can be meaningful in its 
absence and does not need to be present in the communicative aspect of the expressed 
word. For Husserl, “communication and intimation, while the raison d’être of 
expressions, is not essential to their use, whereas their being meaningful is essential” 
(Simons 109). Theoretically, we have reached a point of entelechy: a realization of the 
possible, where potential has become a potent actuality. The essence of my perception, 
therefore, is one where it is possible for me to tell myself that all S are P because, 
paradoxically, I am at a place and space of Husserl’s epoché – a logical suspension of 
logic. Rather than myself being hic et nunc (here and now), I have inverted being to not 
being; being is now/here. The solidus ( / ) implicates the barriers of our own now and 
here perceptions, where what we perceive to be now is both presently now and here 
simultaneously. By erasing the solidus, we see “nowhere” and, in turn, that our own 
perceptual possibilities of fulfillment are now constituted by non-fulfillment, of absence 
as presence.  
 To illustrate this further, consider Norman Maier’s Nine Dots Puzzle, which 
comprises three rows of three dots (fig. 5.3). The task is to connect all nine points with 
four straight lines, yet not allow the pen to leave the paper.  
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       Fig. 5.3: Nine Dots 
 
When attempting to do this task, most people typically find that five straight lines are the 
minimum number required. Four is an impossibility. Yet, at the same time it is possible 
if we employ an atypical “aperception” of what we do not perceive (figs. 5.4 and 5.5).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.4: Nine Dots in Perceptual Framework and Fig. 5.5: Nine Dots Beyond Perceptual Framework  
 
As Martin Scheerer has suggested, the first response is often perceiving the dots within 
the framework of fixed points, or a square, because “people are so dominated by the 
perception of a square that the[y] do not ‘see’ the possibility of extending lines outside 
the square formed by the dots” (qtd. in Kershaw and Ohlsson 489). Extending this 
phenomenon to a relation of a nowhere space of absence as presence, our predispositions 
are “to turn on a dot, as opposed to turn on a point on the paper where there is no dot … 
on a non-dot point” (490). Here, what is not signified in its absence is in fact a sign in its 
non-presence, and perception of that absence depends on an ability to go beyond the 
borders of what – the things – we perceive that we see. As Husserl claims, things in 
themselves can exist independently of consciousness (Woodruff Smith 380), and that 
what we intuitively know is not the same as what is.  
 
5.1 Zu den Sachen Selbst (To The Things Themselves) 
 Husserlian pure phenomenology – as Husserl himself terms it “to the things 
themselves” – enables both a conscious separation from and cohesion with the primacy 
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of egocentric sensing, feeling, and privileging of the unilateral “I.” Phenomenology, 
then, is concerned with “the concrete institutions upon which the mind applies its 
activities of attention, abstraction, collective combination, and reflection” (Mohanty 48).   
In a phenomenological application it is possible for an object to be both real and non-
real; that is, meaning is not immanent but perceptible – and perceptible in multitudinous 
ways that we otherwise may not accept as possible. If there is a truth, its meaning – at 
least in terms of corresponding with the object perceived and the fulfillment of the way 
in which we expect to perceive such an object – can be reinscribed as not so much truth 
but a coincidental act, and therefore subject to a reinscription of what constitutes belief 
(50). In effect, the meaning of our experience of an object is simultaneously both 
grasped and created.  
 When we perceive an object, it is through a framework of perception that we 
have already determined, a singularity of perception that Husserl refers to as 
“fulfillment.” When we see “a house,” for example, our perception is already informed 
by our prior expectations of what constitutes “a house.” Moreover, such perceptions do 
not even have to be multi-dimensional in order to reach perceptual fulfillment. If we see 
just the front of a house, we still perceive “a house.” Even if they are unseen, we at once 
also perceive the sides and the back of the house, not by looking at them directly, but on 
drawing on our empirical observations to fill in what is missing; in other words, to 
(ful)fill the expectation of this frame of reference concerning “what a house looks like.” 
In Husserlian terms, these shadowy, partial disclosures are adumbrations, or the parts 
sketchily revealed to us as a perceived whole. As Herman Philipse points out: 
  Husserl starts with the notion that all objects of outer perception are 
  given in adumbrations. ... When, for example, we walk around a  
  house, the different adumbrations of the house succeed each other in 
  an ordered manner. If these ordered sequences of adumbrations are 
  disturbed or broken, we suffer a perceptual illusion or even a  
  hallucination. (257)   
Confusion, or an interruption to the process of perceptual fulfillment, occurs when – in 
the case of this example – we are confronted by the information that this house is not 
like any other we have known or experienced. We might find that the back of the house 
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has been demolished in the process of re-building, or that there is a highly unusual glass 
greenhouse and swimming pool that gives the structural whole precarious, interesting 
angles. With this interruption, or skew, our perceptual fulfillment is arrested and we find 
the need to question what we think we see. Such internal questioning is a cornerstone of 
critically reflective thought, for it can take us to places of investigation that might 
otherwise not have occurred to us. 
 Yet, the degree of discomforting confusion associated with such diversions is 
often perceived as something negative – aligned with misunderstanding and even a sense 
of hopelessness. It is reassuring to contemplate a return to the relative safety of what we 
“know” and what we “believe.” We are comfortable with such perception for we already 
know it well, and to move beyond it is to consider confrontation with what is unknown: 
Haunted by the absence of essential and shared definitions of our lives 
which might tell us how we ought to be, transfixed by the nothingness or 
possibility which pervades our lives and fills us with anxiety and dread, 
we seek to escape by ... choosing not to choose, by passionately attaching 
or centering our lives on some external value, thing, person or cause. ... 
We want to play a part half-consciously chosen so that we don’t have to 
be responsible for the choice. We want to do what everyone else is doing, 
because it seems safe and solid in a life which has lost all security and 
orientation ... . [Yet] to recognize the need for choice, not to avoid it but 
to affirm it in living, is to choose to choose. It is to be “authentic,” that is, 
it is to relate oneself to oneself, to affirm one’s own and unique existence. 
(Brockelman 20-21) 
If, as in the case of the glass greenhouse and swimming pool, our frame of perceptual 
reference is broken by a startling claim or provocative challenge, we need to stop, 
reflect, and re-evaluate our impressions that initially seemed so secure.  This latter 
reflective process is part of the Husserlian eidetic reduction, which leads to what I term 
an eidetic impasse; that is, a stage of cognitive blocking in which to continue on the 
same lines of thought one has held previously is no longer possible, and the only feasible 
alternative is to seriously consider and negotiate alternative perspectives.  
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 The problem with the house analogy, as Joseph Kockelmans claims, is that 
cognitive movement does not necessarily follow sequentially from one point to another 
(“Intentional” 141).  Cognition, and particularly critically reflective acts of cognition, 
should not presuppose a singular, successive forward motion towards something, but a 
shifting, recursive series of what might better be described as gains and losses, advances 
and retreats, tentative hypotheses and disenchanting deadlocks.  What all of this 
indicates is that the nature of thinking – of a mind’s being in regard to any given object – 
depends not on what the object is, but on both the ways in which it is presented and the 
subjective judgment framing such perception (Mohanty 50).  The differences in 
perception here are a distinction between ontic phenomenology and noetic 
phenomenology; the former focusing on a phenomenon of an object’s being, the latter as 
a phenomena of the act of perception as having constituted that being. Decritique is 
concerned with the latter.  
 Phenomenologically, it is the act of our perceptions towards the object-things 
themselves to which we shift our attention in a twofold reductive movement: first, the 
eidetic reduction; secondly, the phenomenological reduction. The former involves 
awareness of what constitutes our knowing and our non-knowing, of ignoring individual 
existence “in order to dwell exclusively on the essence” (Levinas 100); the latter is a 
process of phenomenological reduction, describing the ways in which our awareness of 
multiple layers of meaning has constructed our knowing – or, as Gerd Brand claims, “a 
self-reflection in which the ego unfolds itself in its self-alienation” rather than “a putting 
into action of a subjectivity that exists for itself” (206-07). And yet it is not a case of 
seeking destruction of our perceived world, but a de(con)struction: 
The reductions do not destroy the world in which we live, nor do they 
deny it; they only put this world between parentheses. What remains after 
the reduction is nothing but the transcendental ego with its transcendental 
life. Once we have gained access to the transcendental sphere with the 
help of the reductions we can start the task of clarifying the essence of 
what we find there by means of the intentional and constitutive analyses. 
... The phenomenological reductions make it possible for the mind to 
discover its own nature. (Kockelmans, “Phenomenological” 222) 
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 The phenomenological act concludes by considering the possible ways that not-
knowing can be reconceptualized as knowing; a deconstructive reduction of the 
certainties of knowing on which we have based perceptions of what we understand to be 
true.  The possibility becomes inherent through this process because, as Quentin Lauer 
points out, “when the ego is objectified, its constitution does not enjoy the same priority 
as does subjective constitution” (“Other” 171).  We are free to intuit critical possibilities, 
not in the intuitive sense of some psychic-awareness that deliberately rejects rational 
inference in favor of what might colloquially be called “gut instinct,” but in the act of 
trying to consciously recognize the most fundamental foundations on which a sense of 
knowing presents itself to our “I.” Such a process of methodical working-back is what 
Husserl calls reduction, and undertaking this reduction occurs when one is consciously 
and deliberately aware of working in a transcendental sphere. As Kockelmans puts it, 
this attitudinal sphere is one “in which we can perceive things as they are in themselves, 
independent of any prejudice” (“What is” 30).  
 The significance of such assertions is that what we often take as the givenness of 
understanding is not a given at all, but rather a construct of consciousness.  Our 
perceptions of the world and the meanings we make from the objects we perceive as 
existing independently of spatio-temporal frameworks is drawn from concrete and 
conscious acts of perceiving. Consciousness, therefore, is conscious of consciousness; 
we cannot be unconscious of what is a conscious conceptualization. The ramifications of 
such consciousness are that all we perceive is a result of conscious cognition, whether 
we choose to believe that it is an unconscious and internalized given or not.  Naturalized 
assumptions, therefore, may be perceived as givens in relation to culture, gender, race, 
socioeconomic, and religious conditions – and conditioning – but to acknowledge the 
consciousness of perceptual choice we use when directing our perceptual gaze to objects 
is to instigate the process of reflecting on such acts and to also initiate the possibility of 
change.  In Husserlian terms, to acknowledge these perceptual conditions is the basis of 
bracketing; we are conscious of our own consciousness and momentarily seek to 
suspend our subscription to the perceptual results this consciousness delivers in order to 
constitute an essence of belief – what J. N. Mohanty describes as the residue of pure 
consciousness – “not as another region of being but rather as the absolute ground of all 
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positing of being” (61).  The act of bracketing, or undertaking a descriptive 
transcendental reduction is, therefore, a matter of transcending notions of the psyche as 
inherently and immanently constituent of being to instead become consciously and 
critically aware of the possibilities to project the very notion of being as a separate 
ontological schemata – occurring within a spatio-temporal moment of which we are 
conscious of having constructed.  This is the basis of distinction between ontic and 
ontological existentialism: the former, as it is concerned with real being, or of relating to 
having real being, is not phenomenological; the latter, focusing on that related to the 
nature or meaning of being-and-existing is phenomenological in that it seeks to 
transcend a state of privileging the primacy of being in and of itself (Edie).  
 The concept of being and consciousness-of-being as separate from time and 
space is important in the phenomenological process; indeed, Aron Gurwitsch asserts that 
for consciousness, “time would not exist at all” (134). If we consider the recollection of 
memory as an act of consciousness, our memories are presented to us as fragmented 
images of time. It is irrelevant, insofar as our memories are able to recall, how much or 
how little time has actually passed between the event and its recollection. We can 
conjure the image and replay it in our minds as a moment of re-perception. Whether the 
event happened six months, six years, or six decades ago is unimportant for the act of 
perceiving the memory. However, the object (noema) of memory depends, and is a 
correlation of, my act of perception (noesis) – and in the act of perceiving the object-
memory I am unlikely to recast the event as it contextually and objectively stood – as it 
occurred. At best, I am able to reconstruct a facsimile of reality, but one that is 
shadowed by my perceptual experiences both before and since the temporal fixture of 
that moment-in-memory.  
 Such transcendental reductionism, however, does not seek to replace existing 
truths with other truths of an apodictic alternate perspective (Mohanty 67). In the 
process of transcendental reduction it is not the noema, or outcome of inscribing an 
object with meaning, nor the noetic, the act of perceiving or thinking, but a process of 
describing the acts in which we both perceive and inscribe meaning; the active 
movement of correlating what goes on within, between, and during the noema and the 
noetic. In Husserlian terms, this is the noetic-noematic correlation.  During the process 
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of descriptive reflection, it is possible for us to perceive all and any assertions to be 
“truth.”  Key concepts to consider here, however, are notions of active and passive, and 
their relationship to logic, persuasion, and truth. Whereas an accepted, undescribed, and 
unreflective relationship between perceiving an object and the fulfillment of that 
perception in terms of establishing a meaningful truth can – and frequently does – fall 
within the realm of logical construction, thereby establishing its veracity by an 
apparently scientific and rigorous means, logic is a passive form of thought. If I assert 
that A is B, and B is C; therefore A is C, I construct a hypothetically valid syllogism. 
And yet, without reflection in terms of stepping back to observe and describe what this 
“I” who is doing the act of perceiving has constructed as A, B, and C to begin with, then 
my argument is one of a priori parameters.  In Mohanty’s terms, all this “I” is doing is 
passively synthesizing modes of consciousness that begin at one point and linearly travel 
to a seamless “logical” conclusion (69). 
 The logic of truth, however, appeals to us primarily because it is “given in itself 
and as itself in such a manner that the subject of the act cannot doubt the being of the 
act” (Lauer, “Evidence” 150). To do so would be to doubt what we have constituted as 
our selves, a solipsistic mindset that refutes alternatives as untenable because they have 
the potential to disrupt the perceived world we think, and therefore believe, that we see. 
Yet, in doing so, we construct a sequence of logic that is in keeping with the intentional 
fallacy of authorship (Wimsatt and Beardsley), one that reveals “only itself and whatever 
is contained in it” as the “essential intentionality of consciousness” – truth-perceptions 
that are ultimately unseen and unacknowledged because they reflect the cognitive sheen 
of logical substance that “contains its own evidence, its own guarantee of givenness” 
(Lauer, “Evidence” 151). It is as though the act of perceiving is like the drawing of a 
bow, the arrow of which is taken from a quiver constitutive of our experience; we draw 
the bow (noesis), the bow springs back and then forward to hit the target (the object-
noema) that we have intentionally already placed in our sights. 
 In relation to intentionality and the part it plays in phenomenological reduction, 
as Kockelmans asserts, “all consciousness is intentional” (“What is” 32).  The subject 
actively seeks unity in order to quash an inherent intolerance of ambiguity when seeking 
to "make sense" of things. As the subject experiences an act, the act may in turn be 
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characterized "as a consciousness of an object whether real or ideal, whether existent or 
imaginary" (Gurwitsch 119). The mind, however, seeks to “make sense” of what we 
might call discrete object components, much like the way a tiled mosaic is constituted by 
assembling various fragments to make a whole. When we pass by the mosaic, we are 
generally unaware of the mortar lines that connect the pieces and instead perceive the 
image in its entirety. As Gurwitsch points out, "[b]ecause of the resemblance among the 
sense data [the mosaic pieces], the mind passes so smoothly and so easily from one to 
another that it is scarcely aware of the transition" (121).  In contrast, we can easily 
perceive a sense of non-sense when we stare, for example, at an individual word for a 
long time without interruption.  The word begins to lose its sense, and the idea of 
connecting the letters d-o-g with a canine seems suddenly odd and incomprehensible. 
Something we previously have taken for granted becomes, through semantic satiation, 
objectified to the point where it becomes possible to consider the ways in which it has 
been constructed as an arbitrary sign. Similarly, identity – the way we perceive ourselves 
– is not fact, but a fiction constructed from our own imagination, and our imagination is 
informed by our own perceptive filtering. 
 A “logical” argument that builds from accepted, unquestioned a priori beliefs is 
an essential point of contention in Husserl’s noetic-noematic correlation, for a linear 
unidirectional path of the noetic (the act of perceiving) towards the noematic (the object 
of perception) does not allow the possibility of a skew to the perceptual fulfillment. As 
Richard Schmitt asserts, the noetic implicates “the subject-in-relation-to-the-object,” 
while the noematic involves “the object-in-relation-to-the-subject.”  In the noetic-
noematic relationship, each determines the other and is understood within this 
reciprocity. The noetic subject-I examines an object framed and informed by what has 
been experienced, yet simultaneously considers the noematic feelings, desires, and 
beliefs that have formed those experiences (67). In effect, the ego-as-subject does not 
exclusively exist (Brand 207), but that the subject-I is reconceptualized as an object-I, 
and – to be “logical” – each agrees with the other.  
 The concept of reinscription and recasting the subject-as-object can be seen in 
the Hegelian dialectic, particularly in terms of a logical progression of thesis-antithesis-
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synthesis-thesis. And yet, Hegel’s dialectic does not account for the constituent parts of 
such a perceptive triangulation and re-triangulation.  From Husserl: 
[T]he attempt to doubt any object of awareness in respect of it being 
actually there necessarily conditions a certain suspension (Aufhebung) of 
the thesis; and it is precisely this that interests us. It is not a 
transformation of the thesis into its antithesis, of positive into negative; it 
is also not a transformation into presumption, suggestion, indecision, 
doubt ... . Rather, it is something quite unique. We do not abandon the 
thesis we have adopted, we make no change in our conviction, which 
remains in itself what it is so long as we do not introduce new motives of 
judgment, which we precisely refrain from doing. And yet the thesis 
undergoes a modification – whilst remaining in itself what it is, we set it 
as it were 'out of action,' we 'disconnect it,' 'bracket it.' (“Thesis” 76) 
Phenomenologically, the problem with the Hegelian dialectic is that what we take as our 
thesis is constituted from our selves, the antithesis is its opposite, and the synthesis 
becomes a new thesis. While the freedom of consciousness to articulate an antithesis 
and, in turn, actively synthesize and reconstitute the thesis into a new thesis may appear 
to negate any preconceptions or presuppositions, it is still a forward movement drawn 
from a starting point of what we know. Although it may be argued that the original 
consciousness contained in the initializing thesis is no more, the antithesis that negates 
the thesis is not entirely presuppositionless because its own opposing parameters are 
based on a comparative binary from the thesis to begin with (Farber). Even the meta-
analytical idea that we can construct thesis, antithesis and synthesis is, in itself, a 
presupposition – explaining why Marvin Farber notes that "the principle of 
presuppositionless has been called the greatest presupposition" (37). In contradiction to 
the Hegelian dialectic, where we might begin to think critically and reflectively is at the 
point where we begin to be conscious of our intentions to ascribe meaning before 
meaning has even been ascribed (Smith and Woodruff Smith 9). 
 The experiences of empirical observation constitute a framework of suppositions 
and cannot, therefore, be called a presuppositionless state of being. In Farber's words: 
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[Presuppositionlessness] must lead to a mind divested not only of all 
bodiliness, but also of all real and ideal conditions of experience and 
thought. It would seem that solipsism is the unavoidable beginning. If 
one's quest for ultimate understanding leads him [or her] to such a basis, 
he [or she] must be prepared to pass beyond solipsism. The 
phenomenological method undertakes to meet this problem. (41) 
Such consideration leads to the ambiguity of presuppositionlessness as a concept in 
itself. It can refer to ideas or assumptions we hold in advance; it can also refer to facts 
we accept as true beyond doubt. The structure of a presuppositionless position, then, 
would mean rejecting its determination by its own laws. It is because of the 
verisimilitude that reflecting on one’s self appears to engender that acts of self-reflection 
have been attributed to a psychology-of-self, an internalized analysis and explication of 
why we do what we do, yet this is not phenomenological. It is also not difficult to see 
why, therefore, phenomenology has – mistakenly I would assert – been associated with 
the literary theory of Reader Response and its hermeneutic application (Selden and 
Widdowson). Where we might accept that a valid interpretation of text – and, by 
extension, the world around us – can reflect an externalized projection and analysis of 
self-introspection that embraces concepts of “what this text means to me,” the 
introspective nature of self-reflection, at least phenomenologically, is not one of 
analysis, of finding out “who I am” and “from where I come” as an act and validation of 
truth-in-individual meaning, but ways in which we might describe a conscious 
awareness of what we have constructed as truth in a transcendental act that enables us to 
conceive and perceive the possibility inherent in who we are not.  
 As an example of a Reader Response interpretation as a non-phenomenological 
and unidirectional noetic-to-noematic hermeneutic, consider an excerpt of student 
writing provided by David Bleich. Here, Bleich’s “Student K” is interpreting the 
meaning contained in a poem about a wall, and has chosen to project that interpretation 
based on empirical understanding of what “the Berlin Wall” signifies. Bleich both 
advocates and endorses the intrinsic value for his student in making such “personal 
connections” to the poem’s meaning: “The ‘Berlin wall’ ... was built to keep the East 
Berliners from going over to the better life plus it walled out the possible chance of 
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jealousy of seeing how well the others are living. This wall could also mean the wall of 
racial prejudice and narrow-mindedness ... .” (qtd. in Bleich 1267, my emphasis). Yet, 
at no time does Bleich comment on or even acknowledge the incongruent claims made 
in this interpretation by “Student K.”  The student first inherently posits the fallacious 
assertion that all West Germans have a “better life” of which East Germans are jealous. 
In the next sentence, the student claims that the wall could also represent narrow-
mindedness or racial prejudice. Neither Bleich nor the student, however, considers the 
prejudice and narrow-mindedness apparent in the statement. While Bleich does claim 
that such an interpretation is a “useful form of expressing feelings about literature” 
(1270), the excerpt here expresses some rather startling assumptions drawn from 
individual experience that, phenomenologically, need consideration. It is a rather 
arrogant assumption to make that life is “better” in the West and, by extension that East 
Germans are/were unhappy and jealous. If we were to dig into the perceptual ideals 
informing the student’s analysis, we might move to a position where it is possible for 
Student K to reflect on the constituent, noemic parts that underlie her noetic projection; 
in short, we would be asking Student K to think critically and reflectively about her own 
thinking much more so than merely expressing a subjective feeling-response. 
 By the same token, there is a need to deliberate what might be meant by an 
assertion that calls for students to think critically as an act of internalized reflection 
instead of externally expressing a projection of what one subjectively already feels.  
Schmitt, arguing that reflection is “the mind thinking about itself,” also claims that a 
mind thinking about itself can occur with absolutely no reflective qualities at all, and 
uses examples of such manifestations as “brooding about one’s own feelings and 
emotions, self-pity, nursing feelings of resentment or a sense of [personal] injury” (62).  
It is for this reason that I make the distinction between the subjectivity and the 
objectivity of critical argument: It is not that subjective responses are to be completely 
eliminated and replaced by a coldly unfeeling analytical mind, but that a focus on what 
the individual-I as a singular, individual feels and thinks is phenomenologically 
transcended. It is quite possible, for example, to argue passionately about an issue or 
topic – exhibiting characteristics that may easily be ascribed to subjective fervor – yet, in 
a phenomenological application of such argument, whether the “individual” who is 
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arguing the point “personally” ascribes to it at all becomes irrelevant. Husserl puts it 
another way: “It makes no essential difference to an object presented and given to 
consciousness whether it exists, or is fictitious, or is perhaps completely absurd” (qtd. in 
Simons 116).  On the other hand, when an argument ensues that is drawn from outside 
the parameters of the epoché of phenomenological description – that is, an argument 
based on what an individual does personally believe – what is at risk is the perception of 
personal affront, of taking criticism personally, of being driven to a place where the only 
room to maneuver involves defense of existing ideological belief. Schmitt makes an 
interesting analogy that relates to this point, and it concerns the characterization of a 
revolutionary: 
To be a successful revolutionary a man [or woman] must think but [s]he 
need not, and perhaps should not, reflect. If the reformer were to reflect 
[s]he would have to temper his [or her] revolutionary zeal, detach himself 
[or herself] from his [or her] aims and his [or her] habitual attitude toward 
the world, and question what had seemed self evident before. (63) 
The distinction, therefore, involves one between an insulated subjectivity and a 
transcendental subjectivity, the latter seeking to be consciously aware of the parts that 
have constituted the whole of the individual-I. Phenomenologically, existence is not 
assumed, and this state becomes possible by Husserl’s notion of essential intuition in 
which we can grasp an essence, yet simultaneously posit that it has no existence (Farber 
50).  Although we may begin with the "self-validating cognitive experience" (56), it is 
through an acute state of presuppositionlessness, or an awareness of the ways in which 
we internalize and self-validate our acknowledgement of suppositions as “real” that 
underscores the notion of critical possibilities that, in turn, can lead to the possibility of 
praxis.  
 Martin Heidegger, however, argues that transcendental detachment is an 
impossibility, for we are intrinsically an integral component of Dasein, of Being, and 
here lies a distinction between Heidegger’s existential phenomenology and the 
transcendental phenomenology of Husserl.  Whereas we might say that existential 
phenomenology considers the meaning of Being as a given constituent, transcendental 
phenomenology attempts to radically ground and make explicit the meaning of possible 
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being (Kockelmans, “Phenomenological” 223, emphasis added). For Heidegger, what 
constitutes our humanness is that “our consciousness both projects the things of the 
world and at the same time is subjected to the world by the very nature of [our] existence 
... . We are inevitably merged with the very object of our consciousness” (Selden and 
Widdowson 52).  Yet, as Jaakko Hintikka asserts, “it is crucially important to emphasize 
that, according to Husserl, there is an actual interface of my consciousness and reality, 
that reality in fact impinges directly on my consciousness” (83). This leads to one 
distinction between Heidegger and Husserl; for the latter, reality directly impinges on 
my consciousness of being, while for the former, being constitutes my consciousness of 
reality. My contention, therefore, is that if our consciousness is something of our own 
creation, we should not condemn our selves to accepting it as such without any 
acknowledgement to the possibility of conceiving it another way.  In support of this 
claim, Lauer takes up a contrast between Heideggerian phenomenology and that of 
Husserl, describing the latter approach as one that “effectively unite[s] immanence and 
genuine objectivity” by positing that: 
Our everyday way of looking at things may clothe them with attributes 
our philosophical thinking cannot justify, but we must have the courage 
to eliminate such attributions from our consideration. ... With nothing but 
phenomena to go on, we can find by noetico-noematic analysis all that 
objectivity available to us in a reflection on the acts of consciousness 
themselves. (“Evidence” 152, 154) 
In the same light, and to extend the application “to the things themselves,” our 
consciousness – our being – can be as much a thing as the objects of our perception. 
Rather than thought emerging from a Kantian “notion of sense-experience as an 
intrinsically undifferentiated, chaotic, disordered mass of impressions” (Edie 240), 
Husserl rejects the subject as an enclosed and self-containing form. Instead, the 
experience of intended perception is both at-once transcendent and immanent. In 
Husserl’s terms, “the subject is intentionally directed towards a world which it is not but 
of which it is the lived experience” (242).  Phenomenological description, therefore, 
demands consciousness that is aware of these acts as objects within consciousness (243). 
When I speak of objectivity or detachment, it is not in terms of artificially severing what 
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we perceive as our intrinsic selves, but reflecting on our awareness of such a construct as 
one of many alternative possibilities – an acknowledgment and acceptance of 
phenomenon being “the world as experience, from a certain point of view, under a 
certain aspect” (243).  Phenomenology is not intended to describe a “real world,” but a 
world constructed as a primary reality through perceptions of experience (245). In this 
regard, Husserl writes of grades of clarity and obscurity, emphasizing the need for 
awareness of degrees of intensity within such gradations: 
When an apprehension that reaches beyond what is intuitively given 
weaves empty apprehensions into the real intuitive apprehension, for 
now, by degrees as it were, an increasing amount of what is emptily 
presented can become intuitable, or of what is already intuitable emptily 
presented. Thus the procedure of making clear to oneself consists here in 
two interconnected sets of processes: rendering intuitable, and enhancing 
the clearness of what is already intuitable. (“Eidetic” 108) 
Intuitive essences are brought closer to us – more sharply in focus, or rendered as more 
intuitable – if we accept what Husserl describes as the “zone of obscure apprehension” 
(109) and are willing to transcend psychological resistance to tolerate “fluctuating 
clearness and intermittent obscurity” (115). Whatever is obscurely presented comes 
closer to us in its own peculiar way, allowing us to genuinely consider the possibility of 
being that which we are not. 
 
5.1.1 Reality as Truth is Not Reason For Being  
 The Husserlian notion of a transcendent consciousness is not, however, without 
its critics. Jean Paul Sartre, for example, challenges Husserl’s position, arguing that it 
“renders the unifying and individualizing role of the I totally useless. It is consciousness, 
on the contrary, which makes possible the unity and the personality of my I. The 
transcendental I, therefore, has no raison d'être” (329). Here it appears that Sartre is 
positing that all understanding and meaning in the world is constructed, maintained, and 
endorsed by an a priori subjective ego-I and anything that seeks to transcend it is, by 
default, incapable or voided of the ability to construct, maintain, or even bestow 
possibilities of meaning and understanding.  Claiming that the transcendental I is 
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“superfluous” and “a hindrance,” Sartre asserts that “it would tear consciousness from 
itself; it would divide consciousness; it would slide into every consciousness like an 
opaque blade. The transcendental I is the death of consciousness” (350). Here, Sartre 
attempts to turn Husserl's assertion about consciousness as an awareness of 
consciousness back on itself in order to support an argument that is on tenuous 
ideological ground to begin with. Questions arise that Sartre does not satisfactorily 
address: Can we not perceive consciousness as opaque? Must it be as lucid as Sartre 
suggests? While we might agree that the transcendental I may be the death of 
consciousness, it is only on the terms that self-consciousness has been constituted by the 
noemic horizon and contained by the arêtes or borders of existing cognition and 
ideological structure.  Further, although Sartre objects to the Husserlian assertion that 
"reflection modifies the spontaneous consciousness" (334), the objection is not 
sustainable. If we were to argue that it did not modify spontaneous consciousness, then 
we would also have to assert that all consciousness is concrete, a priori and therefore 
non-modifiable.  
 At issue in our perceptions and the beliefs that inform them is what constitutes 
reality and truth, whether the perception is one of individuality or of the collective.  For 
many, however, the manacles of belief are iron-clad, constituting the inalienable truth of 
both what-I-see-I-believe and what-I-believe-I-see. If, however, we were to consider a 
concrete reality juxtaposed with an abstract unreality, we may well be moving into the 
concept of possible worlds, with the parallel Husserlian “life world” that emerged during 
his so-called fourth period between 1928 and 1938 (Kockelmans, Introduction 19).  
What I as an individual perceive as being, as living “my life,” is not necessarily as 
concrete as I initially conceive it to be. I can say that I am a being in this world; my act 
of living, of existing, of being here is real enough. I am aware of things – of objects – as 
they are perceived by me. There is “a clock” on the wall above me, “a bird” outside in 
the tree (even though I can’t see it), a “sheepskin rug” on the floor behind me (though I 
can neither see, hear, nor presently touch it); I am aware of the existence of “my son” 
who, even though he is not here in the room with me is still “here” in the sense that he 
has gone to the grocery store with his father. Yet, as Husserl writes, “[w]hat is actually 
perceived . . . [is but] a dimly apprehended depth or fringe of indeterminate reality” 
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(“Thesis” 69). My son, for example, is "my son” because "he is." And that's about as far 
as the perception of a determinate reality goes.  
 If, however, I were to think about the conceptualization of "my son," of his name 
as the word "Tio," and describe its connotative characteristics – even to the point of my 
reference to the pronoun "he" – we might say that I have moved into an elemental eidetic 
reduction. I have identified and categorized elemental parts of perceptive understanding 
that a moment ago I perceived as givens; moreover, I am willing to detach my "self" 
from such fundamental "understanding" and bracket these conceptual moments for the 
purposes of further descriptive observation. This would then mark the point where a 
phenomenological reduction can begin: the act of examining what I perceive and do with 
that perception in relation to a deeper descriptive consideration of the elements – the 
noemics – that constitute the words articulating "my" perceptions. Here, we might 
describe the constituent parts of concepts such as "love," “mother,” "biological 
relationship," "helplessness and youth versus wisdom and maturity," and even consider 
"my" acts in relation to these perceived understandings, motives, justifications, and 
rationalities. All of this is constitutive of a phenomenological act.  Through the eidetic 
and phenomenological reductions, I move from a world of facts into one of general 
essences – of considering valid those possibilities outside what I have previously known.  
My objective is to shift my understanding from what I “know” to ideas about knowing, 
and I do this by considering ways in which things can be known or seen differently, 
while still maintaining whatever it ostensibly is (Kockelmans, “What is” 30-31). In 
essence, I am working in a transcendental sphere in order to see in a radical and original 
way.  
 Husserl distinguishes between concepts of the natural world and what he later 
came to call his Life World theory, and here again is evidence of a response to critics 
who claim that it is not possible to transcend what one constitutionally is.  Yet, this is 
not what the Husserlian phenomenological reduction seeks to do, as Kockelmans strives 
to make clear in a commentary on the natural world: 
[The human] cannot seriously ask himself [or herself] the question of 
how [s]he can get outside his [or her] “island of consciousness” and how 
what manifests itself in his [or her] consciousness can acquire objective 
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significance. For when I apperceive myself as a natural [hu]man, I have 
already apperceived the spatio-temporal world and conceived of myself 
as in space where I already have a world-outside-me. Transcendental 
questions can be asked only within the phenomenological attitude, which 
is to be opened up by the phenomenological reduction. (“Transcendental” 
184) 
Clearly, there is a distinction between the natural and phenomenological aspects of 
perception, or what Husserl calls “attitudes.”  In the natural attitude, human thought and 
perception focus on those things that appear unquestionable and obvious, and that we 
express our perceptions first as singular judgments before progressing deductively and 
inductively to construct new understanding and knowledge as a result of that perception 
and thought (Kockelmans, “What is” 27). In contrast, the phenomenological attitude 
does not implicate deductive or inductive processes, but is a process of descriptive 
analysis (29) – and the term “descriptive” as opposed to “explicative” is a critical 
distinction. Engaging in a sphere of possibilities, truths – as referents of expressions or 
consciousness (Simons 127) – are neutralized rather than explained or justified: 
[T]he question of whether the object intended is real, illusory, 
hallucinatory, imaginary, independent, subsistent, or transitory is set 
aside for purposes of description. Whether the intended object is veridical 
has nothing to do with its status as intended. ... Just as phenomenological 
reduction neutralizes the ontological placement of an object, so it sets in 
abeyance the belief in personal identity, history, and empirical reality of 
the individual making phenomenological descriptions. (Natanson 338-39) 
 In the Cartesian Meditations, Husserl declares that he invalidates, inhibits, and 
disqualifies commitment to objects as they are experienced; in short, to “bracket the 
objective world” (qtd. in Schmitt 59).  The result of such objective-world bracketing, as 
Schmitt points out, correlates with discovering the transcendental ego: “I suddenly 
experience that it is I who must decide whether the claims to reality of the objects of 
experience in particular, and of the world as a whole in general, are valid claims” (60). 
And, it is this “aware ‘I’” that constitutes the essential or, in Husserl’s terms, the pure 
ego.  In this sense, the word and concept of transcendentalism relates to going beyond 
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lived experience through awareness of one’s mind having constructed that experience, a 
process that requires at least some degree of imagination in order to be able to conceive 
an alternative world at all, or what Husserl describes as “an ‘open horizon’ of possible 
perceptions” (qtd. in Smith 404). As Barry Smith and David Woodruff Smith assert, 
"[a]ssociated with each act of consciousness is a horizon of possible further experiences 
of the same object (25), bringing with it a correlation to transgressing Freire's and 
Giroux's conceptualization of borders.  If we extend this to consider the possibility of 
worlds and the possibility of being, it also becomes possible to “imagine things that do 
not exist or radically misconceive things which do exist” (26). 
 It is the possibilities of being that is a core component of Decritique in its 
application as a critical pedagogy.  This sense of not-knowing, of unsurety, reflects 
Kockelmans’ summative phrase in reference to Husserlian phenomenology, that of a 
“sphere of ambiguity” (“What is” 24). It involves a willingness to refrain from making 
judgment about our acts of perception, to suspend the final call on what is and instead 
commit to a genuine engagement in considering what might be. Objects are reduced to a 
state whereby they are all perceived as equal within individual consciousness (Smith and 
Woodruff Smith 12). The suspension of endorsing truth as truth, of consciously 
abstaining from ascribing conditions as veridical, is the basis of what Husserl describes 
as the “assumptive turn” (Simons 125), and informs the method of epoché – literally, 
suspension of judgment.  
 
5.2 De(con)struction 
 While elements of deconstruction are apparent in Husserlian pure 
phenomenology, there are specific aspects of Derrida’s theoretical mode that inform 
Decritique. The act of moving from what we accept as knowledge, of being something 
other than who we are, relates to a fundamental component of deconstruction – that of 
destabilizing a privileged center; in a sense, to move beyond the “ledge” of what we 
“know” and reinscribe it with the possibilities of being something very different.  As 
Tochon asserts, “[k]nowledge is not at issue in the deconstructive process” (67). The 
lines or parameters of what we think become, to use Derrida’s word, the arêtes or 
barriers that constitute the logic of what fits with the ways in which we always-already 
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make sense of things. Here, the components of Husserlian eidetic reduction (bracketing) 
and the transcendental epoché are reflected in Derridian différance. To perceive 
difference, one must be aware of points or definitive aspects of comparison, and then 
deconstruct such borders by deferring attempts to establish fixed truths, embracing the 
conceptual non(sense) that absence is presence.  
 Construction of meaning within our individual consciousness is, therefore, 
surrounded by a borderline of knowing. To examine this borderline critically and expose 
the areas of perception where what is real and what is not meet enables the juxtaposition 
of our beliefs with whatever we do not believe, and as a result to compare these states as 
alternatives with equal validity.  Of critical importance, however, is this concept of 
validation – of a genuine commitment to entertain the possibility of real alternatives that 
are currently not perceived as real at all. The value of the D.I.S. is that it operates as a 
conscious commitment to rescind our beliefs – if only temporarily – in order to become 
consciously aware of our consciousness engaging in alternative modes of thought, 
whether that thought is constituted theoretically, culturally, politically, or institutionally 
(Derrida, “Living On” 85).  If there is no agreement to detach from an awareness of our 
own existing ideological beliefs, we at once negate the possible validity of alternatives, 
and reflection of our own thinking remains mired in the precepts of already-constituted 
truths. By agreeing to operate in the D.I.S., students consciously recognize they are 
temporarily taking on another self, receptive to alternative perspectives, and with a 
willingness to criticize all with equal skepticism. Once students understand and agree to 
this concept, they are ready to participate in the process of deracination, both in terms of 
giving and receiving it.  
 Critics argue, however, that it is not possible for such detachment from our 
selves to occur. Indeed, as Tochon asserts, while philosophies of metacognition presume 
“that human beings can transcend their condition-action rules and grasp their control 
processes at a level of pure awareness,” such subjective idealism is not apparent in 
postmodern philosophical approaches, ones arguing that “higher levels of meaning are 
always embedded in a complex of nested values,” and because “meaning is situated, it 
cannot be grasped without reference to its interconnections with situations” (24; Garver). 
In response, I agree that socio-historically and ideologically we are categorically 
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constituted by race, gender, and culture, with a subset of the latter comprising sexuality, 
nationality, political persuasion, and religiosity – among other things. In short, who we 
are is in many cases determined by powerful forces in which we come to “find” 
ourselves. Indeed, Heidegger posits that “[a]ll interpretation is situational, shaped and 
constrained by the historically relative criteria of a particular culture” (qtd. in Eagleton 
62). And yet, we might in turn rhetorically posit, as Derrida asserts, “what makes a 
rhetorical question possible can sometimes disturb the structure of it” (“Donner” 115). 
Why must choice and circumstance, whether inherently or not, fix us into our own 
historical contexts in terms of interpreting meaning and truths? Certainly, the "historical 
distance between ourselves and a work [or moment] of the past, far from creating an 
obstacle to true understanding, actually aids such cognition by stripping the work of all 
that was of merely passing significance about it" (Eagleton 63), and this – I assert – is 
one of the principles of the D.I.S: A distancing of what we know and what we are in 
order to step out from such self-imposed parameters and remove the ideological gloss 
that can tarnish our perceptive understandings, before returning again with an 
unfamiliar, or perhaps defamiliarized, re-visioning of our selves and of our being, 
“objectified to the point where we can criticize and so revise them” (68). 
 A re-visioning of self, however, carries with it the potential for destruction of self 
– or, as Tochon terms it, of contemplating a dangerous ridge where “it is easy to fall off 
into the gulf that nearly surrounds you” (35). The possibility of the dissolution of self, 
whether in part or whole, can be a threatening concept – and yet simultaneously one of 
liberation, of Roland Barthes’ jouissance. The dissolution of meaning also carries with it 
a latent force of a “freeplay of words, which seeks to undo repressive thought-systems 
by a ceaseless slipping and sliding of language” that in the shattering of self-constructed 
perceptions can be a “private, asocial, [and] essentially anarchic experience” (Eagleton 
71-2). In such fertile ground, tilled, sown and scattered with seeds of new thought, 
possibility for change becomes real rather than imagined: 
 Caught up in this exuberant dance of language, delighting in the  
 textures of words themselves, the reader knows less the purposive  
 pleasures of building a coherent system, binding textual elements  
 masterfully together to shore up a unitary self, than the masochistic  
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 thrills of feeling that self shattered and dispersed through the tangled  
 webs of the work [thought] itself. (72) 
 The concept of the death of self – at least in terms of the ways in which we have 
come to know our self – involves exploration of an internalized crypt of the mind, where 
a collection of images, thoughts, feelings, and perceptions are stored before being 
organized according to the conduit of ideological processing. As Richard Rorty asserts, 
“the word ‘I’ is as hollow as the word ‘death.’ To unpack such words, one has to fill in 
the details about the I in question, [and to] specify precisely what it is that will not be 
[to] make one’s fear concrete” (23). The aim of the D.I.S. is to establish and enact 
awareness that we can temporarily halt the process of ordered cognition; to make a 
process that we think we know unknown, and within that process to make concrete our 
fears of that which we do not know in order to “become aware of our own half-articulate 
need to become a new person, one whom we as yet lack words to describe” (Rorty xiv). 
In short, we can reinforce the concept that “the very idea of the first-person singular, 
with all its claims to agency and consciousness, is irrevocably undermined when that 
pronoun is shown to be plurally determined” (Castricano 10).  
 Derrida addresses both the issues of the death of self and disrupting ordered 
cognitive processing in his texts The Gift of Death and “Where a Teaching Body Begins 
and How It Ends.” In the former, it is through theoretical discussion; in the latter, it is 
through exemplification.  Derrida’s “Teaching Body,” at first glance, appears to have all 
the characteristics of incoherent rambling.  As Rorty puts it, “Derrida is interested not in 
the ‘splendor of the simple’ but, rather, in the lubriciousness of the tangled” (126). Yet, 
the series of unrelated, tumbling thoughts marked by parenthetical inserts and 
metaphors-building-on-metaphors serve not only to delineate shifts and movement in 
thought, but expand on them in loosely connected layers – as though Derrida is aware of 
his own awareness of constructing multiple truths. It is reminiscent of Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s conceptualization of truth as a “mobile army of metaphors” (qtd. in Rorty 
27), one uttered by a subject that is inherently a fiction, and whereby “the ego of which 
one speaks when one censures egoism does not exist at all” (Nietzsche 370).  Through 
his writing, Derrida does not seek to represent reality, but to instead describe an 
unreality. Although writing about teaching, it is possible to apply Derrida’s thoughts to 
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the process of thinking itself, especially in terms of what he describes allusively in 
regard to binary oppositions as “fighting on two fronts, on two stages, and according to 
two ranges [so that] a rigorous and efficient deconstruction should at one and the same 
time develop a (practical) critique of the current philosophical institution and engage a 
positive, rather affirmative, audacious, extensive, and intensive transformation” 
(“Teaching” 89). Moreover, it is necessary “for deconstruction not to limit itself to the 
conceptual content of philosophical pedagogy, but to tackle the philosophical scene and 
all its institutional norms and forms, as well as all that renders them possible" (87, 
emphasis added). For Derrida, deconstruction “must not, cannot, simply pick and choose 
among long and relatively immobile chains on the one hand, and short and rapidly 
obsolete chains on the other.” Instead, he argues that “it must exhibit this strange logic 
whereby … the multiple powers of the oldest machine can be reinvested and exploited in 
a situation never encountered before” (93). In effect, we can reinvent the wheel. 
 As Rorty points out, however, such a Nietzschean view in regards to “the 
impulse to think, to inquire, to reweave oneself ever more thoroughly, is not wonder but 
terror” (29), and one circumvented by the recognition of Gelassenheit, “the ability not to 
wish to overcome” by those “who are unable to stand the thought that they are not their 
own creations” (118, 109).  And yet, as Derrida asks in relation to the question of self, 
we frequently fail to consider “‘who am I?’ not in the sense of ‘who am I’ but ‘who is 
this I?’” (“Donner” 92).  Returning, then, to the question as to whether it is possible for 
us to detach from ourselves, it is salient to consider Derrida’s thoughts on the issue: [I]f 
there were no absolutely heterogeneous interiority separate from objectivity, if there 
were no inside that could not be objectified, there would be no secrecy either. ... Is it not 
sufficient to transform what one complacently calls a context in order to demystify ... or 
decipher all the secrets of the world? (101, 82). To deny the possibility of movement 
within structured thought processes is to affirm the power of the ideology, the belief in a 
set of ideas that makes our actions not only possible, but self-referentially plausible. As 
Derrida claims, the roots of knowing – of the episteme – are “thrust deep into the soil of 
ordinary language” (“Structure” 960), and there is a distinction that can be drawn 
between structure as stratified, non-movement and the freeplay that is immanent within 
structure. This apparent paradox is something that can both restrict the free movement of 
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ideas within that structure or, alternatively, allow it (960).  Derrida’s point in relation to 
this is that when we privilege our beliefs as central, immutable components of our being, 
we are disavowing the existence of alternative centers and thereby privileging 
monocentric, egocentric meaning. The concept of a singular self, as Derrida asserts, is 
ostensibly one of delusion, for within the self are many traces of otherness. What 
constitutes the boundaries of the self is correlative with a point of impasse – the aporia 
and arêtes of Derrida and Foucault.  For the individual consciousness, therefore, 
language and meaning rests on a schismic conflict between svoj – one’s own – and čužoj 
– that which opposes one’s own (Bakhtin, “Discourse” 292). If we reach such an aporia, 
or impasse, then we cannot move forward, nor can we move sideways. There are, it 
seems, at least two avenues open to us in such a situation: we can retreat along the path 
we've already traveled, or we can allow the pressure to build, like internalized volcanic 
forces on tectonic plates, until the only escape is explosion – or, cognitively speaking, a 
reorganization of our existing “cogitography” in order to realize that our internalized 
boundaries are both manifestations of what we call individuality, yet an individuality 
that has more to do with the influence of others than the individual. It is through the 
process of self-objectification that Bakhtin’s concept of vnenakhodimost – or 
outsideness – can occur, and this is precisely what the D.I.S. attempts to engender. As 
Bakhtin writes, “[by] objectifying myself (i.e., by placing myself outside [of myself] I 
gain the opportunity to have an authentically dialogic relation with myself” (“Text” 
122).  
 Ironically, in our deference to presence, to that which is and to what we are, we 
cannot defer meaning beyond the frame that portal allows us to articulate and envision. 
Therefore, we privilege cognitio, to know, rather than incognito, to not know, with the 
accompanying elements of disguise and concealment of identity. Here we might think of 
an “incognitive act” – the examination of who or what has not been and is not as an 
interruption, a signifying function in that it contains elements of that which it does not 
signify, much in the same way that presence constitutes itself by the existence of 
absence. The reinscription of self is a movement punctuated by the possibility of being, 
or at least the self-imposed parameters of our own frameworks of self. We may speak of 
privileging individual writing voice and legitimizing the intention of the utterance, but 
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where and when do we pause to critically reflect on that intention? From where has this 
intention come? Bluntly, “individualistic subjectivism is wrong in ignoring and failing to 
understand the social nature of the utterance and in attempting to derive the utterance 
from the speaker's inner world as an expression of that inner world” (Vološinov 93). If 
we can separate the act, the event, the utterance, and the presence from its contextual 
linguistic structure, the form of its expression and contextual parameters, what do we 
find in the gulf between them, or beyond and outside of them? We may well find a 
referential signifying framework that is mobile, casting a reflective lens of différance 
through which we can examine these differences of self and yet simultaneously defer 
from re-casting it in a cognitive domain that privileges immobility, inflexibility, and 
certitude. Subtle shifts in perspective and re-perspective expand, therefore, in a 
cascading framework, where "each [comparative presence/absence] perspective shows 
the error of the other in an irresolvable alternation or aporia [impasse]" (Culler 96). 
 The human mind can imagine any thing. Even in non-sense, sense can be 
constructed by imagining a context in which it does have meaning. “What counts,” as 
Jonathan Culler claims, “is the plausibility of the description of the circumstances” (122-
23). Here, we might consider Derrida’s “Living On”/Borderlines as an act of writing 
what operating in the D.I.S. might look like. The whole concept of Derrida’s title is 
curious, reflecting the polemics of the piece. The text, horizontally divided at a position 
two-thirds from the top of the page, splits the text into two parts; the lower a 
personalized meta-narrative (récit) that underscores the upper, or what I might describe 
as superlative and supralative monologues – even going so far as to further divide it into 
representations of dominant supermonologue versus subordinate submonologue of self, 
while in actuality still being part of a whole dialogue that is linearly fractured by the 
presence of a present line. What is absent here is a deliberate attempt to cross that 
borderline to interrogate the spaces between, suggesting what Derrida means by the 
"enigma . . . of translation" (89). There is also a deliberate attempt to distinguish the 
“Living On” from the Border Lines, something that itself proves problematic in 
attaching to it conventional means of citation: Do we capitalize? Underline? Italicize? 
Place in quotations? In the process of thinking, deciding, and reflecting on even the title 
we find ourselves confronted with potentially subversive acts of mutilation to accepted 
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practice, the standardized normality over methods of citation, which in turn offers us 
space to question the why of why we even endorse standardized normality and who has 
constructed it. Through such deliberation, it becomes possible for one to enter a strange 
borderland, a “frontier region which seems to give the widest glimpse into the other land 
… though this land may not by any means be entered and does not in fact exist … . This 
procedure is an attempt to reach clarity in a region where clarity is not possible. In the 
failure of that attempt, however, something moves, [and] a limit is encountered” (Hillis 
Miller 231, emphasis added).
It is the potential for change found in “something moving” that constitutes a 
critical component of deracination and the D.I.S. As Foucault posits, discussing the 
concept of thought, criticism of our self-thoughts is inextricable from self-
transformation. Applied to critique, it “does not consist in saying that things are not 
good as they are. It consists in seeing what kinds of self-evidences, liberties, acquired 
and non-reflective modes of thought, the practices we accept rest on” (Foucault, “Est-il 
donc” 33).  Moreover: 
  Criticism consists in driving this thought out of hiding and trying to  
  change it: showing that things are not as obvious as we might believe,  
  doing it in such a way that what we accept as going without saying no  
  longer goes without saying. To criticize is to render the too-easy  
  gestures difficult. In these conditions, criticism (and radical criticism)  
  is absolutely indispensable for all transformation. Because a  
  transformation which would remain within the same mode of thought,  
  which would only be a certain matter of better adjusting the same  
  thought to the reality of things, would be a superficial transformation.  
  (34) 
While Foucault often makes reference to the transformative, he does not suggest that this 
is a necessary and intractable element. Rather, he emphasizes creating the possibility for 
transformative change, as opposed to the superficial self-deceiving platitudes that may 
come when we think we have been transformed. The latter is a deception-of-ease. 
Transformation-as-reform, Foucault argues, is “the result of a process in which there is 
conflict, confrontation, struggle, [and] resistance" (34) – a form of cognitive hardship 
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that we often prefer to avoid. And yet confronting this difficulty is the only way, 
Foucault believes, for any kind of genuine transformation to occur. Catharsis, as change 
within the individual mind, becomes possible when we are prepared to consciously 
engage in de-mapping the cognitive landscape, of demarcating the borders and ridges 
that encapsulate our intellectual territory, of refusing to name the noetic geography that 
has, in turn, been named for us, and to transcend our own impositions of self in a 
movement that is at once an externalized projection of and internalized reflection on our 
own being. 
 
5.3 Theory in Practice: Deracination and the D.I.S. 
 One question that readily arises is why consider alternate ways of being, 
particularly in an educational and sociological milieu driven by multicultural tolerance, 
acceptance, and respect? Within such a framework of diversification, some may argue, 
tolerance equates with acceptance which in turn, and by default, leads to respect for 
those who are different from ourselves. My contention is that such an argument reflects 
a hidden curriculum of empowerment, one that operates on the tangible and alluring 
promise of liberation but in action can too easily be trapped within an ideological 
framework of its own design – or what Michael Apple describes as a “network of 
assumptions that, when internalized by students, establishes the boundaries of legitimacy 
... since at no time are the assumptions articulated or questioned” (99; Pinar et al.; B. 
Flores, “Sheep”).  
 Rather than endorse a veneer of tolerance, acceptance, and respect as an a priori 
constituent of human collaboration and interaction in the 21st century, I instead posit that 
we endorse the quixotic complexities that are characteristic of the human mind and, by 
extension, the human psyche. Creatures of adaptability, humans are rational beings 
capable of both constructing and passing judgment within an ostensibly disinterested 
natural world, yet within which the human has essential interest in terms of each 
individual existence – one that is formed and re-formed through our interactions with 
others and our experiences of what we perceive as truth and reality in the world.  It is not 
until death that our being is concretely set as immutable and final. Yet, what is 
perplexing here is that as humans our being is not chosen nor constituted by our 
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individual selves, but by following the paths of others – at the hands of class, culture, 
gender, education, contemporary media, and religion. Moreover, although there is an 
inconstancy of living in that ideas and situations present themselves at apparently 
random opportunity, we seek to realign the incongruities and bring them back into a 
justifiable alignment with what we already perceive as our existential self. Within this 
perspective, even the current privileged triad of tolerance, acceptance, and respect can be 
easily reinscribed to fit existing frameworks of referents, and exhibit startlingly different 
characteristics of what constitutes each in the process of such reinscription, resulting in 
the sketchily obscure adumbrations of meaning that Husserl describes.  
 Decritique in practice, therefore, is concerned with interrupting the process of 
perspective, and of disturbing, through cognitive interjection, the “ordered sequences of 
adumbrations” (Philipse 257) that together inform our rationalistic systems of thought 
and belief in order to open the possibility of challenge, query, or critique.  As a mode of 
articulating thought, the two main – and complementary – parts of Decritique are 
deracination and the D.I.S.  Deracination, or the critique of ideas functioning within a 
transcendental and eidetic reduction, is fundamentally a critical dialogue, whether 
delivered in a formal sense – as in students “doing deracination” of their colleagues’ 
writing – or the more informal and personalized dialogic exchange between student and 
instructor through verbal or written conduits.  By identifying inconstancies in ideas 
expressed through speaking and writing, we can begin to pull at the thread of cognitive 
fabric, unraveling and disturbing the patterns and textures that constitute the thought that 
has produced the articulation. What follows are two instances of deracination as a semi-
formal dialogic exchange between student and instructor in order to exemplify the 
application of the theory in the first-year college English classroom. 
 The first instance involves a student who was preparing to write a critique – a 
deracination – of a colleague’s draft. The student claimed that she found the piece very 
well written and that she did not disagree with it at all; therefore, could she write a 
“positive” deracination? My response countered her proposition as undermining the 
essential characteristics of critically reflective thought that the act of deracination seeks 
to engender. In this case, it is irrelevant that the deracinator agrees with the points made 
in the draft, or even that it is “well-written.” The purpose is to disengage such personal 
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perceptions of what is right and what is “evident as real” so as to look beyond that: to 
actively seek our injunctions or sanctions on the points made in a piece of writing. It is 
as if we were to say, let’s hold that point right there, suspend it, rearticulate it, turn it 
inside out – reminiscent of Bakhtin’s á l’énvers – in the process of describing its 
perceptual framework in another form (Rabelais 11). In essence, it is not about this 
student passing judgment that concerns using her awareness of the parameters of her 
own sense of “being” and how that being perceives what constitutes “good writing” – 
the Husserlian “spatio-temporal existence” – but of transcending such parameters to go 
beyond a self-constituted framework. There, I posit, is the critically reflective challenge 
of a deracination. Ideally, and through the act of deracinating, the student demonstrates 
her own acknowledgment and awareness of the ways in which her constituted “self” 
both operates and transcends the noetic-noematic correlation of perceptual 
understanding. 
 The second instance occurred in an English 1301 course in which a text dealing 
with the contested issue of abortion, Sappho Scott’s “Letter to You,” was being read and 
analyzed. Scott’s piece is a short narrative that poignantly reflects the deeply disturbing 
ambivalence of a 47-year-old professional woman as she writes a confessional letter of 
lament addressed to her unborn child. One student, a deeply committed Christian, not 
only strongly objected to discussion of the topic, but refused to consider Scott’s piece as 
validating any point of view other than an evil attack on contemporary Christianity.  
Using the principles of Decritique to frame a response to the student’s objections, and in 
keeping with the concept of actively seeking critical dialogue between student and 
instructor, my reply sought to reflect a guided eidetic reduction, one that acknowledges 
the perceptions of “I” – in this case, the student’s perceived view – as merely one among 
a number of perceptions, whether those are “real” in lived experience or not, in an 
attempt to engage the student in what Brockelman describes as the “difficult process of 
mental ascesis in which one neglects the individual in favor of the essential” (33).  
 The student’s lengthy note opened with the caveat that it had been written in the 
spirit of respectful disagreement, and then launched into a vitriolic and passionate 
defense of Christianity as the source of all logic, liberty, and even concepts of 
“meaning” and “truth.”  The email note concluded with the rationale that as a Christian 
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“God” will ultimately determine punishment and reward in a day of judgment, there is 
little need to deliberate over irrelevant questions concerning society. In its perceptual 
entirety, the argument is built on an unmitigated adherence to a logic of religiosity, one 
that draws its sustenance from its own parameters of reason. The critical question for the 
educator practicing Decritique is how to offer perceptual alternatives while working 
within those same cognitive parameters produced by the student. Deracination, because 
of its singular focus on providing alternatives within the structural framework of the 
text, much like an algebraic equation, seeks to bracket the concepts and reduce the 
whole meaning to conceptual parts that are then subjected to reflective analysis that, 
while inherently acknowledging the argument presented, simultaneously aim to decenter 
and shift the privileged subjectivity of personal belief to a more marginal and detached 
place for analysis. It is also important that, as an educator, my own privileged belief 
system is seen to be just as marginalized – just as open to the possibility of alternatives. 
Here is an excerpt from my reply: 
Whether the ideology of Christianity is “devoid of critical logic, 
reasoning ... and/or does not engage in its usage” is not the issue here 
because the validity of the Christian belief system is not under attack, nor 
are individuals who may hold such beliefs personally under attack. 
Therefore, individual belief that meaning does not “exist outside of and 
apart from God” is not an issue for contention. ... The question over 
“what is liberty” is a telling one. Liberty, from the perspective of the 
argument we read [in the course notes], is John Stuart Mill’s 
interpretation – not necessarily “mine.” So, while it seems that the 
question is more directed in terms of rhetorically asking me to define 
what I consider to be liberty, whatever it is I personally believe is equally 
irrelevant. We might claim [as she wrote] that “[l]iberty is a Christian 
view and it was the foundation on which this country was established,” 
but how would such an assertion sit in the eyes of a Marxist? An Islamic? 
An atheist? Moreover, consider the statement that “[o]ur forefathers, 
renowned intellectuals in their own right ...,” and then re-cast it from the 
perspective of a radical feminist. How would she or he consider the term 
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“forefathers” and “renowned intellectuals”? A counter-argument might 
run, for instance, that the implied binary opposition set up here is that 
men are renowned intellectuals and women are not.  The point is that all 
these perspectives of argument frequently cast different shades of 
meaning on a question. Whether we choose to believe in and ascribe to 
these perspectives at the end of the day is not relevant to the activity of 
engaging critically reflective thought. [The student asks:] “Why are these 
questions important?” It would be easy to fill several textbooks 
examining this, tracing it from the roots of Socratic inquiry to 
contemporary and urgent social problems relating to massive inequality 
of wealth, oppression, exploitation, war, and social injustice. All of these 
are both buoyed and driven by ideological manifestations. Not 
questioning ideological belief is, by default, to accept and endorse the 
current social status quo – an ideology in and of itself. (B. Flores, 
“Reply”) 
My response attempts to decontextualize, paradoxically, the Christianity within the 
Christian perspective and to assist the student question and challenge these perspectives 
by juxtaposing indelible alternatives. While accepting the cognitive framework of a 
contemporary Christian interpretation, it is at the same time a separation from the 
personal inscription of belief in such an interpretation in order to reach a point of 
detachment – the epoché of suspending belief – where it becomes possible to perceive 
our own perspectives in alternative ways.  
 Promoting the possibilities of such genuine alternatives is what Richard Lynch, 
in defining what constitutes part of thinking critically, claims is an objective that “raises 
the possibility that both the critical thinker and her milieu will be challenged, unsettled, 
and perhaps changed” (3). Rather than focus on the objection as inherently negating or 
even dismissing the Christian perspective entirely, an act that risks alienating the student 
into a position of defense and perception of personal attack or even ridicule, my reply 
aims to reinscribe the meaning already given and produced by the student through what 
Paul Brockelman describes as a series of questioning “expression-meanings which 
intend or point to a ‘sense’ which never can be adequately contained in any of those 
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expressions, and yet which is disclosed through them” (65). It becomes a metaphorical 
attempt to isolate the thought concepts from their contextual parameters by chiseling at 
the cognitive mortar holding such sequential elements together in order to envision a 
different picture – to experience the possibility of a different understanding.  
 Other topics of investigation could equally be applied as terms and concepts in 
themselves: Consider words such as “freedom,” “empowerment,” and “democratic 
voice.” These are all things, aspects, ideas, and ideals for which we often espouse we 
should die to preserve, and yet these ideals look strange when reflected back to us as a 
mimetic paradox: Freedom on these conditions; empowerment the way I constitute it as 
you cannot because you are not free; democratic voice in a country where votes are the 
ideological whores of wealth – bought, bartered, sold, and traded by and in the interests 
of a wealthy and powerful ruling class. In light of the shifting lenses of ideology that are 
carefully laid onto meaning and articulation by those in power, I posit that it is quite 
possible that we can not know “reality” for any number of reasons, most of them having 
to with the machinations of a social system set on fulfilling the perceived needs of the 
handful in power at the expense of those who are not. Becoming aware that knowledge 
of reality is a matter of what we choose to perceive about it, in its essentialized state, is 
part of being human. As Brockelman puts it, the act of attempting to avoid choice is a 
“self-limitation from being a full self . . . to live a sort of pallid half-existence, [or] what 
... Nietzsche referred to as ‘bad conscience’” (19). 
 While any topic could be used for phenomenological investigation and eidetic 
reduction, it is often the more contestable social issues such as abortion and racism that 
present starker contrasts when subjected to critique. As object-noema we would likely 
find a great many trite and formulaic assertions in our student essays such as “abortion is 
murder” or “racism does not exist due to policies of affirmative action.” Indeed, we 
might say now that in any given social group most “rational” people would say that 
racism is wrong. Yet, if we have so many who agree, in principle at least, that it is 
wrong, the question remains as to why we have so much of it? Why the need for 
affirmative action? Why, if it’s acknowledged as being so wrong does the concept of 
racism even flourish as an agenda for discourse? Here, we return to the adumbrations of 
perception, and of the mosaic-tiling that pieces together our perceptual referents: The 
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pieces as stagnant ideals, such as the concept that “racism is wrong,” may be accepted at 
face-value, but within a collected individual consciousness the outcomes we see enacted 
may look very different in their articulations. 
 It is not just “topics” that are open to a deracinative focus, but concepts 
themselves. One of the more common assertions I hear or read from first-year college 
students is the notion that “I am entitled to my opinion.” To apply deracination to such a 
statement we would first consider it as a phenomenological event comprising constituent 
parts – the things themselves – and the first-stage bracketing of the eidetic reduction 
would look as follows: 
 
  [I] [am] [entitle(ment)] [my] [opinion]  
 
The [I] and [my] are the most problematic elements of such an equation, because – 
phenomenologically speaking – [I]/[my] cannot be taken as a concrete given, one with 
immutable, pre-constituted boundaries. Who this “I” is may even shift according to time 
of day, state of health, state of mind, and reaction – emotional and cognitive – to the 
immediate surrounding context. The [am] is of secondary focus, because it implies a 
past-state of being; an acceptance of what has already been constituted and an inherent 
unwillingness to re-perceive the being as anything but reflecting the image the perceiver 
believes she has seen and internalized. Issues of [being entitled], or [entitle(ment)] 
reflect the [am] of being and concepts of what is right and just given what inherently is, 
and [opinion], in turn, reflects a constitutive sum of [I], [my], [am], and the corollary 
[entitle(ment)] that are justified as belonging to [I], [my], and [am].   
 Theorizing, however, remains an abstract ideal until it is put into practice, and 
we might ask what such a phenomenological analysis of sentence structure would look 
like in application. In response to the rhetorical question, consider the following 
comment posted on a WebCT discussion forum from a student in a face-to-face 
Decritique course: “It’s only my opinion, but there are some odd and interesting students 
in this class. ... But, I have the right to my own opinion.” There are a number of 
elements to consider in terms of guiding the student – through response – into an eidetic 
reduction of his own words and thoughts. The first is to focus on the words themselves 
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and what “things” they constitute; the second is to work towards deconstructing the 
inherent premise of autonomy contained in the concept of “I,” “am,” and “entitlement”; 
the third is to provide means for generating alternative perspectives within the context of 
the ideas expressed themselves. What follows is my response to the student’s comment: 
Most people, at least in a democratic society, would have little argument 
with the statement “I have the right to my opinion.” But, the issue in 
terms of critical analysis is not challenging the right for “I” to “have” an 
opinion, but of questioning – sincerely and reflectively – who is this “I”? 
What has constituted this “I”? What informs what this “I” thinks? (A 
multitude of ideological factors: family, culture, religion, education, 
media, literature, government ...). Has this “I” ever genuinely considered 
an alternative mode or way of being, even if in the end the “I” holds on to 
original ideas/opinions?  Look how the comment that “there are some odd 
and interesting students in this class” is followed with the statement 
“[n]ot that I am at all prejudiced about any one, I think everyone has a 
valid reason for being who they are, and I have no reason to question any 
of them. I just know people are all different.”  The words “odd” and 
“interesting” often have pejorative connotations, and this may be why the 
post offers reassurance that there’s nothing disparaging about the 
observations. However, they are fascinating words because they are so 
ideologically loaded; that is, they “mean” a great deal more than what 
initially appears. Because of this, we feel the need to justify their use for 
the context in which we’re speaking/writing. “Odd,” as in different from 
the norm – and in a wider social context – indicates possible suspicion, 
even threat, and “mass society” is, almost paradoxically, incredibly 
effective at quashing any threat to its gelatinous mediocrity. (B. Flores, 
“Response”) 
 True to the phenomenological concept of “to the things themselves,” the 
response does not seek to pass moral judgment, nor to contemplate the uncomfortable 
position of inherently agreeing with the student about his “odd” or “interesting” 
colleagues, nor circumvent the opportunity to establish critical dialogue by endorsing the 
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notion that everyone, indeed, does have the right to an opinion. Instead, it aims to focus 
exclusively on what the student writer has produced, and to reflect critically and open-
endedly over the ideas contained within the text itself.  The objective is to articulate an 
interruption to the process of perspective, and through interjection, to disturb the 
sequence of thought patterns that have constructed the articulation expressed through 
text in order to open extended margins of possibility for alternative modes of thought. 
These aspects will be considered in the following chapter – one that presents a pilot 
study contrasting the pedagogy of Decritique with the Concept of Critical Care. 
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6. Pilot Study: Decritique and Critical Care 
 
 As a pilot study to test the null hypothesis of Decritique, I taught seven class 
sections of first-year college English 1301 or 1302 over three consecutive semesters 
from fall 2003 to fall 2004 at Del Mar College. Del Mar is a fully accredited junior 
college in Corpus Christi, Texas that each year provides instruction to 21, 000 credit and 
non-credit students in the first two years of a four-year college or university degree, as 
well as granting associate degrees in vocational and technical education. As a 
community college, Del Mar maintains an open-admissions policy that caters to a broad 
cross-section of students ranging from Dual Credit courses in which advanced-level 
senior high school students study for concurrent first-year college course credits, to 
remedial coursework for under-prepared students seeking college entry, to both 
traditional college aged and mature-aged students. A recognized Hispanic-serving 
institution and ranked in the top two percent of community colleges in the United States 
that grant associate degrees to Hispanics, demographically the average Del Mar student 
is a 26-year-old Hispanic female in receipt of financial aid and likely the first in her 
family to pursue a college education (DMC Statistical Profile). 
 Four of the seven classes were taught using Decritique (DEC) and three with the 
Concept of Critical Care (CCC), with the student population including Dual Credit high-
school, traditionally-aged, and mature-aged students. The class sections were further 
divided in terms of delivery – either face-to-face (F2F) in a computer-assisted classroom 
or fully online (OL) using the educational software program WebCT. The objective was 
to establish on observation, through qualitative and quantitative analysis, and in keeping 
with the primary and secondary components of the research question, whether there 
were tangible differences in sophistication of analysis and reflective thought between the 
two approaches, and if further investigation into Decritique as a reconceptualized critical 
pedagogy was warranted.  
 Several limitations of this study need acknowledgement in relation to reliability 
of the data and the statistical significance of the results. These are: 
• A small population of 80 students; 
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• External factors of class assignments; 
• Inconsistency in content of courses; and 
• Researcher bias 
The first three points are interrelated. Ideally, the study would have drawn from a far 
larger student population, but as an adjunct instructor there were restrictions placed on 
the number of courses I was permitted to teach. Moreover, decisions about the classes 
assigned to adjunct instructors are made by departmental chairs and scheduling faculty; 
as a result, I was unable to select the classes I would teach. While the results would carry 
greater validity had the seven class sections been identical in terms of all English 1301 
or all English 1302 course material, this study reflects a combination of both. The 
content of the courses taught over the three semesters, therefore, is inconsistent, and this 
is why in certain sections of the analysis particular focus is given to the English 1301 
classes. Finally, while researcher bias was minimized through the use of blind 
evaluations and genuine commitment to the project, results would carry more conviction 
had the classes been taught by independent, third-party instructors informed about the 
two different pedagogical approaches.  
 Students considered eligible for the study were those who, regardless of a 
passing or failing grade in the course, had completed all the assignments used for 
research analysis. These assignments were: Individual Portfolio Journal (IPJ entries) 
from the first and last three weeks of each semester; the first essay; the final essay; and 
peer critique (CCC) or deracination (DEC). Courses were divided between English 1301 
(fall) and 1302 (spring), mandated first-year college English classes usually taken 
sequentially. In my teaching of these courses, emphasis was placed on students writing 
thesis-driven analytical essays that showed evidence of critically reflective thought. 
While both classes focused on text analysis, English 1301 looked more closely at themes 
of contemporary social issues while 1302 applied socio-cultural theory to thematic 
interpretation of literature. However, regardless of a CCC or DEC class, the readings, 
lecture notes, WebCT environments, and essay and IPJ writing prompts were 
respectively identical for English 1301 and English 1302. 
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Table 6.1 
Pilot Study Population Fall 2003 to Fall 2004 
Semester Class Pedagogy Mode Population Retention 
Fall 2003 English 1301 
English 1301 
DEC 
CCC 
OL 
F2F 
11 
15 
91.6 % 
65.2 % 
Spring 2004 English 1302 DEC 
DEC 
OL 12 
13 English 1302 F2F 
100 % 
68.0 % 
Fall 2004 English 1301 
English 1301 
English 1301 
DEC 
CCC 
F2F 
F2F 
OL 
10 
10 
9 
59.1 % 
50.0 % 
CCC 81.8 % 
   Total: 80  
 
 Over the three semesters, as represented in Table 6.1, the population of 80 
students comprised 46 (57.5 %) instructed with Decritique and 34 (42.5 %) with Critical 
Care. Of those, 48 (60.0 %) were taught in a face-to-face classroom and 32 (40.0 %) 
online. Statistically, the mean DEC demographic was a female aged 20.2 years taking 
the class either OL or F2F, while the average CCC student was also female, slightly 
younger at 19.5 years, and taking the course F2F. The average age of the population was 
19.9 years, with 40 percent being Dual Credit students aged between 16 and 18 years.  
Average age excluding the Dual Credit students was 21.8 years. The DEC F2F students 
represented a wider age variance from a low of 19 to a high of 52. While the median, or 
middle, age for this group was 24 years, the modal age of 19 years reflects a 
concentrated group of 19-year-old students; moreover, those in the 19-to-24 year age 
range constituted over 50 percent of the population.  Average gender distribution across 
semesters was 32.5 percent males to 67.5 percent females, although the DEC classes 
showed a slightly increased enrollment of male students at 6.9 percent when compared 
with the CCC groups (Tables 6.2 and 6.3). 
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Table 6.2 
Overview of Population All Semesters 
 
Semester Group Students Average Age Males Females 
Fall 2003 DEC OL 11 17.2 36 % 64 % 
 CCC F2F 15 21.4 39 % 61 % 
Spring 2004 DEC F2F 13 28.4 31 % 69 % 
 DEC OL 12 17.7 33 % 67 % 
Fall 2004 DEC F2F 10 21.4 45 % 55 % 
 CCC F2F 10 20.3 29 % 71 % 
 CCC OL 9 17.0 18 % 82 % 
Total:  80 20.0 32.5 % 67.5 % 
 
Table 6.3 
Comparison of Demographic Data All Semesters 
Group Students Average Age Males Females 
All Students 80 20.0 32.5 % 67.5 % 
CCC OL and F2F 34 19.5 28.6 % 71.4 % 
CCC OL  9 17.0 18 % 82 % 
CCC F2F 25 21.0 34 % 66 % 
DEC OL and F2F 46 21.2 36 % 64 % 
DEC OL 23 17.5 34 % 66 % 
DEC F2F 23 24.9 38 % 62 % 
 
 Retention statistics were broken into three components: the first examined the 
entire population; the second considered all students eligible for the study; the third 
excluded Dual Credit students, with the rationale for exclusion based on the mandated 
high school attendance requirements that was not a factor for non-Dual Credit college 
students. Average retention between the two groups based on the eligible population was 
79.6 percent for DEC and 65.6 percent for CCC, a difference of 14.0 percent in favor of 
the Decritique classroom. Excluding the Dual Credit students, the disparity was less 
marked, with 63.5 percent DEC retention compared with 57.6 percent CCC, a difference 
of 5.9 percent. Retention data is presented in Figure 6.1. 
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 Fig. 6.1: Retention Comparison: Eligible Population and With Exclusions 
 
For English 1301 students, admission for enrollment at Del Mar College is regulated by 
the results of state-designated reading and writing placement tests. For this study, test 
scores of the eligible English 1301 students were collected to ascertain if there were 
significant variations between the groups. Del Mar accepts any one of the following five 
tests to determine such eligibility: 
• TAAS: Texas Assessment of Academic Skills 
• TASP/THEA: Texas Academic Skills Program6 
• SAT: Scholastic Aptitude Test 
• ACT: American College Test 
• COMPASS: Computer Assisted Assessment 
 
Table 6.4  
Equivalency of Minimum Passing Scores in College Placement Tests 
 
Test Reading Score Writing Score Combined Scores 
TAAS 89 1170 1259 
TASP 230 230 460 
SAT 500 500 1000 
ACT 19 19 38 
COMPASS 84-100 82-100 166-200 
 
                                                 
6 In late 2003, the TASP test was renamed THEA (Texas Higher Education Assessment) 
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 A comparative equivalency of minimum passing scores for entry into English 
1301 is shown in Table 6.4. As the only requirement for enrolling in English 1302 is 
successful completion of English 1301, the 1301 course grades of eligible 1302 students 
were used as an equivalent comparison rather than standardized placement test scores. 
 Analysis of the IPJs was by word count, complexity of thought, written 
expression, and range of vocabulary.  IPJs also served as a place for students to write 
their observations and reflections about each class, which were incorporated into the 
analysis of the study. The peer critique (CCC) and deracination (DEC) assignments were 
evaluated by word count, development of ideas in relation to examples and discussion of 
their relevance, the tone of writing – whether formal, semi-formal, or informal – and 
degree of concrete, critical direction that a student provided to his or her colleague. 
Evaluation also included word count, sentence complexity (words per sentence; passive 
tense percentage), and Flesch-Kincaid Reading Ease (RE) and Reading Grade Level 
(RGL). Generally, the lower an RE score, the easier an essay is to read; conversely, a 
higher RGL indicates more complex written expression of ideas. A low RE score 
accompanied by a high RGL, therefore, indicates an essay that articulates complex ideas 
in a sophisticated, yet clear style. A high RE score combined with a low RGL suggests 
the inverse. Ideally, then, students would decrease the RE score and increase the RGL. 
Finally, analysis of these assignments involved constructing categories to reflect either a 
positive (+) correlation for “critical” commentary or a negative (-) for “uncritical.” The 
rationale for the positive/negative correlation was that the more specific and detailed the 
commentary, the more it reflected depth of critical thought (+ve); the more students 
resorted to token niceties of social discourse, the lesser degree to which the student was 
thinking critically and reflectively (-ve). The correlation data used for measurement is 
presented in Table 6.5. 
 
Table 6.5 
Positive/Negative Correlation: Peer Critique and Deracination 
 
Analytical Categories Examples/Definition + or - 
Personal Communication “I hope I’ve done this right …” - 
Token Niceties “This essay is good” or “excellent job” - 
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Vague, Generalized Finalities “You need to elaborate more” - 
Sandwiching Critical Comments Criticism comes between praise - 
Specific or Summative Criticism Criticism drawing on cited examples + 
Contradictions/Objections Identifying contradictions and developing objections + 
Stand-alone Critical Comments Critique that stands without exemplification + 
 
 Although first essays were evaluated by the researcher through written 
commentary to each student, final essays were submitted electronically and graded 
“blind” by two first-year college English instructors, one of whom was the researcher. 
Such blind submissions involved removing any references to student or course identity, 
saving the files under each student’s social security number, and holistic evaluation 
without commentary. As for the peer critiques and deracinations, essays were also 
evaluated by word count, sentence complexity, RE and RGL. Essays could earn a 
maximum numeric grade of 100, with letter-grade divisions represented as follows: A 
(90-100); B (80-89); C (70-79); D (60-69); and F (59 or below). Assessment criteria, 
known in advance by all students, were drawn from the Del Mar College English 
Department’s Expectations for Formal Written Work in College-Level Courses, and this 
also served as the criteria for analysis (see Appendix B). 
 
6.1 The Concept of Critical Care: Fall 2003, Fall 2004 
 A total of 34 eligible students were enrolled in three CCC classes in fall 2003 
and fall 2004; of these, 9 were Dual Credit students. While two class sections were 
taught F2F and one OL, all three were English 1301 courses. Average age in each 
semester was 21.4, 17.0 and 20.3 years, with an overall mean of 19.5 years. Gender was 
nearly equally distributed, with a male:female ratio of 28.7 to 71.3 percent.  
 
Table 6.6 
CCC Age and Gender 
 
Semester Students Average Age Male Female 
Fall 2003 F2F 15 21.4 39 % 61 % 
Fall 2004 OL 9 17.0 18 % 82 % 
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Fall 2004 F2F 10 20.3 29 % 71 % 
Total: 34    
All Averages:  19.5 years 28.7 % 71.3 % 
 
As none of the placement tests for entering English 1301 students was common to all 
students, a mean was established within the population to provide high, average, and low 
points of comparison for the disparate test scores. The established mean taken from all 
five tests is represented in Table 6.7. 
 
Table 6.7 
Mean Across Semesters CCC English 1301 Placement Tests  
 
Placement Test High Average Low Minimum Pass 
TAAS 2, 330 2, 003 1, 890 1, 259 
TASP/THEA 518 493.8 462 460 
SAT 605 540 440 500 
ACT 47.5 40.9 31.5 38 
COMPASS 168.5 160.8 118 166 
 
It is important to note that averages taken from three of the tests showed means below 
the minimum passing score  (SAT, ACT, and COMPASS). This anomaly is explained 
by an essay-writing component of the placement tests. If a student receives a high-
passing grade on the test’s essay portion, the low reading/writing score is dismissed. For 
the purposes of this study, the essay scores were not calculated for comparison. Analysis 
of test scores from all 34 CCC students indicated that 25 (73.5 %) were above the 
minimum passing score and 9 (26.5 %) were below. 
 
6.1.1 Pedagogy in Practice 
 For the CCC classes, I made a concerted effort to emphasize a sense of nurturing 
and understanding, being sure to establish direct eye contact with the students in the F2F 
classroom and to smile encouragingly when they spoke. During the first class meeting, 
whether F2F or OL, we undertook an introductory activity involving the writing of a 
short biographical statement, which students then exchanged and used to “introduce” 
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each other to the class.  Students were then asked for input about the type of classroom 
environment that would be most conducive to their learning, and ensuing discussion 
endorsed the value of open sharing and support. This, in turn, led to the establishment of 
ground rules for communication drawn on the principles of tolerance and respect. I 
advised the groups that while I took note of absenteeism, attendance was neither 
mandated nor evaluated, and that those students who were prepared for class and 
attended regularly – physical presence in the F2F classroom and virtual presence for the 
OL students – not only demonstrated respect for their peers, but also tended to achieve 
better results in the course. I promoted the classroom as a place of warmth and caring, 
emphasizing the pronoun “our” when describing assignments or activities, and 
reinforcing the importance of involvement, concern, and investiture by all, including the 
instructor.  
 During the weeks that ensued, in each of the classes a pattern began to emerge, 
whether in the OL environment or in the F2F, where the majority of students showed a 
marked preference for my initiation and development of discussion. In the F2F groups, 
many students came unprepared for class, having not read the assigned material – a point 
few were reluctant to admit, whether through half-embarrassed silence, smiles, or 
shrugs. While the OL group, based on their contributions to the discussion forums, fared 
better in this regard, the content of their posted messages reflected a sense of “answering 
the question” posited by the instructor, and was frequently prefaced with words of 
concern, such as “I hope I’ve got this right” or “this is only my opinion, but … .” 
Subsequently, both as a whole class and within small groups, we went through the 
readings, collaboratively identifying points for further discussion. Each student who 
made a point was validated by name as an authentic contributor – “so, as Roberta says 
...” – in order to foster a sense of community and sharing. In the F2F classrooms, I also 
made sure to sit beside students as they spoke, avoiding the authoritative teacher-
presence at the front of the class. 
 In the open discussion forum interactions and in responses to IPJs, my comments 
were marked by a positive, encouraging tone – almost always opening with a point of 
affirmation and with any critique “sandwiched” carefully between two compliments 
(Rubin 386). Yet, the CCC IPJ posts – whether OL or F2F – continued to be problematic 
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in terms of development, exemplification, and reflection. Moreover, responses were 
driven almost entirely by observation from lived experience as veridical evidence. 
Abortion, as a topical example, was often wrong because “God and the Bible say so” or 
that it is “murder, plain and simple,” or “my cousin had an abortion and regrets it to this 
day.”  Attempting to expand discussion beyond the parameters of “the personal,” I often 
posited “what if” questions integrated into the narrative of my replies. While seeking to 
build the students’ sense of trust in me as a non-threatening partner in their learning, I 
also modeled development and exemplification by paralleling their writing style; that is, 
using personal examples from my own experience, yet extending those examples into a 
broader social application. Verbal discussion in the F2F classes and written open forum 
posts for the OL group also tended to focus on the veracity of individual truth. When we 
engaged the topic of religion and poverty, typical answers ranged from personal stories – 
“I worked at the diocese office here in the city and I know what goes on with the food 
voucher system” – to experiences about being saved by the Christian faith or affected by 
what is written in the Christian Bible.  Carefully phrased objections such as “how might 
a Muslim respond to such a comment” were often met with disparaging assertions about 
Muslims as religious fanatics, with the conversation quickly digressing into the 
September 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York as “evidence” 
for such statements. While I would have liked to have seen fewer examples driven so 
clearly by personal belief in the CCC classroom, following the principles of this 
pedagogy that seeks to respect rather than directly challenge the opinions of others, I did 
not critically intervene, allowing students the unfettered and authentic expression of 
their individual voices and ideas. Authenticating such voices also extended to my 
vocabulary choice with the CCC students, using the language and diction with which 
they were comfortable. Rather than using words such as “arbitrary,” “ubiquitous,” or 
“that’s acceptable” – terms that are part of my vernacular – I chose “random,” 
“everywhere,” and “that’s cool” in an attempt to foster common ground.  
 In keeping with the socio-cultural analysis characteristic of English 1301, writing 
assignments drew from readings and class discussions that presented contemporary 
social issues of homelessness, abortion, and gender-relations. One of the readings, 
“Breakfast at McDonald’s,” described a woman’s experience buying breakfast for two 
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homeless men at a fast food restaurant. Students were asked to analyze the text in 
relation to a thematic question of “what’s wrong with this picture?” There are several 
instances in the story positioning the protagonist as representing the Christian-duty of 
giving, and a sanctimonious tone that glosses over the material conditions of existence 
for the two men. In discussion, there was near-unanimous agreement that the woman’s 
actions were warm-hearted and caring. Many supported this claim by stating that on 
occasion they had given one or two dollars to the homeless – except, interestingly, when 
such people smelled offensively of alcohol. Five students (one in F03; two each in the 
F2F and OL F04 semesters) demonstrated discord by raising more serious questions 
about why the homeless men were destitute in such an economically advanced country 
as the United States. Attempting to support the objection and foster deeper, more critical 
reflection, I encouraged this line of thinking in a non-threatening way by asking the 
students as a group “what do you think about these other viewpoints?”  
 Despite this intervention, the majority perspective dominated in the CCC classes: 
People are homeless because they don’t try or work hard enough, and that anyone in 
America can rise if he or she puts forth enough effort, reflecting an intrinsic commitment 
to what might be termed the “American dream of opportunity.” Although this consensus 
was reached through collaboration, there was spirited, yet ostensibly one-sided, 
discussion. F2F students at times talked over one another, demonstrating enthusiastic 
engagement with the topic, and posted discussion messages in the OL class also 
temporarily increased at this point. Assertions drew heavily on stereotypes about 
“drunken homeless people” who deserved what they got from their own actions or the 
relating of personal stories about friends or relatives having participated in socially 
unacceptable behavior such as drug abuse or criminal activity and suffered as a result. 
The few students who had raised discord did not continue with their opposition and, 
although they offered some reflection in their private IPJ entries, ultimately conceded to 
the points of the group. 
 
6.1.2 The Individual Portfolio Journals 
 The primary objective of the Individual Portfolio Journal (IPJ) was to actively 
engage students in critical reflection on their learning, and two sets of IPJs were 
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examined from the CCC classes: Weeks 1-3 from the start of semester and Weeks 10-12 
from the end.  My responses were positive and encouraging, offering constructive 
questions to prompt further student response. Analysis focused on calculating word 
count and examining language use. The first IPJ set comprised twelve questions ranging 
from initial impressions of the course, to difficulties students thought they may 
encounter with their learning, to prompts relating to the first set of readings. 
 Students from all three CCC classes wrote a total of 58, 141 words (9, 286; 21, 
663; 27, 192) in their first set of IPJs. The highest word count at 27, 192 came from the 
CCC OL students, and this is not surprising considering that communication in the 
online environment is entirely text-based. The comparison between the two remaining 
CCC classes, both F2F, is interesting. In the fall 2003 semester, CCC F2F students 
produced only 9, 286 words in the first IPJ set, compared with students in the 
comparative fall 2004 group, who wrote 21, 663. The final set of IPJs yielded similarly 
comparative results. Again, the highest word count was from the OL class at 20, 105 
words, with the two F2F groups recording 10, 541 and 19, 421 words – or a total for all 
classes of 50, 067 words. With a total enrollment of 34 students, the average word count 
produced across semesters for the first IPJ set was 1, 710 and for the final set 1, 472. 
This data is represented in Figure 6.2. 
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 Fig. 6.2: Comparison of IPJ First and Final Word Count: CCC 
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 Analysis of the students’ language in the IPJs yielded consistent results in terms 
of diction. In addition to drawing on the veracity of personal truth when exemplifying 
points, CCC students did not show evidence of a wide vocabulary, often using 
colloquialisms such as “this freaked me out” and short, syllabic words such as “scared” 
and “hard.”  In reference to completing the course, many expressed abstract and 
generalized notions of desiring to “get through it” or “do well enough to pass” rather 
than communicating more tangible, concrete goals and expectations. Responses in 
regard to the course readings were answered diligently, yet frequently in a sequential 
pattern of separated “answers” to each “question,” and often enumerated. Moreover, 
CCC students consistently rewrote each IPJ question in full before providing their 
response beneath it.  
 As the purpose of the IPJ was for exploratory and informal writing that made 
personalized, individual connections with the course themes and reading, I emphasized 
that grammar, punctuation, and spelling (GPS) would not be graded for accuracy. On 
observation, the IPJ posts were likely to use slang expressions, misspellings and, 
curiously, often an omission of capitalized letters. CCC students also tended to use 
clichés and formulaic assertions. When offering a definition for critical thinking, as an 
example, most students responded with a single statement such as “thinking outside the 
box” or “looking at both sides of an argument.”  My responses to the CCC posts were 
underscored with positive reinforcement, careful use of the student’s name, and 
reference to “me” as an individual and identifiable audience-reader, as in the following: 
“This is a very good point you’ve made here, [student name], and I think I understand 
what you mean. Perhaps you could use some more specific examples, though, to make 
your point clearer to me.”  
 By the fifth week of semester, I began to comment less in the IPJs, reasoning that 
students would sustain the established momentum. This was the case with IPJ writing, 
but with the exception of an animated debate over homelessness, open forum discussion 
dwindled considerably. Although I again began responding to the few contributions that 
appeared on the open forum, my posts frequently ended up far longer than those to 
which I replied. Still, several OL students communicated to me their concern about my 
perceived interactivity; one emailed to ask “why are you angry with us? Don’t you like 
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us anymore?” The reference to the pronoun “us” indicates that this student had discussed 
the situation with colleagues in her high school class and acted as spokesperson for the 
group.  In keeping with the principles of Critical Care, my return email was positive, 
emphasizing how well the students were doing and reassuring the group that there was 
no ill feeling on my part. 
 
6.1.3 First Essay 
 It was course policy that all students who submitted the first essay on or before 
the due date could rewrite the assignment for a better grade provided the essay was 
evaluated at less than an A. Letter grades of A, B, or C indicated a passing paper, but the 
D or F was not given on these first essays; instead, students not meeting passing criteria 
received a non-failing grade of “Draft.” If the student chose not to rewrite such an essay, 
the grade would revert to a failing F by the end of semester. The objective of my CCC 
commentary was to guide students in making significant revision to their work, 
endorsing the concept of writing as a recursive process rather than a final product. 
Emphasis was placed on encouraging, positive remarks designed to bolster student 
confidence and self-esteem. I also sought to maintain the integrity of the students’ 
writing by commenting only at the end of each paragraph. The following excerpt from 
an F2F 04 essay, one that received a “Draft,” exemplifies the typical style and tone of 
CCC commentary. The essay prompt asked students to consider embedded gender-
relations in a newspaper article that discussed the attempts of single men and women to 
find their “ideal partner” through a blind-date competition. My comments are in italics 
and prefaced with an arrow (Å): 
 
In the Caller Times newspaper there was recently a contest called The Most Eligible 
Bachelor/Bachelorette. In this article, people choose one of several different people and 
vote for one single man and one single woman who seem like the “most eligible” 
bachelor and bachelorette. Readers can also vote for their favorite couple. The couple 
that wins this contest get to go on a free date at the expense of the Caller Times. Society 
has molded everyone to overlook the small underlying social commentaries in an 
everyday article or ad. 
 
ÅThe direction of your essay is outlined very clearly here, [student name], but can you 
see the leap from discussing the article to your quite strong thesis about society having 
molded everyone?  We need a smoother transition here to help me understand the 
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connections between your ideas. Why not try to open your essay with the last sentence of 
this paragraph and then work in an introduction to the newspaper article? 
 
In this article, the winners of the contest were [names identified]. The main reason the 
audience picked these people is because they were probably the most “high profiled” out 
of the bunch.  [One] is a young reading teacher and [the other] is a news reporter for the 
local television station. A big factor for [the male] getting chosen is the fact that it is a 
good publicity stunt for the TV station. The voting is not a completely fair vote. Before 
the date the two writers [of the article] interviewed [the female contestant . . .].  While 
waiting for her to “primp” herself up before the date she [the writer] mentioned that 
while Benavides fixed her hair the family dog was watching her transform into an 
evening glamour princess. 
 
Å This last sentence is great, [student name]!  Maybe you could also think about how 
the idea of “eligibility” connects with being “a woman,” too – that is, she “has” to look 
like a “glamour princess.” Not too sure about saying that the voting “is not a 
completely fair vote,” because we don’t really know this, but overall, you’re on the right 
track. I really like the part about the family dog watching it all! 
 
Å Final Remarks: There’s lots of potential here, [student name]. You show a very good 
understanding of the concepts behind looking deeper into something that on the surface 
is not very significant at all. Some minor grammar problems need attention (review 
section 4.2 in your grammar book). Read over my comments and then let’s see a rewrite. 
 
 Of the 34 first essays submitted, 18 passed (52.9 %) with 4 As, 8 Bs, and 6 Cs.  
Sixteen (47.1 %) received a status of Draft. After rewrites, the grade distribution 
changed to 28 passing (82.4 %) with 10 As, 11 Bs, and 7 Cs. Six essays (17.6 %) failed 
with either no rewrite submitted or a rewrite that received a D or F. Ten students from 
the F2F 03 class submitted rewrites, with all but one of these receiving a passing grade 
of C or higher for the first essay. From the F04 students, four had received an A and so 
did not qualify for a rewrite. Eleven of the remaining students submitted rewrites. Ten of 
these received a passing grade of C or higher, with only one essay earning a failing 
grade of D. None of the F2F rewrites, however, earned a grade of A on rewrite. Of some 
concern is that four of the OL students did not submit a rewrite at all, and so the grade 
reverted to an F by the end of semester.  This data is represented in Table 6.8. 
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Table 6.8 
Distribution of CCC First Essay Grades 
 
Before Rewrites # After Rewrites # 
A 4 A 10 
B 8 B 11 
C 6 C 7 
Draft 16 D/F 6 
Total 34 Total 34 
 
 As for the peer critique assignments, analysis of the essays examined word 
length, average words per sentence, percent of passive sentences, and Flesch-Kincaid 
Reading Ease (RE) and Reading Grade Level (RGL). While the two F2F classes 
averaged a similar grade for the first essay at 83.2 (F04) and 81.8 (F03), the OL class 
scored a significantly lower average at 71.8. The explanation is that four students from 
this latter class whose essays had received a “Draft” chose not to submit a rewrite, and 
the average OL grade at 89.2 is far higher than the F2F when re-calculated with the four 
non-rewrites excluded. The RE score is consistent across the three classes in the mid-to-
high fifties, as is the RGL at 10.3 (F2F F03), 9.0 (F2F F04), and 10.0 (OL F04). Use of 
passive sentences ranged from a low of 8.3 % to a high of 15.0 % in the F2F F04 and 
F2F F03 semesters respectively, and the average words per sentence holds reasonably 
steady at between 17 and 20. The average length of the essays is greater in the F04 
classes (the identical average word count of 904 in each is a coincidence) than the 728 
word average of the F2F F03 class. A summation of averaged results for the first essay – 
after rewrites – is provided in Table 6.9, while summative averages across the three 
semesters for the first essay are presented in Table 6.10. 
 
Table 6.9 
Analysis of First Essay CCC After Rewrites 
 
Structural Analysis F2F F03 F2F F04 OL F04 
Word length 728 904 904 
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Average words per sentence 19.4 16.9 20.2 
Passive sentences 15.0 % 8.3 % 12.0 % 
Flesch-Kincaid Reading Ease 55.4 59.8 54.9 
Flesch-Kincaid Reading Grade Level 10.3 9.0 10.0 
Average Grade 81.8 83.2 71.8 
 
Table 6.10 
Summative Analysis of CCC First Essays After Rewrites 
 
Structural Analysis Average Across Semesters 
Word length 845 
Average words per sentence 18.8 
Passive sentences 11.8 % 
Flesch-Kincaid Reading Ease 56.7 
Flesch-Kincaid Reading Grade Level 9.8 
Average Grade 78.9 
 
 
 
6.1.4 Peer Critique  
 While the objective of students analyzing, assessing, and evaluating the work of 
their colleagues is the same for both deracination and peer critique, the application is 
different. In undertaking peer critique, CCC students followed the Washington State 
University Critical Thinking Rubric (WSUCTR), reading and discussing it in class, and 
focusing on the rubric’s organizational headings that categorize degrees of critique into a 
sequence of Scant, Minimal, Acceptable, and Substantial (see Appendix C). The peer 
critique assignments were tied to the writing, drafting, and submission of the final essay 
for the course. My analysis of this assignment compared key phrases with either a 
positive (+) or negative (-) correlation; I also examined word count mean, passive 
sentence percentages, and Flesch-Kincaid Reading Ease and Grade Level.  
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 Total peer critique word count produced in the three CCC classes was 11, 844, or 
an average of 348 words for each of the 34 critiques. The OL group recorded the highest 
word count at 5, 039; next was the F2F fall 2004 class at 4, 749 words; last was the  
2, 056 words recorded by the F2F fall 2003 group – as represented in Table 6.11.  
 
Table 6.11 
Comparison of Peer Critique Across Semesters 
 
Category of Analysis CCC F2F CCC F2F     CCC OL      
Average words per sentence 16.2 11.7 15.9 
Passive sentences 8 % 2 % 6 % 
Flesch-Kincaid Reading Ease 64.2 67 62 
Reading Grade Level 8.1 6.7 8.5 
Word Count 2, 056 4, 749 5, 039 
 
Although the sample is very small, one point to note is that higher word counts did not 
result in increased reading grade levels (RGL), nor a lower percentage in passive 
sentence use. The highest RGL of Grade 8 was achieved by the F03 F2F (8.1) and OL 
(8.5) groups, that recorded a total of 2,056 and 5,039 words respectively in their peer 
critiques. The 4, 749 words produced by the F2F F04 class nearly equaled that of the OL 
(5, 039), yet the RGL was a very low 6.7 with a correspondingly small 2 percent of 
passive sentences. This group did, however, record the highest reading ease of 67, 
although the other two classes were not far behind at 64.2 and 62.  Interestingly, and 
despite the low word count, the F2F 03 students averaged the highest number of words 
per sentence at 16.2, compared with 11.7 (F2F F04) and 15.9 (OL F04), indicating that 
while the total word count was not high, the sentence structure for this first group was 
more complex than their F2F counterparts, and on par with those in the OL class.  
 Comparing the positive/negative correlation in the key phrases of analysis 
showed that, on average across the three classes, 87.9 percent of the peer critiques 
reflected negative correlations of personal communication, token niceties, vague or 
generalized finalities and the “sandwiching” of critical commentary between two non-
critical statements (86.7 %; 82.7 %; 94.2 %). This left 12.1 percent, on average, of 
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positive correlations in terms of specific or summative criticism, developed 
contradictions/objections, and stand-alone critical comments (13.3 %; 17.3 %; 5.8 %).  
 
Table 6.12 
Positive and Negative Correlations Across Semesters  
 
Positive/Negative Correlatives +/- CCC F2F    CCC F2F    CCC OL      
Personal Communication - 6.5 % 5.6 % 8.3 % 
Token Niceties - 9.8 % 6.7 % 15.6 % 
Vague, Generalized Finalities - 48.5 % 53.2 % 46.9 % 
Sandwiching Critical Comments - 21.9 % 17.2 % 23.4 % 
Specific or Summative Criticism + 4.5 % 5.8 % 1.7 % 
Contradictions/Objections + 6.3 % 11.1 % 3.0 % 
Stand-Alone Critical Comments + 2.5 % 0.4 % 1.1 % 
 
Analysis of the correlations often reflected minimal development that frequently stayed 
well within the confines of the concrete, either in terms of the essay prompt’s 
requirements or commentary that focused only on specific points the writer had made 
without attempts to expand the direction of ideas. In short, the CCC students tended to 
stay with what had been prescribed by the assignment’s prompt, the associated readings, 
and the guidelines provided in the CTR. Of all three classes, the F2F F04 students 
averaged the highest percentage for positive correlatives at 17.3 percent, the OL F04 
class the lowest at 5.8 percent, and the F2F F03 group falling in the middle at 13.3 
percent. 
   
6.1.5 Positive Correlations 
 Specific or summative criticism, defined as a critique that pinpoints perceived 
deficits, yet is unsupported by convincing counter-arguments, was below 6 percent in all 
three classes (4.5 %; 5.8 %; 1,7 %), and almost uniformly offered at the end of a peer 
critique. Examples from the three classes include: “since it is the closing of the paper, 
these new topics aren’t going to get touched on” and “in the second paragraph you 
present the woman contradicting herself and then state the same idea in the third 
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paragraph” (F2F F03); “[y]our first paragraph is also scant, due to the fact that it does 
not reflect the prompt” and “[t]he rest of your body [paragraph] does nothing more but 
talk about the story that we all read and know about” (F2F F04); “without a clear and 
easy to isolate thesis statement the reader is lost” (OL F04). 
 The identification of contradictions then showing the development of objections 
to the incongruity was highest in the F2F F04 class at 11.1 percent, followed by the F2F 
F03 group at 6.3 percent and a low of 3.0 percent from the OL F04 students. For this 
category of analysis, the working parameters were objections to a point, coupled with 
development of a strong counter-argument to support the objection. Both the F2F classes 
showed stronger performance in this category than their OL counterparts, with 
comments such as “a point you don’t back up is why women should be religious, 
someone who is caring and compassionate – unless of course you believe that those 
concepts of woman are wrong” (F03), “let’s recall that the feminist movement is the 
fight for women to acquire rights and, therefore, the anti-feminist goes against all of 
this” (F04) and “you say that [character’s name] does not work and she still has 
freedom,’ – well, you contradict yourself because it clearly states [in the reading] that 
she is a writer” (F04). The OL students, in contrast, tended to focus more on the 
specifics of the essay assignment in this category, with a fairly typical example as 
follows: “As your intro, it must set up your essay by pointing out a clear thesis and must 
also include the major points that your supporting paragraphs will provide. You have not 
done this” (OL F04).  
 Stand-alone critical comments were apparent the least in all the categories for 
analysis, with all three classes recording less than 3 percent of the total peer critique 
word count (2.5 %; 1.1 %; 0.4 %). While the F2F 04 students recorded the highest in 
contradictions and objections, they were the lowest in the stand-alone comments at 0.4 
percent, followed closely by the OL F04 group at 1.1 percent. Typical examples from 
both these groups include “the people writing this junk are full of bologna” (F2F F03), 
“the second paragraph begins rather oddly” and “this sentence confuses me” (F2F F04). 
The OL F04 students showed the least amount of stand-alone critical commentary at a 
dismal 0.4 percent, with one example being: “Your third body paragraph makes no sense 
to what you were trying to say in the previous two.”  
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6.1.6 Negative Correlations 
 Given that the OL F04 class recorded the lowest positive correlation percentage, 
it is not surprising that this group recorded the highest for negative correlations at 94.2 
percent, followed by the F2F F03 class again falling in the middle of the three groups at 
86.7 percent, and the F2F F04 students at 82.7 percent.  
Evidence of personal communication, where a student writer communicates an 
individualized message or note within the critique, was highest in the OL F04 class at 
8.3 percent.  The two F2F groups showed less than a one percent difference, at 6.5 and 
5.6 percent for the F03 and F04 classes respectively. Such messages always appeared 
either at the beginning or at the end of a critique, and include such examples as “thank 
you for allowing me to help in your essay” (F03), “I’m not going to lie, I don’t really 
know if I’m doing this correctly, but I will try my best” (F2F 04), “I hope that I didn’t 
come across as being rude, and if I did then I am truly sorry” and “[r]emember, I am not 
trying to be offensive in any way” (OL F04). The most curious phenomenon out of all 
the peer critiques, however, was the incidence of the phrase “this is just my opinion,” 
which constituted just over one-third of the total percentage for the personal 
communication category.  
 The use of token niceties, or the saying of something positive without 
sandwiching a negative comment in-between, were characterized by their near-
sycophantic appeal to emotion and often marked by the use of exclamation points or 
smiley-faced “emoticons.” The OL students not only had the highest percentage in this 
category at 15.6 percent, but also tended towards messages designed to bolster the self-
esteem of the writer rather than to comment positively on the work produced. Examples 
include: “Keep up the good work ☺,” “[g]ood luck, I know you can do it,” and “you 
incorporated that [example] into the beginning better than any of the papers I had read!” 
While the F2F students also appealed to emotion in their use of token niceties, the tone 
was more generalized than the OL group, and more likely to relate specifically to the 
writing rather than the writer: “Overall, your paper is excellent”; “good job of wrapping 
up your essay” (F2F 04), and “your paper was interesting – I learned a bit of history at 
the same time, so thank you!” (F2F 03). The F03 group recorded the second-highest 
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percentage of token niceties at 9.8 percent, with the lowest of 6.7 percent apparent in the 
F04 class. 
 Respectively, the F2F 03, OL F04, and F2F 04 students showed a 48.5, 52.3 and 
46.9 percent use of vague, generalized finalities in their peer critique assignments. 
Defined as the attempt to pass critical observation, these comments are more successful 
in conveying empty ideas that lack substance. Key words and phrases often used in this 
category include references to whether an essay “flowed well” (or not), a perceived need 
to “elaborate more,” and observations that “a lot of work” was needed.  The two F2F 
groups recorded the highest percentages for vague generalizations, at 53.2 (04) and 48.5 
percent (F03). Typical examples taken from these two groups are: “I got confused when 
you started talking about the two stories [only one was assigned] in your essay, so 
therefore I give your intro a scant”; “I give you an acceptable on your first body 
paragraph. The same can be said for your second body paragraph, which was good just 
like the first, so therefore I give it an acceptable” (F2F 04); “the closing paragraph was 
acceptable. It may have been a bit brief, though” (F2F 03). The OL class scored the 
lowest for vague generalities at 46.9 percent, with such examples as: “This paragraph 
has a topic sentence so that is a plus” and “If I must, I would rate the body paragraph 
ideas as ‘acceptable,’ yet could still use silly grammar work.”  
 The final category of analysis for peer critique is the “sandwiching” of criticism 
(Rubin), a term describing placement of a negative comment in between two positives. 
The two F2F classes scored closely in this regard, at 21.9 (03) and 23.4 percent (04). 
Examples, with the sandwiched criticism underlined, were: “Your second body 
paragraph is done very well, just emphasize more about her [the protagonist] with some 
word changes, but other than that you did great” (04) and “the ideas are great, although 
this is obviously a work in progress, but the essay has alot [sic] of potential” (F03). The 
OL students showed the least amount of sandwiching at 17.2 percent, but the caliber of 
criticism was similar to their F2F counterparts: “Again, great examples from the text. 
One thing is that you should use more symbols to show your points. Otherwise, it’s a 
good paragraph.” 
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6.1.7 Final Essay 
 Although there was no rewrite option for the final essay, its topic of abortion had 
been discussed throughout the semester, as had a focus on gender-related and feminist 
themes. Students had also been introduced to basic elements of fiction such as 
protagonist, antagonist, conflict, irony, and symbolism. The text used for the final essay 
was Sappho Scott’s short story “Letter to You” – a poignant and highly symbolic 
reflection on a mature, professional woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy – and 
the writing prompt asked students to identify symbols and ironies that supported an anti-
feminist theme. The final essays were evaluated blind and holistically by two first-year 
college English instructors, of whom the researcher was one, and the grade determined 
collaboratively. No written comments were recorded. In addition to following the style 
and content criteria for college-level essays provided by Del Mar, evaluations reflected 
the parameters of the prompt: We looked for evidence of an anti-feminist theme 
supported by examples of symbol and irony from the text. In addition to a letter-grade 
evaluation, essays were also analyzed in terms of word length, average words per 
sentence, passive sentences, Reading Ease (RE) and Reading Grade Level (RGL). 
Finally, using the latter categories, a comparative analysis was done between the first 
and final essay averages for CCC students across the three semesters. This data is 
presented in Table 6.13. 
 
Table 6.13 
Analysis of Averages CCC Final Essay with First Essay Comparison 
 
Structural Analysis F2F F03 F2F F04 OL F04 
 First Final 
 
First Final 
 
First Final 
 
Word length 728 774 
 
904 972 
 
904 935 
 
Words per sentence 19.4 22.2 
 
16.9 15.2 
 
20.2 17.8 
 
Passive sentences 15.0 % 13.1 % 
 
8.3 % 15.8 % 
 
12.0 % 17.0 % 
 
Reading Ease 55.4 56.8 
 
59.8 59.9 
 
54.9 57.4 
 
Reading Grade Level 10.3 10.5 
 
9.0 8.5 
 
10.0 9.0 
 
Average Grade 81.1 81.2 
 
83.2 83.0 
 
71.8 81.1 
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 All three classes show a marginal increase in average word count for the final 
essay when compared with the first: 3.3 % (F2F F03); 6.1 % (F2F F04); and 2.8 % (OL 
F04). In the average words per sentence, while the two F04 classes showed a decrease of 
1.7 (F2F) and 2.4 (OL), the F2F F03 students recorded an increase of 2.8. A similar 
pattern was observed in terms of RGL with the F2F F03, up from 10.3 to 10.5, recording 
the only increase; the two F04 classes dropped from 9.0 to 8.5 (F2F) and 10.0 to 9.0 
(OL). The trend was reversed in analysis of passive sentence averages. Comparing the 
first and final essays, both F04 groups increased the percentages from 8.3 to 15.8 (F2F) 
and 12.0 to 17.0 (OL), while the F03 essays showed a decline from 15.0 to 13.1 percent. 
Change in the RE over the semesters was minimal, with a divergent range of only 2.4 
(F2F F03, up 1.4; F2F F04, up 0.1; OL F04, up 2.5). The average grade showed high 
consistency with the F2F F03 and F2F F04 essays reflecting a minuscule deviation of 
0.1 and 0.2 respectively. The OL F04 class showed wide variation, but the 9.3 percent 
difference between first and final essay averages (71.8; 81.1) is again likely the result of 
four students in that class who did not submit a rewrite of the first essay draft and 
therefore received a failing grade on that assignment.  
 
Table 6.14 
Summative Averages of CCC First and Final Essays 
 
Structural Analysis First Essay Final Essay 
Word length 845 894 
Average words per sentence 18.8 18.4 
Passive sentences 11.8 % 15.3 % 
Flesch-Kincaid Reading Ease 56.7 58.0 
Flesch-Kincaid Reading Grade Level 9.8 9.3 
Average Grade 78.9 81.8 
 
 Summative averages of the first and final essays across the three semesters, as 
represented in Table 6.14, show an increase in four areas of analysis: word length (up 
4.1 %), passive sentence use (up 3.5 %), RE (up 1.3), and grade (up 2.8) – the latter 
indicating an increase of just over a third of a letter grade. Minimal decreases were 
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apparent in the average words per sentence, down 0.4 from 18.8 to 18.4 and the RGL, 
down 0.5 from 9.8 to 9.3.  
 
6.1.8 Retention, Attendance, and Participation 
 To ensure comparative consistency between the disparate modes of interaction in 
the F2F and OL classrooms, and as all students had access to identical computer-based 
environments, attendance and participation was measured using the WebCT tracking 
feature, which recorded how many times each student logged in and a tally of the posted 
discussion messages (both open and IPJ) of all students eligible for the study. Of the 58 
students initially enrolled in all three CCC classes (23 F2F F03; 24 F2F F04; 11 OL 
F04), 36 (62.0 %) were retained; that is, students who did not withdraw from the 
courses. From the retained group, 30 (83.3 %) passed the classes and 6 (16.7 %) failed. 
Of these students, 34 were considered eligible for research inclusion; that is, regardless 
of a passing or failing grade for each course, 34 students completed all the assignments 
used for analysis in this study.   
 Retention, as an auxiliary and incidental component of this study, was examined 
using data from all students, both eligible and non-eligible. The percentages vary widely 
across the semesters, with a high of 81.8 percent (9 students retained; 2 withdrew) in the 
OL F04 class, to 65.2 percent (15 retained; 8 withdrew) for F2F F03, to a low of 50.0 
percent (12 retained; 12 withdrew) for F2F F04. High retention in the OL F04 group was 
expected; this class comprised Dual Credit students whose high-school graduation 
depended on passing their college course. For the non-Dual Credit classes, retention in 
the F2F F03 group fared better than the F2F F04, with 15.2 percent more students 
retained in the former.  While all eligible students from both the F2F 04 and OL F04 
classes passed, 11 (73.3 %) passed the F2F F03 course and 4 (26.7 %) failed. These four 
students either failed the final essay or final exam, assignments that together constituted 
50 percent of the course grade, through a failing essay/exam grade or non-submission of 
examination.  Average retention, pass, and fail statistics for all CCC students, eligible 
and non-eligible, were: 62.1 percent retained, 83.3 percent pass, 16.7 percent fail.  
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Table 6.15 
Overview of CCC Enrolment, Retention, and Pass/Fail 
 
Category F2F F03 F2F F04 OL F04 All Classes 
Initial Enrolment 23 24 11 58 
Withdraw 8  
(34.8 %) 
12 
(50 %) 
2 
(18.2 %) 
22 
(37.9 %) 
Retained 15 
(65.2 %) 
12 
(50 %) 
9 
(81.8%) 
36 
(62.1 %) 
Passed Course 11 
(73.3 %) 
10 
(83.3 %) 
9 
(100 %) 
30 
(83.3 %) 
Failed Course 4 
(26.7 %) 
2 
(16.7 %) 
0 
(0 %) 
6 
(16.7 %) 
Eligible Students 15 
(100 %) 
10 
(83.3 %) 
9 
(100 %) 
34 
(94.4 %) 
  
 In relation to reasons for withdrawal, of the eight students who withdrew from 
the F2F F03 class, four stopped attending during the first four weeks. The remaining 
four had sporadic attendance through the semester and eventually dropped the course on 
their own volition. I made several attempts to talk with students who had more than 
three absences, communicating through email, after-class discussion, or phone calls. 
With the exception of two students who could not be contacted, all expressed varying 
degrees of challenge in their personal lives; none indicated perceived difficulty with the 
assigned work. Similar observations were apparent for the 12 students who withdrew 
from the F2F F04 class. Three stopped attending and nine identified various personal, 
non-college related problems as a cause for their failure in the class. The two students 
who withdrew from the OL F04 course did so at my recommendation as, due to non-
submission of assignments and poor participation, both risked a failing grade. As Dual 
Credit students, they were subsequently transferred back to a high-school English 
course. While caution needs to be exercised in drawing conclusions from a relatively 
small sample, overall there was a tendency for CCC students to divulge personal 
problems perceived as barriers to their learning and to see those barriers as concrete and 
insurmountable obstacles to their completion of the course.  
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 Participation of the 34 eligible students was measured by the number of log-ins 
to the WebCT environment and average number of posted forum messages (Table 6.16).  
 
Table 6.16 
CCC Participation of Eligible Students 
 
Category F2F F03 F2F F04 OL F04 Overall Averages 
Log-in Averages 468 603 652 574 
Total Posts 351 335 317 334.3 
Average Post/Student 23.4 33.5 35.2 30.7 
 
The average log-in statistics for each student was higher in the F04 semester than F03, at 
603 (F2F) and 652 (OL) compared with 468 (F2F), as indicated in Table 6.16. Although 
the total number of posted messages, both in the open and IPJ forums, was similar for all 
three groups at 351 (F2F F03), 335 (F2F F04), and 317 (OL F04), there is a deviation 
between the F03 and F04 semesters in terms of the average number of posts made by 
each student. In F03, the 15 F2F students averaged 23.4 posts, while the 10 F2F F04 and 
9 OL F04 students each averaged 33.5 and 35.2 posts respectively. Examination of 
attendance and participation from all three classes show that eligible students averaged 
574 log-ins, 334.3 total posts, and 30.7 posted messages per student. 
 
6.1.9 Student Observations 
 Student perceptions of the CCC classes were collected by way of three IPJ 
questions posited at the end of semester, focusing on experiences with peer critique and 
its relationship to critically reflective thinking, and a reflection on the course itself. 
Although semester’s end student commentaries, particularly those that are not 
anonymous, are objectively unreliable, the observations of the CCC students nonetheless 
provide a basis for comparative analysis with their DEC counterparts.  
 Generally, responses over peer critique from CCC students reflected 
identification – or recognition – of a collective normality, and the ways in which it was 
maintained. As an example, consider the following F2F student responses: “Critiques are 
good. You can reflect back on what the person has said. And, I also think it’s 
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respectful”; “[h]onestly, I never doubted my work. Not even when I was critiqued. I was 
satisfied and confident [that] I knew what was asked of me”; “although I do not agree 
with some, I do respect those opinions [of the critique] because I want others to respect 
me like I respect them. … I am reminded of a quote that I heard: ‘Do unto others as you 
would have them do unto you’”; “everyone is always going to have their [sic] own 
opinions on everything”; “receiving those helpful tips from one another [in the critiques] 
did us all a great favor”; and “my thoughts on revisions of my final essay were mainly to 
fix the little glitches I made.” Note the use of words that reinforce conformity to 
idealized communal expectations: “Critiques are good”; they are “respectful”; everyone 
is entitled to an opinion, even if “I do not agree with some”; “I knew what was asked of 
me”; “I want others to respect me like I respect them”; the receipt of “helpful tips from 
one another did us all a great favor”; and the “fix[ing of] the little glitches” in order to 
produce an essay that met the group criteria. In this latter assertion, “glitches” are 
inherently negative; an abnormality that needs to be “fixed” so as to produce an 
acceptable whole. 
 Reflections from the OL students showed similar concern with maintaining the 
status quo, yet a disconcerting aspect of the online students’ writing was the ways in 
which some sought to reconcile what they perceived as potentially unsettling 
disruptions: “I was not comfortable with the experience of critique”; “[m]y critiquer was 
nice about it. I didn’t get offended … [and it] was a very positive experience. If she 
disagreed with one of my statements, she said so, but nicely”; “it is so hard, for me at 
least, to not sound rude”; “my critique went over smoothly. I found new ways of 
relaying constructive criticism and helpful suggestions without causing hostility”; 
“[c]ritiquing helps let the writer understand what went wrong, what they should do to 
prevent that happening in the future, and how to accept constructive criticism”; and 
“[student name] was really nice in her critique and I wish she hadn’t of been.” Phrases 
such as “not comfortable,” “didn’t get offended,” “positive experience,” “said so, but 
nicely,” “[i]t is so hard … to not sound rude,” and “constructive criticism” – as 
inherently opposed to “destructive” – all indicate an awareness of the social collective 
and that disturbing the status quo is something negative to be avoided. There was also 
recognition when the collective unity had been maintained and not marred by dissent, as 
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in the comment that “[m]y critique went over smoothly. I found new ways of relaying 
constructive criticism … without causing hostility.” Only one student voiced 
dissatisfaction with the process of critique, and it was a marginal, undeveloped 
objection: “[Student Name] was really nice in her critique and I wish she hadn’t of been” 
(emphasis added). 
 As one of the objectives for the courses – and as a tenet of this study – the 
component of critically reflective thinking was important. Students were asked to define 
the term and then discuss what it individually meant to them, particularly in relation to 
perceived changes they saw between the start and end of semester. Unlike the 
observations made on peer critique and the course as a whole, there was no significant 
difference between the F2F and OL classes in regard to this question, so they are 
presented together, verbatim: 
•  “Critical thinking is great and makes you feel good about yourself” 
• “… is thinking outside the box” 
• “Wow!!! My concept and view of critical thinking has changed undoubtedly a 
lot. As a matter of fact I have a whole new perspective towards critical thinking 
thanks to this semesters English class” 
• “I have learned to reflect on things that I usually though[t] as commonsense” 
• “… it is important to not accept what is on the surface but always question what 
seem[s] to be reality”  
• “It might sound idiotic or just ironic but my sense of critical analyzation has 
become more critical. Even though I thought I couldn’t analyze things anymore 
than I already did, I found out I could” 
•  “I like that I have the ability to dissect ideas into concepts and feelings” 
•  “My opinion toward critical thinking has changed a little. Basically this semester 
I have learned to analyze in depth what the common eyes sees is not always true” 
• “…the tolerance in my critical thinking has grown” 
• “[C]ritical thinking isn’t just using the knowledge that you already know but 
opening yourself up to the knowledge of those around you and other resources 
and using to analyze your answer to find more than one answer” 
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• “My concept of critically reflective thought is that it is a most important tool to 
use for writing because it gives a more credible point to what you’re writing 
about” 
 Relatively few students showed evidence of specificity in their responses, but 
three in particular stand out as exemplifying aspects of criticality that involve going 
beyond one’s own perspective: One student “learned to reflect on things that I usually 
though[t] as commonsense”; a second claimed to have developed ability to “analyze in 
depth what the common eyes sees [sic] is not always true” – although what the student 
likely meant was analytical depth beyond what the common eye tends to perceive as 
true; and the third wrote about the importance of not accepting what is on the surface but 
to “always question what seem[s] to be reality.”  Other students used interesting word 
choices, such as “the tolerance in my critical thinking has grown” and “the ability to 
dissect ideas into concepts and feelings.” Here, while there is some evidence of making 
tangible the abstract concept of critically reflective thought, in the first instance it is tied 
to “tolerance” and in the second to dissection of “concepts and feelings.”  
 The majority of comments, however, were of a far more generalized nature, such 
as “it is a most important tool to use for writing because it gives a more credible point to 
what you’re writing about” or that it is “thinking outside the box.”  Other responses were 
perplexing, as though the students did not quite know how to articulate what they were 
thinking: Although one claimed that “Wow!!! My concept and view of critical thinking 
has changed undoubtedly a lot” and “I have a whole new perspective towards critical 
thinking,” the student did not elaborate any further. Another offered the convoluted “my 
sense of critical analyzation [sic] has become more critical,” then followed up with 
“[e]ven though I thought I couldn’t analyze things anymore [sic] than I already did, I 
found out I could.” And, though the comment expressed awareness of alternative 
perspectives and multiple viewpoints in critically reflective thought, a final student 
defined it as “using the knowledge that you already know but opening yourself up to the 
knowledge of those around you and other resources and using [it] to analyze your 
answer to find more than one answer.” 
 Overall, the F2F students’ perceptions of their classes were positive. The 
comments, however, lacked specific details, tending instead to draw on generalizations. 
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And, although many claimed that they learned to look more deeply into things, ironically 
this ability was not apparent in their own reflections on the course: 
• “All the topics we wrote about seem to expose our true feelings and emotions 
towards certain subjects. … I have strongly developed my understanding on how 
people think and what influences their thought” 
• “All the entries made in our IPJs related to some form of Socratic questioning 
and looking deeper into the meaning of everything” 
• “I liked how you played the devil’s advocate” 
• “I learned from this course to not only read a book [the class did not read any 
books] but really read deep into the thoughts of the writer and try to bring out the 
message that the writer is trying to bring out” 
•  “[N]ot understanding something fully until we go over it in class would be a 
recurring theme for me, personally, in this course” 
• “In all our [class] discussions, I always had my own thoughts, or already knew 
the answer” 
• “English was fun” 
While comments such as “I always had my own thoughts, or already knew the answer” 
and “English was fun” indicates a sense of ease, confidence, and lack of challenge in the 
semester, observations about having “strongly developed my understanding on how 
people think and what influences their thought,” “looking deeper into the meaning of 
everything,” and “really read[ing] deep into the thoughts of the writer” show evidence of 
critical engagement with the course objectives, although it should be noted that the latter 
comment was made by a student who also claimed that “I learned from this course to not 
only read a book, but …” – no books were read; only short stories and articles. The 
reference to “Socratic questioning” and “devil’s advocate” demonstrate an 
understanding of the teacher’s role in extending critical thought, a point also reinforced 
with one student’s claim that she was not able to fully understand concepts “until we go 
over it in class.” Other students reflected on their experiences in exposing “true feelings 
and emotions,” a characteristic indeed apparent in many of the IPJ entries and class 
discussions where personal opinion was often valorized as unassailable truth.  
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 A similar sense of enjoyment and positivity about the course was also apparent in 
the OL students’ reflections, yet there was an uncomfortable emphasis on the teacher’s 
role in learning. This latter point is somewhat mediated, however, when considering that 
the online class comprised Dual Credit students and that, unlike college or university, 
their high school environment was structured and highly controlled, which fostered 
dependency rather than independence.   
• “The questions you asked made me think outside the box” 
• “I felt confident [in the class] most of the time because we were never downed. 
We were always given positive comments which helped build our confidence”  
• “I feel as though I have become more of an independent thinker and you as a 
teacher have never criticized me, just redirected me to where I need to focus on” 
•  “You MADE me think for myself. You gave me the answer, or a bit of it, yet 
wanted MORE” 
What is problematic about these latter two statements from the online students is the 
inextricable link to “the teacher” and the integral role she played in what the students 
perceived as their educational growth. Note, for instance, “[t]he questions you [teacher] 
asked made me think outside the box”; that you “never criticized me” but “redirected 
me”; “you MADE me think for myself”; you gave me the answer; and you wanted 
MORE” (emphases added). Here, the teacher is holder of wisdom, giver of knowledge, 
and the maker of cognitive movement – all of which reflects high student investiture in 
perceiving education as a conduit of passivity and receipt rather than active knowledge-
seeking drawn from the individual student’s volition and desire to learn. One online 
student even revealed a worrying sense of dependency on me as teacher in an email note 
reflecting concern that an inherently nurturing relationship was at risk when she received 
a low grade on her first essay: “I really thought I had disappointed you,” she wrote. 
“That’s why I sent you that email asking if you were angry with me. I would hate to 
make you angry or disappointed with any of my work.” 
 
6.2 Decritique: Fall 2003, Spring 2004, Fall 2004 
 Over three semesters, a total of 46 eligible students were enrolled in four 
Decritique classrooms between fall 2003 and fall 2004, and of these 23 were Dual Credit 
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students (English 1301 OL; English 1302 OL). One English 1301 section was taught in 
the fall 2003 semester (OL), and a second in the fall of 2004 (F2F). Two sections of 
English 1302 were taught in the spring of 2004 (one OL; one F2F). Respectively, the 
average age in each semester was 17.2, 21.4, 17.7, and 28.4 years, and the overall mean 
was 21.2 years. Gender, with an average male:female ratio of 36 to 64 percent was 
relatively evenly distributed across all semesters (Table 6.17). As for the CCC analysis, 
a mean of placement test scores was established for the English 1301 students to provide 
high, average, and low points of comparison (Table 6.18).  As none of the DEC students 
sat the ACT placement test, reference to it is eliminated. In relation to the English 1302 
sections, because the only requirement for students enrolling in this course is a passing 
1301 grade, a median of those students’ English 1301 grade point average (GPA) was 
calculated for an equivalent comparison between the two classes. As the median English 
1301 course grade of 3.0, or a B, was the same for both groups, no significant difference 
between the two classes was apparent in terms of preparation for English 1302 
coursework. 
 
Table 6.17 
DEC Age and Gender 
 
Semester Students Average Age Male Female 
1301 OL F03 *7 11 17.2 36 % 64 % 
1301 F2F F04 10 21.4 45 % 55 % 
1302 OL S04 * 12 17.7 33 % 67 % 
1302 F2F S04 13 28.4 31 % 69 % 
Total: 46    
Averages:  21.2 36 % 64 % 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Asterisks denote a Dual Credit class 
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Table 6.18 
Mean Across Semesters DEC English 1301 Placement Tests  
 
Placement Test High Average Low Minimum Pass  
TAAS 2, 566 2, 134 1, 904 1, 259 
TASP/THEA 530 509 480 460 
SAT - 550 - 500 
COMPASS 181 160 104 166 
 
 
English 1301 students scored above the minimum pass in all placement tests except for 
the COMPASS. This anomaly, also apparent in the CCC group, is explained by the test’s 
dismissal of low reading/writing scores if the accompanying essay portion receives a 
high passing grade. In this study, the essay components of placement tests were not used 
for analysis. Examination of the test scores from all 21 English 1301 students show that 
20 (95.2 %) were above the minimum passing score and only 1 (4.8 %) was below.  
 
6.2.1 Pedagogy in Practice 
 From the first day of semester, I took a tone of criticality with the DEC students, 
in both the verbal F2F and text-based OL environments. In the former, the first 
statement made was: “This is English 1301 [or English 1302] and you are here to learn 
how to think.” I then spoke about the quite marvelous capabilities of the human mind 
and how it can so easily be dulled into a catatonic acceptance of the status quo. I also 
said things that, in a setting of social discourse, would be considered rude, or at least 
unkind:  
I don’t care about internet down-time, grandmothers who are dead or 
dying – sometimes twice in a semester – work schedules, or despotic 
bosses. Take some initiative and resourcefulness to think your way 
through these problems.  We’re not here to have some feel-good chat 
about books. And, if it occurs to you that you’ve made a mistake 
enrolling in the class, this [paused; held up the paper] is what a drop slip 
looks like. 
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I was also clear about the course drop policy: “Three absences,” I told the students, “and 
I’ll drop you from the class.” Such words and tone were, of course, not designed to be 
hurtful. Instead, they reflected the pedagogy’s theory of an acerbic criticality tempered 
by the tools of humor: satire, irony, and parody.  Although references to dying 
grandmothers or statements such as “I don’t care” appear callous and the drop policy as 
strict authoritarianism, it is important here to anticipate a misperception about 
Decritique: It is not a tyrannical, drill-sergeant pedagogy where obedience is demanded 
and power is yielded through rule-making and punishment. In practice, it holds a 
curiously quixotic caliber seeking to transgress what is ordinarily said and thought by, 
ironically, using the things that are thought and said – reflecting a contextual tension 
where “the playfulness is serious and the seriousness in the end is only play” (Oakeshott 
202, qtd. in Brookfield and Preskill 6). This is apparent in the darkly humorous images 
of “despotic bosses,” “feel good chat[s] about books,” and grandmothers who succumb 
to death, often more than once.  
 Admittedly, it was a harrowing experience, even with the benefit of non-verbal 
cues (F2F), creative use of punctuation, and words such as “hmm” (OL) that parodied 
the perceptual brutality. In both verbal and written communication I was careful to omit 
references to the second-person pronoun “you” in an effort to separate the act of 
commentary from the individual student-as-recipient, and in the process model the 
parameters of the D.I.S. even before students were formally introduced to it.  From the 
start of semester, the objective was to establish a strong sense of criticality in the 
students’ writing and thinking, and that expectations for such were high. Yet, 
conditioned myself to the mantras of social discourse, I wanted the students to like and 
respect me as their teacher, and initially their reactions were reserved and cautious, as if 
they were unsure whether to express amusement or despair. Particularly in those first 
few weeks, it did indeed feel as though I were walking on the edge of an abyss. I 
reminded myself that humor is a potentially potent critical tool, and if humor compelled 
students to move into a more critically reflective state of being, then a reinvention of self 
– marked by genuine individual growth and learning – is genuinely possible.  
 Around the third week of semester I noticed something remarkable in the DEC 
F2F classes: Students were not only attending regularly, but had read the assigned 
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material and were arguing about points in both verbal and, in the open forums, written 
discourse. When the topic of abortion was introduced, DEC students cited concern for 
individual circumstances, issues of poverty and overpopulation, the question of a 
woman’s autonomy over her own body, the potential for birth defects and the long-term 
effects of this on a community, and a vigorously argued discussion over the need for 
distinction, or not, between church and state. My deliberately provocative interjections 
were blunt, delivered with a careful vocabulary that aimed to model accurate shades of 
meaning and expose students to an array of synonyms and antonyms. In response, the 
students began incorporating words I often used, such as “voracious,” “languid,” and 
“vapid.”  At this point, I informed them that their vocabularies were “woeful,” which 
gave rise to the Woeful Vocabulary Forum.  Here, each week the students and I would 
post definitions and pronunciations of words taken from the texts we studied, including 
dystopia/utopia, blithe, iconoclast, catholic/Catholic (English 1301), fin de siécle, dulcet, 
verisimilitude, and nihilism (English 1302).  On several occasions throughout the 
semester, students from the F2F classes referred to this forum with dry humor – 
reinforcing what had become a sense of critical camaraderie and animation in 
discussion. Students would even respond to unusual words such as “ouroborous” with 
posts titled “ourobo-what?”  
 In contrast, while the OL students showed strong evidence of critical engagement 
through well-developed written discussion, the playful solidarity apparent in the F2F 
classroom was lacking. As one example, when I duplicated the Woeful Vocabulary 
Forum for the OL classes, very few students commented on it and none contributed 
words. While the F2F students were three times as likely to post collectively in the open 
forums, OL students tended to reserve their posts for private IPJ writing. A further 
instance of this reserved sobriety, involving the English 1302 students, occurred during 
spring break – a week in March when the College is closed and no classes are held. 
While the OL students logged in to their WebCT environment infrequently, the F2F 
students continued their posted discussions throughout the week, with five of the 
students logging on as many as three times a day. By Week 10 of the semester, log-on 
tallies for the OL students were uniformly in the 400-500 range, but over half the F2F 
students had registered 800 to 1,000. Although diligent in their studies, there was a 
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distancing between me and the OL students, and I posit that the online environment was 
a significant factor. This observation was a surprise. Initially, I thought it would be 
easier to deliver acerbic comments to “faceless” students, and for them to receive it. Yet, 
despite attempts to duplicate the verbal and non-verbal cues of humor through text, 
Decritique in the online environment was far more sterile than the face-to-face 
classroom. 
 
6.2.2 The Individual Portfolio Journals 
 As for the CCC classes, the first IPJ set comprised twelve questions ranging from 
initial course impressions, perceived difficulties students thought they may encounter, 
and writing prompts associated with the course readings.  Combined, students from the 
four DEC groups wrote a total of 155, 179 words (37, 684; 39, 770; 45,434; 32,291) in 
IPJs 1-3. The highest DEC word count of 45,434 came from the OL S04 class in this 
first IPJ set; the highest 1301 word count at 39, 770 was recorded by the F2F F04 group 
(fig. 6.3).  
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 Fig. 6.3: Comparison of IPJ First and Final Word Count: DEC 
 
Comparison of the classes show that in English 1301, the F2F students averaged a higher 
word count (3, 977) than their OL counterparts (3, 426); it is reversed for English 1302, 
with OL students averaging more words (3, 786) than the F2F group (2, 484).  The final 
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IPJ set from Weeks 10-12 showed similar results, with the two OL classes recording the 
highest word counts at 33, 607 (1301) and 32, 867 (1302) respectively, and the two F2F 
groups the lowest at 26, 657 (1301) and 25, 302 (1302). With a total enrollment of 46 
students, the average word count produced across semesters for the first IPJ set was 3, 
373 and for the final set 2, 575; a combined word count tally for both IPJ sets from all 
students resulted in 273, 612 words, giving an overall average of 5, 948 words for each 
DEC student.   
 Many responses in the first IPJ set were, overall, disappointing – especially in the 
F2F classes. Entries often reflected caution and confusion, with a sense of confessional 
incertitude, as exemplified in the following excerpt from an English 1302 student: “I’m 
affraid [sic] that I will not be able to analize [sic] things as others can. I hope I will 
succeed but just judging from what we did in class the other day, its [sic] hard reading a 
poem and understand[ing] what the author meant.” While the tone of my reply was 
acerbic, its content sought to extract, or bracket, the student’s core articulations then 
separate them from their subjectivity by re-casting them into a more objective context. 
The words and ideas on which I focused in this excerpt were “hope,” “fear,” and 
“understanding”:  
Yet, it’s often not enough just to “hope,” is it? Instead, do something 
about it – actively work to overcome it. And, is the problem really 
analyzing to the alleged depth of colleagues, or fear of looking stupid? 
Well, what does this word “stupid” really mean? Here’s something 
stupid: Analyzing a grocery receipt from the local HEB [supermarket] – 
and yet it relates to this comment about “understand[ing] what the author 
meant.” As discussed during lecture yesterday, New Historicists might be 
concerned about this, but most theories couldn’t give a toss as to what the 
author “meant.” Instead, what does the text mean? What does it say? 
What does an HEB shopping docket reveal about its owner? Choc-chip 
frosted Ricie Pops, a few dozen glazed donuts, and the irony of a case of 
Diet Pepsi. Oh, my. One of these days a student is going to catch on to 
this and bring an HEB shopping docket to class for analysis …  
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 Although I described the OL environment as more sterile than the F2F, this does 
not mean that OL IPJ posts were not creative, and several made strong use of metaphor. 
As an example, one student drew an extended comparison between online dialogue and 
strawberry milk as constituting “breakfast wars,” pointing out that the flavored essence 
of the drink/dialogue could be artificial or natural, then discussing the “digestibility” of 
such discourse. In both OL and F2F groups, IPJs showed strong development and 
exemplification, a noted absence of personal truth as veridical evidence, minimal use of 
slang, and few errors in grammar, punctuation and spelling – the latter suggesting a 
careful process of drafting, revising, and proofreading before posting.  
 As a primary objective was to interrogate the validity of student assertions, my 
critical responses in the IPJs deliberately attempted provocation, and were interwoven 
with the student writing rather than, as in a CCC class, made at the end of a student’s 
posted message. As for the CCC classes, the momentum of posts was not affected when 
I decreased my IPJ commentary in the fifth week of semester. Overall, DEC IPJs 
reflected a good command of vocabulary, including words and phrases such as “fearful,” 
“intimidated” and a “tad overwhelmed” when students were asked about their 
expectations for the course, and incorporation of words from the Woeful Vocabulary 
Forum in later IPJs. In contrast to the CCC classes, DEC students did not show a 
tendency to reproduce the IPJ questions in full before providing a response.  
 
6.2.3 First Essay 
 As for the CCC classes, all DEC students who had submitted the first essay on or 
before the due date had the opportunity to rewrite it for a better grade, provided it earned 
less than an A. Essays evaluated as a “Draft” and that were not rewritten reverted to a 
failing grade at the end of semester. Like the IPJs, my critical commentary was 
interspersed within the student’s writing, so the act of evaluation through written 
comments became embedded with the discourse. Rather than the task of grading being, 
as Pat Belanoff describes it, “the dirty thing we have to do in the dark of our own 
offices” (61; Huot 166), DEC comments were a form of interactive engagement with the 
writing produced by the students, who in turn responded to that commentary through the 
essay rewrite.  
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 The objective of my commentary was to foster rewrites that showed a depth and 
breadth of critical reflection going far beyond the concept of merely “fixing errors” or 
giving the teacher “what he or she wants.” As such, DEC essay comments were atypical. 
Nowhere was reference made to “you might want to elaborate more in paragraph two,” 
“the essay doesn’t flow quite right,” or “overall, you did a great job.” In order to effect 
the possibility of change in students, the kind of change that means not just knowing, but 
knowing differently (Mezirow), essay commentary was provocative, seeking to instigate 
Tingle’s sense of “narcissistic wounding” (19) with its resistance of anger, outrage, and 
disconcertion – yet still underscored with the critical tools of humor. What follows is an 
example of DEC critical commentary on an essay produced by an English 1302 student. 
My words are in italics and prefaced by an arrow Å: 
 
The two stories that I am choosing to write my paper on are “Harrison Bergeron” by 
Kurt Vonnegut, and “The Ones Who Walk Away From Omelas” by Ursula Le Guin  
ÅDo we need the preemption? What about critical reflection on themes, symbolism, 
characterization and interpretation of these? Do we care how or why the writer here 
went about choosing them?  While using two different methods, both authors send a 
message of dissatisfaction about society. ÅOK These two stories are written almost 
completely opposite of each other; yet, they both have much in common ÅWell, gee, 
this says a lot, doesn’t it … come on – what’s the point being conveyed?  These two 
stories Å repetition; we’re aware there are two stories – it’s hardly going to jump to 15, 
is it?? also caught and held my attention while relaying their message, which is very 
hard to do  Åcaught and held? While relaying? And, do we care if this is “hard to do?” 
“Harrison Bergeron” by Vonngeut is a different story Åwhat, and we’re to take it that 
every story is the same? Moreover, who is “Vonngeut”?  because it does not use 
symbolism to make up its theme, and it does not use characterization. ÅNo, not true. It 
does use characterization, or else there would be no characters. Perhaps the point is 
that it uses flat characters. If so, this needs to be described and developed to show how 
these allegedly flat characters reflect/contribute to a theme  The characters in “Harrison 
Bergeron” are completely flat Åcharacters can be marginally flat? Somewhat flat? A 
great deal flat? with nothing to interpret from them Åso, these flat characters have 
absolutely no purpose? Just how flat are they? But, Vonnegut sends a strong message 
about contemporary society through his use of satire. Vonnegut made Åbut not any 
more? fun of one of societies Åhow many society(ies) are we addressing here?  huge 
Åhuge???  beliefs that total equality is something to strive for. He showed Åthe tense 
shifts are terrible that, if we were all equal, then that would be holding us back. ÅWhat 
does “holding us back” mean? In what sense, specifically?  It would be impossible to 
advance some people to become smarter or stronger, so instead, we would have to 
handicap people to be just like everyone else. ÅBut isn’t this “equality”??? And, 
according to much contemporary rhetoric, isn’t “equality” what everyone should be 
striving for? If not equality, then what do we have? Inequality? Is that OK? Is that 
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good? Doesn’t this mean we have to discriminate (in the sense of the word of “choosing 
carefully”)?  Vonnegut uses simplicity of the English language to keep the reader 
reading Åwhat?? Only simple English can keep readers reading?? Ah! This must be the 
problem with an illiterate society! and humor for the reader to enjoy the reading Åyes, 
it’s called satire  while underneath, he sends out his message that we are silly ???silly  
for striving for equality. I also do not think that Vonnegut thinks equality is a bad thing, 
but there is a good equality and a bad equality. ÅOK, here’s a thought. Let’s see if this 
idea develops ... While Vonnegut’s story had a very strong message, I think the Å??? 
Le Guin’s was that much stronger. Vonnegut has one message to send, and that message 
came through loud and clear Åcliché while Le Guin’s message was heard loud and 
clear, he ÅLe Guin is a woman left a lot more to be interpreted, and to make the reader 
think. Å Not that we’re seeing much of that in this essay   Both authors are dissatisfied 
with society, and both of those dissatisfactions were Åwere? Are they now based on 
something else? based on morals. Both authors were not disappointed with technology, 
but rather, what our society might become.  While both stories could have taken place in 
the past, I believe that both authors intended them to take place in the future, to impress 
to the public the need for change. I both saw that need for change, and heard it loud and 
clear through these two authors. ÅWith the exception of the annoying repetition of 
“loud and clear” there’s a point here, somewhere, and the “conclusion” starts to get 
close to where this essay might be going  
 
Grade: Draft  
  
 The standard caveat placed at the end of all essays receiving less than a grade of 
A is a reminder that a rewrite needs to show significant initiative from the student in 
regard to making change on his or her own volition. The student whose excerpt is shown 
above rewrote his essay, with one section of the final piece presented below to 
exemplify the considerable changes made to his writing:  
“Harrison Bergeron” by Kurt Vonnegut and “The Ones Who Walk Away 
From Omelas” by Ursula Le Guin are alike in that both authors express 
dissatisfaction about contemporary society. Both use two different 
methods to convey their message: Vonnegut uses satire and Le Guin uses 
a surprise ending. While these methods are different, both authors 
succeed in showing their frustrations with contemporary society’s lack of 
morals. “Harrison Bergeron” is a non-formulaic story, mainly because the 
characterization is flat. One example of this is Hazel. She has no 
complexities about her personality, and everything she thinks she speaks. 
Vonnegut uses Hazel to show how simplistic everyone would have to be 
to be equal. Vonnegut not only uses satire throughout his story to make 
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fun of society’s belief that equality is something to strive for, but 
provides humorous examples of what it would really mean to be equal. 
While not the most eloquent essay, nor the most critically sophisticated in the class, for 
this student it represented not only significant change made on his own initiative, but 
also showed increased ability to identify a text’s theme and discuss how elements of 
fiction contribute to that theme.  
 As represented in Tables 6.19 and 6.20, of the 46 first essays submitted from all 
four DEC classes, 24 passed (52.2 %) with 3 As, 12 Bs, and 9 Cs. Twenty-two essays, or 
47.8 percent, received a grade of “Draft.” After rewrites, the pass rate increased to 41 
essays (89.1 percent), with 13 As, 17 Bs, and 11 Cs. Five essays, or 10.9 percent, failed 
with a grade of D or F; of these, three students elected not submit a rewrite. With the 
exception of three students from English 1302 OL, all rewrote the first essay. None 
provided an explanation as to why no rewrite was submitted, but the low five percent 
grade value may have been a factor. This, however, did not deter F2F students in this 
same semester from striving for excellence: Five who initially received a “Draft” earned 
the A they sought on rewrite; five more achieved a grade of B. In the two 1301 classes, 
while one from each submitted a rewrite, the changes were so insignificant that the grade 
of “Draft” only increased to a D. Analysis of the first essays also considered word 
length, average words per sentence, percent of passive sentences, and Flesch-Kincaid 
Reading Ease (RE) and Reading Grade Level (RGL).  
 
Table 6.19 
Distribution of DEC First Essay Grades 
 
Before Rewrites # After Rewrites # 
A 3 A 13 
B 12 B 17 
C 9 C 11 
Draft 22 D/F 5 
Total: 46 Total: 46 
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Table 6.20 
Analysis of First DEC Essay After Rewrites 
 
Structural Analysis 1301 OL  1301 F2F  1302 OL  1302 F2F  
Word count 670 936 698 701 
Average words per sentence 21.0 20.5 20.7 19.8 
Passive sentences 17.9 % 16.5 % 11.3 % 12.7 % 
Flesch-Kincaid RE 51.5 54.0 57.3 59.9 
Flesch-Kincaid RGL 10.9 10.3 10.1 9.3 
Average Grade 82.5 79.7 74.2 86.5 
 
There is a significant deviation of 12.3 percent between the two English 1302 classes in 
relation to the average first essay grade, a phenomenon that is not apparent in the two 
English 1301 groups with a difference of only 2.8 percent. The explanation is found in 
the three students from English 1302 OL who did not submit a rewrite and whose 
“Draft” essays, therefore, reverted to a failing grade of 50. Excluding these three essays, 
the average grade of 82.2 reflects a comparatively smaller difference of 4.3 (Table 6.21).  
 
Table 6.21 
Summative Analysis of DEC First Essays After Rewrites 
 
Structural Analysis  English 1301 
Averages 
English 1302 
Averages 
All DEC 
Averages 
Word length 803 700 752 
Average words per sentence 20.8 20.3 20.6 
Passive sentences 17.2 % 12.0 % 14.6 % 
Flesch-Kincaid RE 52.8 58.6 55.7 
Flesch-Kincaid RGL 10.6 9.7 10.2 
Average Grade 81.1 80.4 80.8 
 
Passive sentence averages across the four classes showed higher use for those in English 
1301 (17.9; 16.5 %), compared with English 1302 students (11.3; 12.7 %). The Flesch-
Kincaid RE scores ranged from low-to-high fifties across the semesters, with the 1301 
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OL students recording the lowest – or easiest – average RE score of 51.5 and the 1302 
F2F the highest at 59.9. RGL showed less variation from a low of 9.3 (1302 F2F) to a 
high of 10.9 (1301 OL).  
 As the essay assignments for English 1301 and 1302 differed, the summation of 
averages were not only calculated across all semesters, but divided between the two 
class groups. The summative structural analysis of the first essay, as represented in 
Table 6.21, shows a close correlation in average grade at 81.1 (1301) and 80.4 (1302), or 
an overall average grade of 80.8. Passive sentence averages remain higher in the English 
1301 groups at 17.5 percent compared to 12.0 for English 1302. Difference in the 
average words per sentence is minimal across semesters at 0.5. The average RE level 
ranges from 52.8 (1301) to 58.6 (1302), while the 0.9 RGL difference between the two 
groups is slightly less than one grade level at 10.6 (1301) and 9.7 (1302). 
 
6.2.4 Deracination 
 To prepare for deracination, all DEC students were assigned a reading entitled 
“Deracination and the D.I.S” (see Appendix D). The text discussed characteristics of 
deracination and the objective, distanced nature of a detached intellectualized space, 
providing specific comparative examples between a deracination and peer critique as a 
model: 
Example of Deracination  Example of Peer Critique 
Although Marcus Wildblood asserts 
why people should vote against gun 
control, his arguments fall flat because 
readers are merely left with 
Wildblood’s “personal opinion” on the 
issue, and this hardly gives credibility 
to his position. Consider, as an 
example, Wildblood’s statement that 
“[quote from essay].” Moreover, poor 
spelling and mechanics compound the 
lack of credibility in this piece.  
 You had some great ideas in the first 
paragraph, Marcus, and I really liked 
the flow of your writing when you 
talked about how people should vote 
against gun control. You might want 
to use more examples, though. You 
also need to check your grammar and 
spelling, because there were a few 
mistakes and that made it hard to read. 
Overall, you did an excellent job and I 
enjoyed reading the piece.  
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Deracinations were tied to the drafting of the final course essay. No word length was 
given for this assignment, and students were advised that part of the task was 
determining the parameters of their criticisms for themselves. DEC students were 
randomly assigned a colleague’s essay to deracinate; in turn, and in keeping with the 
reciprocity of a “deracination set,” each student had opportunity to respond to the 
critique by way of a counter-deracination. 
 While the students were prepared for written critical commentary in that they had 
received it from me on their first essays and IPJs, many in the F2F classes expressed 
concern about their ability to comment critically on their colleagues’ drafts, a point not 
apparent for the OL students until they wrote later IPJ reflections about their experiences 
with deracination. Still, despite initial reticence in the F2F classes, a high degree of 
anticipation was evident when the deracination assignments were given out. Moreover, 
several F2F students were disconcerted by the deracinators assigned to their drafts, 
arguing that those colleagues were not capable of producing thorough, critical 
commentary. My response was remonstrative: The deracinating students, although not 
confident writers, stood to gain a great deal from the counter-deracinations, and the 
objecting students would, moreover, have the greater challenge of countering a weak 
critique.  
 Overall, the standard of deracination was high in both the OL and F2F classes, 
with most students producing well-developed and critically focused responses and 
counters to the drafts of their colleagues. One F2F English 1302 student wrote an 
inappropriate deracination, producing – as her deracinator took some critical pleasure 
pointing out in the counter – what effectively constituted a parody of peer critique, 
replete with phrases such as “needs more elaboration” and “did an excellent job.” In my 
summative “deracination of the deracinations,” a substantial reflection on the assignment 
that was posted in WebCT for all to read, I deliberated over whether the apparent faux 
pas was intentional, even though I knew it was not. To her credit, the student took the 
initiative to rewrite her deracination, and although the revised piece was under-
developed in terms of discussing and exemplifying the points of her critique, it was far 
better than the first.  
Critical Possibilities  191 
 Similar to the CCC groups, analysis of deracinations used word count averages, 
passive sentence percentages, Flesch-Kincaid RE and RGL levels, and an examination 
of positive/negative correlations. The total word count of deracinations across the four 
DEC classes was 51, 913, or an average of 1, 129 words for each of the 46 students. The 
1302 OL class recorded the highest word count at 15, 340, next was 1302 F2F at 14, 
666, then 1301 F2F at 11, 982, and the lowest, at 9, 925 was the 1301 OL group. The 
lowest RE level at 48.2 was recorded in the 1301 OL class, and the highest of 57.6 in the 
1301 F2F. Average words per sentence were nearly identical in the 1301 F2F (18.3) and 
1302 OL (18.4) classes, and for the 1301 OL (20.1) and 1302 F2F (21.7) groups. Use of 
passive sentences was highest for 1301 OL students at 16 percent, while both 1302 
classes recorded an interesting passive sentence average of 13.0 (OL) and 12.0 (F2F) 
percent – the same figures recorded for their first essay. RGL was broadly distributed: 
The lowest at 9.7 was in the 1301 F2F group; the highest of 11.3 for the 1301 OL 
students. This data is provided in Table 6.22.  
 
Table 6.22 
Comparison of Deracination Across Semesters 
 
Category of Analysis 1301 OL  1301 F2F  1302 OL  1302 F2F  
Average words per sentence 20.1 18.3 18.4 21.7 
Passive sentences 16.0 % 13.0 % 13.0 % 12.0 % 
Flesch-Kincaid RE 48.2 57.6 50.4 53.8 
Flesch-Kincaid RGL 11.3 9.7 10.7 11.0 
Word count 9, 925 11, 982 15, 340 14, 666 
 
 Comparison of the positive/negative correlatives in the two English 1301 classes8 
(OL F03; F2F F04) showed that, on average, 86.7 percent of the deracinations 
comprised positive correlations of specific or summative criticism, developed 
contradictions or objections, or stand-alone critical comments (89.9 %; 83.5 %). 
Negative correlatives of personal communication, token niceties, vague or generalized 
                                                 
8 Note that English 1302 was excluded from the positive/negative correlative analysis in order to compare 
the five English 1301 courses (3 for CCC; 2 for DEC). 
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finalities, and sandwiching of critical comments averaged 13.3 percent (10.1%; 16.5 %). 
Both English 1301 groups displayed a very strong tendency for the negative correlatives 
of critical commentary, with the F2F class recording a slightly higher percentage 
(16.5%) than their OL counterparts (10.1 %). Positive correlatives, as expected, were 
high at 89.9 percent (OL) and 83.5 percent (F2F). This data is shown in Table 6.23. 
 
Table 6.23 
Positive and Negative Correlations Across Semesters: DEC English 1301 
 
Positive/Negative Correlation +/- 1301 OL F03 1301 F2F F04 
Personal Communication - 0.2 % 0.0 % 
Token Niceties - 2.4 % 1.1 % 
Vague, Generalized Finalities - 2.6 % 8.7 % 
Sandwiching Critical Comments - 4.9 % 6.7 % 
Specific or Summative Criticism + 38.6 % 13.2 % 
Contradictions/Objections + 46.2 % 67.2 % 
Stand-Alone Critical Comments + 5.1 % 3.1 % 
 
 
6.2.5 Positive Correlations 
 The OL class recorded higher percentages of specific or summative criticism – 
critique that identifies perceived deficits, yet is unsupported by convincing counter-
arguments – at 38.6 percent compared with 13.2 percent in the F2F group. Examples 
from this category include the following: “[P] claims that this piece is an anti-feminist 
manifesto because the woman ‘used to play the violin,’ relating to the confusion [the 
writer displays] of feminism and anti-feminism”; “in [W’s] description of feminists, a 
certain subtle hostility towards feminism is detected”; and “[t]he paper showed every 
sign of a lack of effort, focus, dedication, and resolve.” On the inverse, the development 
of contradictions and objections to incongruity was 18.1 percent higher for the F2F 
students (67.2 %) than those in the OL class (46.2 %), with excerpts including “[M,] 
although declaring this is an anti-feminist manifesto, has just stated that it is a feminist 
interpretation. Is the father not there supporting this woman [in the text]? How does this 
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make it an anti-feminist manifesto?; “[G] claims that the pregnant woman separates 
herself from the woman outside the clinic; clearly, an anti-feminist action. However, if 
feminists and anti-feminists are going to be judged by stereotypical roles, why not 
discuss independence?”; and “[W] tries to convince the now-hesitant reader that anti-
feminists are NOT united by saying weakly that anti-feminists ‘support the same ideas 
but do not necessarily bond with each other’.” Finally, stand-alone critical commentary, 
such as “[u]ltimately, [W’s] essay does not illustrate, even remotely, how the text is an 
anti-feminist manifesto” was more closely aligned between the two classes at 5.1 (OL) 
and 3.1 (F2F) percent. 
 
6.2.6 Negative Correlations 
 Personal communication was absent entirely from the F2F group, and only 
minimally evident in the OL class at 0.2 percent. For the latter group, it occurred where 
two students made specific reference to the recipients’ first names, and one added a short 
personalized note at the end of the deracination. Token niceties, or conveying a positive 
message without criticism, were also minimal at 2.4 percent (OL) and 1.1 percent (F2F) 
– and, where they did occur, they focused on the text produced by the student writer 
rather than that individual him or herself: “The many examples [in this essay] are 
convincing” and “[t]hroughout the essay there are some very strong arguments that 
attempt to link the story with anti-feminism.” Vague generalized finalities were very low 
in the OL class at 2.6 percent, with the F2F students recording more instances at 8.7 
percent. Examples include: “The next point about anti-feminism attempts to make a 
good argument [no elaboration was provided]” and – in what surely must qualify for a 
near-perfect example of a vague generalization – “the conclusion needs some 
significance that is related to the thesis; however, it is not just a restatement of the 
thesis.”   
 In regard to the sandwiching of critical comments, F2F students showed a 
slightly higher percentage (6.7 %) than the OL (4.9 %). The following excerpts 
exemplify the characteristics of this category; that is, an attempt to pass critical 
observation, but one that ultimately only conveys empty ideas: “Although [B] makes 
strong points in his essay, the weak links to theme will need more work if it [the essay] is 
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going to reach its good potential,” and “[L’s claim about independence] is right because 
it does go against the idea of feminist bonding. But perhaps the woman is not exercising 
feminist independence at all. Instead, she is being precisely the way [L] states a feminist 
should be – a woman making her own choices.” 
 
6.2.7 Final Essay 
 While no rewrite was offered on this assignment, all DEC students had 
participated in deracination of their drafts for the final essay. The English 1301 students 
wrote an analysis of an anti-feminist theme and symbolism in Sappho Scott’s “Letter to 
You,” as their CCC counterparts had done. English 1302 students presented a Marxist or 
Feminist interpretation of Arthur Miller’s play Death of a Salesman.  Essays were 
evaluated blind and holistically, following Del Mar College’s style and content criteria, 
then assigned a letter grade. Analysis included word length, average words per sentence, 
passive sentence percentages, RE and RGL levels. As the English 1301 and 1302 
students received different assignments, the comparative examination between first and 
final essays was separated between the two class groups.  
 There was a marked difference in average word counts between the OL and F2F 
English 1301 students, with the latter group producing longer first and final essays than 
the former (see Table 6.24). Both groups, however, increased the average word count  
 
Table 6.24 
Analysis of Averages DEC English 1301 Final Essays with First Essays 
 
Structural Analysis 1301 OL F03 1301 F2F F04 
 First Final 
 
First Final 
 
Word length 670 762 
 
936 970 
 
Words per sentence 21.0 21.6 
 
20.5 17.1 
 
Passive sentences 17.9 % 14.9 % 
 
16.5 % 16.1 % 
 
Reading Ease 51.5 51.0 
 
54.0 56.2 
 
Reading Grade Level 10.9 11.0 
 
10.3 9.5 
 
Average Grade 82.5 86.3 
 
79.7 86.9 
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between first and final essay submissions by an average of 92 (OL) and 34 (F2F) words. 
Passive sentence percentages decreased by 3.0 percent for the OL students and 0.4 
percent for the F2F. While the average words per sentence increased by a modest 0.6 for 
the OL group, the F2F class showed a comparatively significant decrease of 3.4. RE 
(51.5; 51.0) and RGL (10.9; 11.0) remained steady for the OL class, but the F2F group 
increased the RE score by 2.2 and the RGL dropped by 0.8 from 10.3 to 9.5. Average 
grade increased by 3.8 percent (OL) and 7.2 percent (F2F).  
 The English 1302 classes also showed an increase in the average number of 
words produced between the first and final essays, at 273 (OL) and 320 (F2F) words. 
Although the average words per sentence decreased by 0.8 for the OL class, the F2F 
group showed an increase of 1.5. The inverse was apparent for the percent of passive 
sentences, with an increase of 1.7 percent (OL) and a decrease of 0.7 (F2F). RE levels 
fell in both groups by 7.0 (OL) and 5.6 (F2F), but RGL increased – up from 10.1 to 11.0 
(OL) and 9.3 to 10.0 (F2F). Average grade increased for OL students by 7.2 percent, but 
decreased for F2F by 4.8 percent. This data is presented in Table 6.25. 
 
Table 6.25 
Analysis of Averages DEC English 1302 Final Essays with First Essays  
 
Structural Analysis 1302 OL S04 1302 F2F S04 
 First Final 
 
First Final 
 
Word length 698 971 
 
701 1, 021 
 
Words per sentence 20.7 19.9 
 
19.8 21.3 
 
Passive sentences 11.3 % 13.0 % 
 
12.7 % 12.0 % 
 
Reading Ease 57.3 50.3 
 
59.9 54.3 
 
Reading Grade Level 10.1 11.0 
 
9.3 10.0 
 
Average Grade 74.2 81.4 
 
86.5 81.7 
 
  
 Summative averages of the first and final 1301 essays across semesters showed 
decreases in average words per sentence (down 1.4), passive sentences (down 1.7 %), 
and RGL (down 0.3). Increases were evident in average word length from 803 to 866 
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words, RE levels marginally increased by 0.8, and average grade was up by 5.6 percent. 
For 1302 students, average words per sentence and passive sentence percentage 
remained consistent, with only marginal increases of 0.3 word average and 0.5 percent.  
Average word count was significantly higher, however, with a difference of nearly 300 
words between the first and final essays, and while the RE level dropped by 6.3, the 
RGL increased by 0.8. Grade averages were close at 80.4 and 81.6, a difference of 1.2 
percent. This data is presented in Table 6.26. 
 
Table 6.26 
Summative Analysis of DEC First and Final Essays Across Semesters 
 
Structural Analysis English 1301 English 1302 
 First Final 
 
First Final 
 
Word length 803 866 
 
700 996 
 
Words per sentence 20.8 19.4 
 
20.3 20.6 
 
Passive sentences 17.2 % 15.5 % 
 
12.0 12.5 
 
Reading Ease 52.8 53.6 
 
58.6 52.3 
 
Reading Grade Level 10.6 10.3 
 
9.7 10.5 
 
Average Grade 81.1 86.6 
 
80.4 81.6 
 
 
 
6.2.8 Retention, Attendance, and Participation 
 As DEC students, regardless of whether OL or F2F, had access to equivalent 
electronic course environments (WebCT), attendance and participation of all students 
eligible for the study was measured by WebCT’s tracking feature, including the number 
of respective class log-ins and posted discussion messages – in both open forums and 
IPJs. As presented in Table 6.27, of the 65 students initially enrolled in all four DEC 
classes (12 in 1301 OL F03; 22 in 1301 F2F F04; 12 in 1302 OL S04; 19 in 1302 F2F 
S04), 50 (76.9 %) were retained; that is, these students did not withdraw from the 
courses. Of this retained group, 46 (92.0 %) passed the classes and 4 (8.0 %) failed. 
From these students, 46 were considered eligible for research inclusion as, regardless of 
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a passing or failing course grade, all had submitted the assignments used for analysis in 
this study. 
 
Table 6.27 
Overview of DEC Enrolment, Retention, and Pass/Fail 
 
Category 1301 OL  1301 F2F  1302 OL  1302 F2F  All Classes 
Initial Enrolment 12 22 12 19 65 
Withdraw 1 
(8.3 %) 
9 
(40.9 %) 
0 
(0.0 %) 
5 
(26.3 %) 
15 
(23.1 %) 
Retained 11 
(91.7 %) 
13 
(59.1 %) 
12 
(100 %) 
14 
(73.7 %) 
50 
(76.9 %) 
Passed Course 11 
(100 %) 
10 
(76.9 %) 
12 
(100 %) 
13 
(92.9 %) 
46 
(92.0 %) 
Failed Course 0 
(0.0 %) 
3 
(23.1 %) 
0 
(0.0 %) 
1 
(7.1 %) 
4 
(8.0 %) 
Eligible Students 15 
(100 %) 
10 
(83.3 %) 
9 
(100 %) 
13 
(92.9 %) 
34 
(94.4 %) 
 
 Analysis of retention, an incidental and auxiliary component of the study, drew 
on data from all students, whether eligible or not. Percentages are high in the two OL 
class groups (1301 F03; 1302 S04) at 91.7 and 100 percent. However, while only one 
student withdrew from the online DEC courses, both class groups comprised Dual Credit 
students, whose retention statistics are generally excellent given the mandated high-
school attendance regulations. The two F2F classes, both non-Dual Credit, showed 
retention rates of 59.1 percent (1301 F04) and 73.7 percent (1302 S04). Of the retained 
students, pass rates stood at 100 percent for the two OL classes, with 76.9 and 92.9 
percent for the 1301 and 1302 F2F classes respectively.  Of the retained students from 
all DEC classes, four were ineligible for the study as they had not submitted one or more 
of the assignments used in the analysis. 
 Reasons for withdrawal were mostly due to non-attendance/participation and a 
resulting lack of assignment submissions. The one student who withdrew from the 1301 
OL class consistently struggled with the coursework and I counseled her to drop the 
course. No students withdrew from 1302 OL. Of the 14 withdrawals from the F2F 
classes (9 in 1301; 5 in 1302), 12 were prompted by the course attendance policy, which 
allowed students no more than three class absences before being dropped from the 
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course. Of note, however, is that for both F2F groups, those students who accrued class 
absences did so in the first half of semester. Although two students, both from the 1302 
F2F course, remained in the class until Week 15, one dropped on his own volition and 
the other received a failing grade due to non-submission of assigned work. These latter 
two students present an anomaly. For the first time in three semesters of teaching with 
Decritique, I noticed resistance from both. Apparent from the start of the course, they 
exhibited characteristics of a self-imposed physical and mental exile from perceived 
authority – or what Ira Shor has described as a “Siberian syndrome.” Anecdotal 
evidence, however, indicated that their behavior was related to external influences 
outside the scope of the class.  
 Participation from the 46 eligible students indicated that while the two OL 
groups showed similar log-in averages per student at 698 (1301) and 760 (1302), the two 
F2F class groups recorded significantly higher averages of 1, 036 (1301) and 933 
(1302). This disparity was again apparent in the total number of posted messages and the 
average number of posts per student: The 1301 and 1302 OL classes respectively 
showed 547 and 569 posts, with averages of 49.7 and 47.4 per student; the 1301 and 
1302 F2F classes, in contrast, recorded 894 and 1, 249 total posts and per-student 
average posts of 89.4 and 96.1. This data is presented in Table 6.28. 
 
Table 6.28 
DEC Participation of Eligible Students 
 
Category 1301 OL  1301 F2F  1302 OL 1302 F2F All Classes 
Log-in Averages 698 1, 036 760 933 856.8 
Total Posts 547 894 569 1, 249 814.8 
Average Post/Student 49.7 89.4 47.4 96.1 70.7 
 
 
6.2.9 Student Observations 
 The perceptions of DEC students were collected by way of the last week’s set of 
IPJ questions that asked about their experiences with deracination and the D.I.S. and its 
relationship to critically reflective thinking, as well as their reflections on the course 
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itself. Interwoven throughout their responses, deracination – as a process and outcome – 
dominated the students’ responses. A common theme, however, demonstrated awareness 
of the way deracination had affected the students’ own thinking and writing: “It taught 
me about who I am and who I might want to be. … I can say that I think more critically 
about myself” and “it encouraged my ability to go off on a tangent and suddenly get 
back on the subject at the end of whatever is it I’m writing about. It’s through this 
system of trial and error that I extend the boundaries of my own knowledge in search of 
something relative.” Of note are the references to the students’ thoughts about 
themselves and their actions: Consideration of “who I am and who I might want to be” 
in a “system of trial and error” that seeks to extend the boundaries of knowing to make 
new connections with existing understanding.  What these comments share is an inherent 
rejection of conformity to the expectation of an ideal, whether that belongs to the social 
group or to the assignment, and to shift attention to the individual’s place as an auxiliary 
component of the whole. 
 Other students sought to construct some defining parameters for deracination in 
that it “pulls apart the ideas encompassed in the paper,” to “make a case out of nothing,” 
to “critique with an open and unbiased mind” in a “learning opportunity to reflect, 
analyze, and to challenge the basic essence of an essay.” It was also seen as a way “for 
anyone to express how they feel without using emotions, a paradox in itself.” Then, 
there were those who admitted a curious ambivalence about the process, describing it as 
“one that at first can seem appealing with the idea of gaining a whole new perspective 
on your own work,” but then admitting that “what one who has never done this [process 
of deracination] does not take into account is how brutal some of the writing can be.”  
Interestingly, one of the students in the OL class drew parallels between deracination 
and her own deaf culture, writing that “[w]e [those who are deaf] just like to say what is 
there instead of covering up the truth. We just don’t do white lies.” This student then 
conceded, however, that “[c]riticizing is not as easy as it sounds. It truly requires 
concentration and knowledge of the materials used to make a good critique,” a point 
supported by another student who wrote that “[d]eracinating has to be the most difficult 
form of essay writing ... [and] takes much concentration and devotion to do so.” Yet, one 
of the most consistent observations about deracination was a sense of authentication – 
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one that reinforced the students’ own writing as worthy of close, critical analysis: “I was 
expecting a harsh deracination because quite frankly the draft that I turned in was 
absolute rubbish. What I did not expect was a deracination that was a thousand words 
plus over an essay that was only three hundred eighty seven words.”  
 Many of the students wrote, too, of the frustrations they encountered in writing 
their deracinations and counter-deracinations: “I was blinded by my own passions for 
my writing ... [and] needed to mature as a writer in order for me to survive”; or “they 
[deracinations] required the most amount of critical analysis and thought that I have ever 
put myself through.” Others pointed to a sense of confusion and uncertainty in being 
given an assignment with so few parameters. 
Writing a deracination can be a very frustrating assignment. It wasn’t 
until after a few read-throughs that I started to gain a clearer picture of 
what I was supposed to be doing. ... I started to write using the little notes 
I had written along the side of the paper ... [and] using the little things I 
pointed out led to bigger and bigger ideas until I had a reasonably solid 
critique. 
Students also reflected on the challenge of deracination, remarking that it was “harder to 
read and criticize another’s work than to write my own draft. The difficulty comes in 
having to really think critically, more so than in the past, and then critically think on 
behalf of a colleague.” Others questioned their ability “to write not so pleasant ideas 
about another student’s work” or acknowledged a desire not to hurt feelings: “It’s hard 
to tell someone that they need to improve here or there without being too judgmental. 
It’s also hard to tell someone that their writing needs work when you’re not sure your 
writing is any better.” This latter point was reinforced by a student who, asserting that 
the “deracination was not my favorite paper to write,” admitted to the difficulty of being 
critical of another’s essay “when I kept thinking that I was not a good judge to 
objectively criticize someone else.”  
In contrast, however, other students saw deracination as an opportunity to think 
for themselves: “When we began deracinating is when we actually began to critically 
analyze”; “[t]he level of thought that goes into a deracination is high. It crawls into the 
mind [of the student writer] and requires a much deeper and more objective examination 
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of what is being thought” and “[d]eracinations are truly the best way, I think, for a writer 
to expand one’s mind and reach deeper in to their [sic] thoughts than ever before.” Other 
students found the process of deracinating another’s work illuminated problems in their 
own writing: “In my deracination of [F’s] essay, I spoke of his retelling the story. The 
problem was one that I too found myself guilty of because it seemed an easy way to 
provide the evidence to enforce the claim.” Similarly, “without a deracination I would 
not have been able to see my own mistakes. As a writer we are always going to think our 
work is good ... . I not only learned how to take corrective criticism [with deracination] 
but how to give the criticism as well.”  
 With many of the students recognizing that the giving and receiving of criticism 
can be a painful act, the importance of agreeing to work within the parameters of the 
D.I.S. was enforced in many of the IPJ responses. Of her deracinator, one student wrote 
that “she just literally had me dangling from a string as if I were a ball of yarn and she a 
cat just toying with my thoughts. But as I read my deracination paper back to myself I 
just could not believe that there were so many problems”; another claimed that 
deracination “is like falling from a skyscraper to my inevitable doom on the concrete 
sidewalk” and yet “after a while, I would calm down and consider the critical thought 
that had been put into analyzing my work.” For still another student, working in the 
D.I.S. meant understanding “that the comments and analysis were not personal” and to 
“go beyond my own feelings and think about the benefits of a critical analysis.” Many 
conceded that it is possible to detach:  “Although I felt bad I knew that I was working in 
the DIS and so was she [the deracinatee]. In the end, I could pull out the bad points 
because I was under the umbrella of the DIS. The trick is to separate ourselves from the 
reality of a criticism. Truly, one can disconnect from reality and look at the words for 
what they are.” 
The results of working with what many students saw as the negative aspects of 
deracination within the D.I.S., however, were positive. Many took the opportunity to 
completely revise their original drafts after deracination: “Instead of correcting the 
problems that [P] criticized, I wrote a whole new paper, with a different thesis and many 
new resources. I even took a whole new approach. Once I started writing, everything just 
came at once.” Another student wrote that she was “able to make the most out of the 
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corrective criticism that came out of the deracination ... . I feel that this [final essay] is 
perhaps the best paper I have written all year, or even possibly ever written.” This final 
observation is an important one: Indeed, after spending most of the semester with a C 
average for her essays, the student produced one of the highest-scored assignments of 
both the OL and F2F groups combined for the final essay.  
 Again, discussion about deracinations featured prominently in the students’ 
overall reflections on the courses, with many indicating their own sense of 
accomplishment or progress: “I find myself amazed at just how far not only I, but my 
peers have come. Much of this is due to practice and guidance, but some of the skill I 
have developed is thanks to deracination”; “the class demanded more from my brain 
than I thought I was capable of producing. It made my mind scramble around for 
something to cling onto for survival, until I finally got the hang of writing something 
worth reading”; “many times I was stumped [in this class] and once or twice I learned 
that my writing, though praised endlessly before, has quite a way to go”; “I have 
learned, if nothing else in this course, how to think better for myself and that disagreeing 
with someone else isn’t always a bad thing”; and “I remember when we had our first 
glimpse of the first essay topic. We all dropped our jaws in shock, overwhelmed at what 
the prompt was asking for and astonished when we realized we knew exactly what it 
meant.” Other comments related to the amount of writing the students found they had 
produced: “I found it ironic that I was in an English class, yet we didn’t read a single 
book. However, I didn’t expect that I would write the equivalent length of a short story” 
and “I only have a few things to say. One of them is that I might as well have written a 
book.”  
 The reflections also showed evidence that the students perceived their English 
class, and their places in it, as unique: “I’m so used to the standardization of class and 
regulations that I have almost forgotten what it feels like to participate in uninhibited 
brainstorming and learning”; “[t]his is the only class I have experienced where everyone 
converses together, even outside of the class. There have been many hallway discussions 
about what was taking place”; “[t]he first day of class I arrived an hour early, listening to 
this old professor going over his syllabus and thinking ‘if this is my teacher, I’m in 
trouble.’ Then you came walking [down] the hall and I knew this class was going to be 
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great” and “[w]hat has a man become when he can deconstruct a Godzilla movie? Is he a 
monster, much like the big green one himself? No, he is not a monster; he is a student of 
Becky Flores’ English class, a class like no other I’ve ever taken.” Yet, the most 
surprising element of the students’ reflections on the course came from the F2F classes, 
and it was a characteristic not evident in the OL class groups:  
• “Thank you for believing in me” 
• “You spoke to us as adults and did not talk down to us. I appreciated that” 
• “The first thing I wrote [in the IPJ] I said ‘there is more to [W].’ And I don’t 
think I will ever forget you actually wanting to know what that ‘more’ is” 
• “Your words gave me the incentive to continue even when it was difficult. 
Today, I am glad I did not drop the course. I have few people who have 
influenced me as much, and for that I am grateful” 
• “You showed me that you were interested in the student, not the paycheck. It 
truly shows that you love your work and want to reach the student. Thank you 
for being there for us” 
• “I liked the way that you would call on names that were a little quiet or shy so 
that they too could voice their opinion” 
• “My instructor, she is the most important of all. When I felt that I was in doubt or 
unsure of myself she was there to pick up my self esteem and encourage me to 
go on. You made us feel comfortable around you” 
• “Most of all, the difference is you! My first impression of you was ‘she knows 
what she’s talking about’” 
• “I never thought that a Ph.D. candidate would have anything good to say about 
my thoughts and writings. I really do appreciate the honest comments you have 
made in response. You have a good thing going here, Becky” 
 
6.3 Observations: Concept of Critical Care and Decritique 
 From the 80 students considered eligible for this study, 34 were instructed with 
the pedagogy of Critical Care (3 class sections) and 46 with Decritique (4 class 
sections). Of these, 55 were enrolled in English 1301 and 25 in English 1302. While 48 
studied in a face-to-face computer supported classroom, 32 studied online; similarly, 32 
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were Dual Credit students and 48 were non Dual-Credit. The average student age was 
slightly higher in DEC classes (20.2 years) than in CCC (19.5) and there were, on 
average, two-thirds more females than males. Placement reading/writing scores for 
English 1301 showed a higher percentage of DEC students (95.2 %) above the minimum 
passing level than CCC (73.5 %), yet these results excluded the essay portion results of 
the standardized entrance tests. English 1302 students, having all passed 1301 as a pre-
requisite for enrollment, showed a median 1301 course grade of 3.0, or a B. 
 The IPJ assignments showed that DEC students consistently wrote more than 
those in the CCC classes, with a total of 273, 612 words produced, or an average of  
5, 948 words per student. Word count between the DEC OL and F2F environments was 
close, with an average of 6, 504 words per student in the OL classes and 5, 392 in the 
F2F. Conversely, CCC students wrote less, with a total word count of 108, 208 and an 
average of 3, 183 words per student. A major difference, however, was apparent 
between the OL and F2F CCC classes. While the OL groups averaged 5, 255 words per 
student in their IPJs – comparable to the DEC OL results – CCC F2F students averaged 
only 2, 436 words per student. This data, presented in Figure 6.4, indicates that DEC 
F2F students wrote 2.2 times as many words over their CCC F2F counterparts. 
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Fig. 6.4: IPJ Word Count Averages Per Student: CCC and DEC; OL and F2F  
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 Development and exemplification of IPJ writing was problematic in the CCC 
groups. Whether in the OL or F2F environment, the majority of students showed a 
preference for my initiation and development of discussion and many framed their 
writing in terms of “answering the question,” with enumerated responses often prefaced 
with tentative exclamations of “this is only my opinion, but …” or “I hope I’ve got this 
right.” Exemplification was frequently clichéd and drawn on lived experience as 
veridical evidence, spelling was often phonetic or abbreviated, and word choice reflected 
the vernacular. When the outcome of verbal (F2F) or open forum (OL) discussion was 
recorded in IPJs, it nearly always validated the consensual opinion of the group. The 
DEC IPJs, despite initial caution, showed strong overall development, particularly in 
regard to critical reflection on vigorous argument in both verbal and open forum 
discussion, though group engagement was more marked for the F2F students than the 
OL. Vocabulary in both groups, however, showed extensive variety, often incorporating 
words introduced through text readings.  
 Grade differences between English 1301 CCC and DEC students for the first 
essay was greater in the DEC class by 2.2 percent (81.1; CCC 78.9), although it should 
be noted that while all DEC 1301 students earning a non-passing grade of Draft 
submitted a rewrite, four CCC students did not. Excluding those four non-rewritten 
essays, which ultimately earned a failing grade of 50, results in a higher average of first 
essay grades for the CCC classes at 84.7. Final essays did not qualify for rewrites, but 
were tied to peer critique (CCC) and deracination (DEC) assignments. Evaluated blind 
and holistically, there was a difference of 4.9 percent between the CCC (81.7) and DEC 
(86.6) classes, representing nearly half a letter grade in favor of the DEC students. The 
two English 1302 class groups, both instructed with Decritique, showed a deviation of 
only 0.3 percent at 81.4 (OL and 81.7 (DEC). Although based on a very small 
population and the outcome of the final essay assignment, this data for English 1302 
indicates that there is no significant difference between the OL (DEC) and F2F (DEC) 
modes of delivery. For English 1301 (CCC and DEC), the data shows that DEC students 
scored nearly five percent higher on their final essays than CCC.  
 For all classes, English 1301 and English 1302, average words per sentence did 
not show significant statistical differences with both CCC and DEC students recording a 
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slight decrease of 0.4 (CCC) and 0.6 (DEC) over the first and final essay assignments. 
Average passive sentence percentages in 1301 CCC increased by 3.5 percent, decreased 
for 1301 DEC by 1.7 percent, and 1302 DEC students showed a small increase in the 
final essay of 0.5 percent. Of interest, however, is that despite the CCC increase and 
overall DEC decrease in passive sentence averages, the percentage for the final essay is 
very close between the two class groups at 15.3 (CCC) and 15.5 (DEC) – a difference of 
just 0.2 percent. Results for the Flesch-Kincaid Reading Ease (RE) and Reading Grade 
Level (RGL) were mixed. Both CCC and DEC 1301 students recorded a slightly 
disappointing average RE increase of 1.3 (CCC) and 0.8 (DEC); the English 1302 DEC 
students, however, showed a significant RE decrease of 6.3. The results are similar for 
RGL. While an increased level is desirable, both 1301 groups showed a decrease of 0.5 
(CCC) and 0.3 (DEC). The 1302 DEC classes recorded an increased average RGL of 
0.8. These results suggest that while there was no significant difference in RE or RGL 
between DEC and CCC in English 1301, the DEC 1302 students improved both the ease 
of reading and the sophistication in expression in their final essays of the course.  
 There were, however, clearer distinctions between CCC and DEC students in 
relation to the depth and scope of revision in the first essay rewrites. Of the 30 CCC and 
43 DEC students who qualified for a rewrite, 21 CCC (70.0 %) and 24 DEC (55.8 %) 
submitted a revised essay. Of these, 12 CCC (57.1 %) and 19 DEC (79.2 %) were 
originally Drafts, while 9 CCC (42.9 %) and 5 DEC (20.8 %) had passed with a C or B. 
Therefore, while 14 percent more CCC students submitted a rewrite than DEC, a greater 
proportion of DEC essays (22.1 %) had received an ostensibly failing grade of Draft. 
The data suggests that a Draft status does not necessarily provide greater impetus for 
students to rewrite or revise their essays, and neither does the pedagogy of CCC or DEC. 
This latter point is further reinforced by the fact that four CCC and three DEC students 
submitted no rewrite at all. Grade distribution after rewrites, however, showed a curious 
anomaly between the CCC and DEC groups. From all essays that initially received a 
Draft, ten DEC students increased their grade to an A (5) or B (10); none from the CCC 
classes earned an A on rewrite.  What this indicates is that DEC students were more 
likely to make significant and effective changes to their essays in the rewriting process – 
as measured by a high passing grade – than those in the CCC classes. By extension, 
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CCC rewrites, based on the grade received, were more likely to contain less significant 
revision, resulting in only a minimal grade increase.  
 As observed in the IPJ assignments, the word count produced in the DEC 
deracinations were significantly higher than the CCC peer critiques. DEC students wrote 
a total of 51, 913 words, or an average of 1, 129 words per student in this assignment. 
For peer critique, CCC students produced 11, 844 words, with a far lower per-student 
average of 348. Moreover, while in the IPJ assignments CCC OL students recorded a 
comparative average word count as their DEC F2F and OL counterparts, this was not 
observed in the peer critiques. CCC OL students averaged only 560 words per peer 
critique compared with the 1, 098 average of their DEC OL colleagues doing 
deracination. The anomaly is even more startling when CCC F2F results are compared 
with DEC F2F: Here, the CCC peer critique average per student was 272 words; the 
DEC F2F deracination average was 1, 159 words per student – the highest average 
recorded of all classes. Anomalous results were also evident in the percentage of passive 
sentences when comparing the essays with the peer critiques/deracinations. While essays 
showed no significant difference, CCC peer critiques averaged 5.3 percent passive 
sentence use, whereas DEC deracinations averaged 13.5 percent. The average words 
used per sentence was also higher in the DEC classes (19.6) than CCC (14.6). The most 
remarkable distinction, however, was in RE and RGL scores. CCC peer critiques 
averaged an RE of 64.6 (high) and RGL of 7.8 (low), while results for DEC 
deracinations were a low RE of 52.5 and a comparatively far higher RGL of 10.7. 
Drawn from this data, conclusions about the differences between peer critique and 
deracination are as follows: Deracinations were 4.3 times lengthier than peer critiques, 
showed 8.2 percent more use of passive sentences, an average of 5 more words per 
sentence, an 11.9 difference in ease of reading, and nearly a 3-grade level increase in 
RGL. In short, deracinations were more developed and expressed more complex ideas in 
a more sophisticated style than peer critiques.  
 In this regard, it is also important to consider the positive/negative correlation 
analysis of the peer critiques and deracinations, and the distinct differences between the 
two. CCC students recorded a positive:negative ratio of 12:88, meaning that 88 percent 
of the peer critiques comprised personalized comments, token niceties, vague and 
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generalized finalities, and the sandwiching of criticism between praise. DEC students, 
on the inverse, achieved a correlation of 87:13, where 87 percent of the deracinations 
were characterized by specific and summative criticism, contradictions and objections, 
and stand-alone critical commentary. As English 1301 final essay grades were a product 
of peer critique for CCC and deracination for DEC, the 4.9 percent higher score in the 
latter group suggests that further investigation of deracination as a specific application of 
critical pedagogy is warranted.  
 Retention results were surprising. Given the nurturing and caring nature of CCC, 
I would have expected less attrition in those classes, but it was the DEC students who 
showed higher overall retention at 76.9 percent compared with 62.1 percent for CCC. 
Pass rates were also higher for DEC at 92.0 percent compared with CCC at 83.3 percent. 
This data, however, relates to all students enrolled in the seven classes, both eligible and 
non-eligible. It also includes the 32 Dual Credit students for whom retention is 
significantly stronger due to mandated high-school attendance policies. The following 
observations, therefore, reflect a distinction between OL and F2F modes of delivery, and 
draws only from the study’s eligible population. Retention for the F2F classes showed a 
significant 8.5 percent increase for DEC students (65.9 %) compared with CCC (57.4 
%), and a higher pass rate at 85.2 percent (DEC) over 77.8 percent (CCC). For the OL 
students, all of whom were Dual Credit, the anomaly is maintained between DEC and 
CCC. Despite historically excellent retention in Dual Credit, only 81.8 percent of the 
CCC students were retained compared with 95.8 percent for DEC OL – a retention 
difference of 14 percent. Again, however, these results are tempered by the population’s 
small size.  
 Participation in the courses, measured by average number of WebCT log-ins and 
forum messages produced by each student showed differences in favor of DEC, and 
remarkably little variation between OL and F2F DEC modes. CCC students recorded an 
overall average of 575 log-ins and 30.7 posts per student. Average OL and F2F CCC 
log-ins were similar at 652 and 536, as were average posts per CCC student at 35.2 (OL) 
and 28.5 (F2F). The DEC classes, however, showed total averages of 857 log-ins and 
70.7 posts per student. Surprisingly, while the OL and F2F DEC students recorded 
relatively close comparative log-in averages at 729 and 985 respectively, the average 
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posts per student showed remarkable disparity. While the DEC OL result averaged 48.6 
posts per student, for DEC F2F it was nearly double at 92.8.  The DEC F2F results here 
are of particular interest because, given the entirely text-based nature of communication 
in an online environment, it would be reasonable to expect the OL students to log-in and 
post more frequently than those in an F2F class, yet the opposite was shown.  
 From the start of semester in the CCC classrooms I sought to establish a 
community of learners bound by a sense of sharing, tolerance, trust, and respect; overall, 
I succeeded. By the end of their courses, students demonstrated an acute recognition of 
the collective and how to contribute to the maintenance of the status quo, actively 
seeking to reconcile potentially unsettling deviations from the norm, underscored by the 
articulation of generalities and endorsement of mainstream assumptions. They also felt 
at ease enough to frequently contribute personal observations and lived experiences to 
illustrate their ideas, and tenaciously hold those beliefs as veridical and unassailable 
truth. Dissent, whether by way of discourse or even transgressing acceptable standards 
of essay or journal writing, was an abnormality – something that needed to be “fixed.” 
While many claimed an increased ability to look more deeply into things, ironically this 
was not apparent in their own reflections on the course. Although there was evidence 
that students could make abstract concepts like “critically reflective thinking” tangible, it 
was often tied to a conceptual framework of respectful tolerance – one that showed 
awareness of alternative perspectives, but with little indication of internalized change. 
There was also an uncomfortable emphasis on the teacher’s inextricable role in learning: 
Revered as the holder of wisdom and giver of knowledge, it is from her that approval 
must be sought. This sense of dependent trust was concerning, for at times it illuminated 
that the students perceived their success rested on the moves I made, or did not make. 
 While the DEC students also showed awareness of alternative perspectives, it 
was characterized by recognition of their own relationship to multiple viewpoints, 
demonstrating an attempt to extend the boundaries of knowing to make new connections 
with existing understanding.  Inherently, DEC students tended to reject conformity to 
ideal expectations, particularly in relation to exceeding the parameters of an assigned 
topic for discourse. Initially, many students showed a curious ambivalence towards their 
studies, yet one of the most consistent observations made was a growing sense of 
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authentication that reinforced their own writing and thinking as worthy of close, critical 
analysis. Moreover, many conceded the possibility of being able to detach and separate 
their own selves from a contextual reality.  Particularly in the deracinations, DEC 
students showed a strong ability to engage in cognitive possibilities by arguing with 
points or issues over which they might ordinarily agree, reflecting a deconstructive 
commitment to the text.  One of the most surprising aspects of the study, however, was a 
distinction between the OL and F2F DEC classrooms. In the former, although students 
were diligent and articulate, the discursive environment was formal and sterile; the 
latter, in contrast, imbued a critical camaraderie that endorsed cohesion and solidarity 
despite the dissent. At the start of the project I thought Decritique would be easier to 
deliver in the online environment where I did not see the students face-to-face and they 
did not see me, but this was not the case. Moreover, while in their course reflections the 
F2F students initially related impressions of shock and disconcertion, their final 
comments almost uniformly expressed sincere, emotional engagement with the course 
and their instructor. From a pedagogy that many consider too blunt, too critical, and too 
potentially hurtful, students in the DEC F2F classes ironically perceived the class as one 
expressing an unexpected essence of critical care.  
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7.  Conclusion 
 
 At the start of the study, I proposed a null hypothesis that, when compared with a 
pedagogy of Critical Care (CCC), application of Decritique (DEC) in the teaching of 
first-year college English makes no significant difference in students’ ability to write 
analytical essays characterized by depth and sophistication of argument and marked by 
evidence of critically reflective thought. Anticipating a rejection of the null hypothesis, 
initially I expected to find that: 
• Essays written in the DEC classes would be more complex, more sophisticated, 
and showing greater analytical depth than CCC – particularly the final course 
essay; 
• DEC students would produce deeper, broader revisions of their essays than CCC; 
• Informal writing in journals and text-based discussion in DEC classes would be 
more significantly developed than CCC; 
• There would be significant differences between online (OL) and face-to-face 
(F2F) modes of delivery; and 
• Due to the nature of “caring,” CCC students would be “happier” or “more 
satisfied” than DEC and, as a result, retention would be higher in the CCC 
classes. 
The research process, focusing on the concepts of critical thinking, critical pedagogy, 
critical literacy, and critical care, showed a recognized need that students in first-year 
college English classrooms develop a cognitive repertoire of tools and skill in regard to 
disrupting or disturbing the barriers of their own ideological tropes; in short, it’s not so 
much a question of teaching writing as it is teaching thinking. What remains 
unaddressed in recent scholarship is the question of how this can be achieved in 
measurable, tangible, and effective ways.  I posit that Decritique offers a response to this 
question, and frame my justification on the expectations established at the beginning of 
this project under four subheadings that summarize the study’s findings. 
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7.1 Essays: Complexity, Depth, Sophistication, Revision 
 Final essays of each course were evaluated primarily in terms of degrees of 
complexity, depth, and sophistication of thesis and argument. Comparison of final essay 
grades over the semesters shows that DEC students averaged nearly a five percent, or 
half a letter grade, increase over their CCC colleagues in English 1301. In contrast, the 
two English 1302 DEC classes, one OL and one F2F, recorded a difference of only 0.3 
percent for the final essays. While a five percent grade difference may not be 
phenomenally large, the significance is that it is a tangible gain, suggesting that 
Decritique pedagogy had some measurable influence on student outcomes. Conversely, 
the very close correlation for the two DEC English 1302 classes provides support to this 
claim with an absence of difference of less than half a percent. Although researcher bias 
was minimized with the blind and holistic grading of these essays by two instructors of 
English 1301/1302, one of whom was the researcher, staking a claim of validity for 
these results would require a larger population over a sustained period and a formal 
process of evaluation by normed third parties.  
 In terms of revision, DEC essays showed a marked degree of depth when 
compared with those of the CCC classes. While more CCC students submitted rewrites, 
revision was greater in those from DEC students, indicating that critical commentary 
embedded within the text – of responding to the students’ ideas and assertions as “the 
things themselves” – may play a significant role in relation to the depth of revision and, 
moreover, that a non-failing grade of “Draft” is not necessarily motivation for students 
to undertake significant revisions to their work.  In their deracinations, assignments that 
were tied directly to the production of essays, DEC students tended to validate the 
possibility of abnormality by actively working to identify incongruity, even when it was 
not initially apparent, therefore opening the opportunity for re-cognition and 
transgression of ideas – not only for the student whose work was being deracinated, but 
for the deracinating students themselves. This capability of being consciously aware of 
critically reflecting on their own ideas reflects the phenomenological process of eidetic 
reduction and also Bakhtin’s vnenakhodimost, of placing oneself outside of oneself in 
order to construct an authentic internalized dialogic relation.  In contrast, the CCC peer 
critiques revealed identification, or recognition, of the established collective norm in 
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terms of what constituted a “good essay,” and sought instead to align the ideas produced 
in student writing with perceived acceptable standards. 
 The time it took to write interwoven, critical commentary into the DEC students’ 
essays is worth consideration. Patently, the practice of commenting only at the end of 
paragraphs with a summative statement at the conclusion of the essay requires less time 
for the instructor – a method used for CCC classes. Yet, in the course of this study I 
discovered that it took almost twice as long to carefully re-phrase and translate honest, 
critical commentary into something more palatable, positive, and encouraging for the 
CCC essays. Moreover, the writing of DEC commentary, inherently integrated with the 
students’ writing, became part of the pedagogy. In this way, the task of evaluation was 
not separated from the act of teaching. Finally, rather than responding to a pre-
determined rubric as a measurement of evaluation, DEC commentary instead responded 
to the ideas of the students and what they brought to their learning.  
 
7.2 Informal Writing: Journals and Written Discourse 
 The 2003 Neglected “R” report from the National Commission on Writing in 
America’s Schools and Colleges (NCWASC), advises that students need to double the 
time they spend writing and, moreover, that writing is a complex intellectual endeavor 
that should serve to stretch the minds of students and sharpen their ability in analysis 
(13). The informal journal and open forum discussion writing produced by the DEC 
students met these goals outlined in the NCWASC report: Their word count, on average, 
was 2.5 times more than in the CCC classes, and the development and exemplification 
of DEC journal entries and forum discussion was far greater than CCC, with the latter 
group endorsing personal truth as veridical evidence and being far less likely to examine 
their own thinking to go beyond what they knew. Although it is not unreasonable to 
expect more developed writing and communication in an entirely text-based online 
environment, as was the case with similar word counts for DEC and CCC online 
students, of particular note in this study is the significant difference in the F2F classroom 
in favor of the DEC groups over the CCC.  
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7.3 Delivery Mode: OL and F2F 
 While there is some indication that the pedagogy of Decritique may positively 
affect student outcomes, this study suggests that there is no overall discrepancy between 
OL and F2F delivery modes. However, there was a surprising distinction in terms of 
implementing Decritique. Although the initial reaction of students to receipt of critical 
commentary was one of dismay and disconcertion in both modes, I had thought it would 
be easier to deliver it in an online environment where the students were unknown to me. 
Conversely, I envisaged it would be more difficult to engage criticality in the F2F 
classroom. This, however, was not the case. Overwhelmingly, while a strong sense of 
critical camaraderie and solidarity developed in all the DEC F2F classrooms, the DEC 
OL environments retained a sense of formal sterility, lacking the dichotomous elements 
of playful seriousness that is an integral part of Decritique. Interestingly, the OL DEC 
classes retained a very serious nature without the play, while the CCC OL and F2F 
classes focused more on the play than the serious. The characteristic feature of the DEC 
F2F classrooms, therefore, was that they successfully integrated both elements.  
 
7.4 Student Observations and Retention 
 The final expectation of the study was that due to the caring, nurturing nature of 
critical care pedagogy, CCC students would be “happier” or “more satisfied” with their 
coursework than their DEC counterparts, and that this would be measured in terms of 
student observations on the class and higher CCC retention statistics. The expectation 
was proven wrong. Despite a conscious commitment to present myself in the CCC 
classroom as warm, positive, nurturing, and enthusiastic – aspects that frequently rank 
highly on student evaluations as very important and desirable characteristics in a teacher, 
this did not translate into higher levels of retention, attendance, degree of course 
engagement, or student satisfaction. Retention was not only higher in DEC classes 
across the three semesters, but the degree of investiture in their learning and engagement 
with the course materials was greater for DEC students. Further, while a characteristic of 
the DEC classroom was a developed sense of self-initiative and independence, the CCC 
showed a worrisome dependence on the teacher, endorsing the concerns raised by critics 
of Critical Care. 
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 Towards the end of each semester at Del Mar College, students complete course 
evaluations independently of their instructors through a third party data gathering and 
analysis organization called the IDEA Center, the results of which I analyzed as a means 
to impartially gauge levels of student satisfaction. Statistical reports are generated that 
rank each class, drawn on student ratings in areas such as teaching effectiveness, course 
satisfaction, and perceptions of progress on three core objectives, pre-determined by the 
instructor. Each semester of the study, the three objectives I nominated were:  
1. Learning to analyze and critically evaluate ideas, arguments, and points of view 
2. Gaining a broader understanding and appreciation of intellectual/cultural activity 
through the study of literature 
3. Acquiring an interest in learning more by students asking their own questions 
and seeking their own answers 
Analysis of these evaluations, represented in Figure 7.1, indicates some statistical 
support for the empirical observations I made here as well as the students’ own 
reflective commentaries on their course experience. The rankings are based on a scale of 
1 through 5, with 5 the highest, and although students are generally reluctant to rank 
such surveys at either extreme, the average results for all the classes in this study show 
that students in the two DEC F2F classes were the most positive about their course 
experience at 4.69 and 4.55 respectively. The CCC F2F group averaged the third highest 
result at 4.53, followed by the first appearance of a DEC OL class at 4.41. The last three 
rankings, in order, were CCC OL at 4.32, CCC F2F at 4.11, and a low of 4.0 from the 
DEC OL class. Of interest in this data set is the two extremes: DEC F2F (4.69) and DEC 
OL (4.0), supporting the claim that Decritique fares better in the F2F classroom, 
although it should be noted that the other DEC OL class falls in the middle of these two 
results at 4.41. A median of 4.37 for all seven classes also indicates that two of the CCC 
groups fell below the average at 4.32 and 4.11. Overall, therefore, the tentative 
conclusion that can be drawn from observational, empirical, and statistical data is that 
DEC F2F students are more likely to be retained, have a higher pass rate, and be more 
satisfied with their learning experience than those in CCC classes. 
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Fig. 7.1: Averages of Course Evaluation Rankings from All Semesters 
 
7.5 Reflections 
 Decritique is a radical critical pedagogy underscored by a philosophy of 
language designed for the first-year college English classroom that offers an alternative 
to contemporary applications of critical theory; namely, critical thinking, critical 
pedagogy, critical literacy, and critical care. One of its strongest characteristics is an 
inherent delineation between re-cognition and recognition; the former actively seeking 
ways to re-position one’s own thinking in relation to perceptions of the world, and the 
latter endorsing existing perception. Initially, students show a tendency of resistance to 
the pedagogy, exhibiting signs of discomfort, disconcertion, and confusion. Typically, 
however, this is replaced by rapid engagement and advancement, often three to four 
weeks into the course. In contrast, CCC students initially engage very quickly with the 
course, yet reach an early plateau that is sustained throughout the semester.  
 As a reinscribed application of critically caring, the Decritique classroom can be 
a contentious one, and this has ramifications for teachers who may wish to use the 
pedagogy. It is not only students who experience confusion and disconcertion, but the 
instructor as well – from whom there needs to be a willingness to walk on what seems to 
be at times the edge of an abyss and a commitment to detach from one’s own personal 
beliefs in order to examine the students’ ideas as “the things themselves.”  The concepts 
of respect and tolerance – or Burbules’ “hegemony of reasonableness” (257) – are 
anathema to Decritique, and teachers can expect to find students who struggle 
tenaciously to articulate a point, who may argue vehemently with others, whose 
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confusion and even agitation is genuine; in short, students who show evidence of what 
Tingle describes as “narcissistic wounding” (19). And yet, this is also evidence of 
critical interaction, animation, and engagement that opens the door to the possibility of 
change.  
 It is not an easy thing to work against established social and educational norms, 
and teaching with Decritique can be as disconcerting and challenging as it undoubtedly 
has been for my students. Yet, Paulo Freire, envisioning a critical and liberatory 
pedagogy, calls for courage on the part of educators and their students – courage to 
transgress what is accepted, what is standardized, and what is frequently unchallenged 
and unquestioned – to venture past the ideological borders that can so effectively bar us 
from engaging in the very real possibilities of transformational change. Decritique aims 
to take the best aspects of critical thinking, critical pedagogy, critical literacy, and 
critical care. It involves a radical revisioning of the critical pedagogue: one who cares 
deeply for her students, yet does not seek harmony or consensus, nor endorses tolerance 
as authentic critical discourse. Rather, he exhibits characteristics of what Václav Havel 
defines as an intellectual – one who should:  
[C]onstantly disturb, bear witness to the misery of the world, be 
provocative by being independent, be the chief doubter of systems and 
bear witness to their mendacity. … An intellectual essentially doesn’t 
belong anywhere; [s]he stands out as an irritant wherever [s]he is … 
[and] to a certain extent an intellectual is always condemned to defeat. 
And yet, in another, more profound sense the intellectual remains, despite 
all his defeats, undefeated … like Sisyphus. He is in fact victorious 
through his defeats. (167; Lifton 118)9  
Certainly, there is a strong component of intellectualization in Havel’s defining 
parameters, and a sense of negativity in terms of actively looking for commentary on the 
world’s miseries, the manipulation of power, and the concept of defeat as opposed to the 
more positivistic idea of winning. Intrinsically, Havel’s call of the intellectual is one 
grounded in passion and emotive acknowledgment of things that are inherently wrong, 
                                                 
9 I have taken some liberties with Havel’s quote to more equitably balance the gender pronouns 
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or of caring enough to become emotionally involved in critique of a moral, ethical, or 
social transgression. 
 Although this study suggests that Decritique is more effective with older, more 
mature college or university students, overall it did reveal a surprisingly high level of 
resiliency from students in their ability to cope with criticism. This, in turn, leads to a 
series of questions for teachers: Are we underestimating the capabilities of our students? 
Are we positioning them as fragile, dependent recipients – and, if so, whether such a 
positioning constructs a self-justifying response; that is, if we see our students that way, 
will they see themselves that way, too?  
  On the proviso that conclusions from this research are drawn tentatively, with 
acknowledgment of the small population and contextual variables, I posit that Decritique 
has the potential to impact the way students and teachers of first-year undergraduate 
English courses approach and engage in text analysis, and has possible tangible gain in 
regard to the depth of reflective, critical thinking and the subsequent analysis of 
collective and individual thought.  I can, therefore, neither accept nor reject the null 
hypothesis. This indicates that further research into Decritique as a critical pedagogy is 
warranted, particularly in the following six areas: 
 
1. The process of deracination as a more effective critical revision strategy than 
peer critique or peer review; 
2. The use of embedded commentary on student-produced writing to foster deeper, 
broader revision; 
3. As a reconceptualized concept of what it means to “care”; 
4. As a method to increase the amount of student writing; 
5. The potential effects on improved retention; and 
6. Emphasis on its value in the face-to-face classroom 
 
Ideally, such a study needs to be undertaken on a longitudinal basis with a larger 
population of both students and instructors working with the principles of CCC and 
DEC, perhaps cross-institutionally, and testing against key sociological and 
psychological markers. 
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 If critically reflective learning is to take place, we first have to concretely 
imagine ourselves in a series of positions that serve to interrogate each other; to 
seriously consider alternative truths as momentary tangible truths; to be willing to 
detach ourselves from our own privileged belief systems long enough to reflect on them, 
to analyze their validity in light of what we learn, and to consider that we may be wrong. 
How can students reach a desirable point of cognitive struggle and confusion that can 
lead to genuine discovery and learning without feeling the pain that criticism 
undoubtedly delivers? This is a question that Decritique seeks to address, and I hope – at 
least in some ways – that my students were able to experience this in their semesters 
with me.  
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Appendix A: Glossary of Terms 
 
CCC Concept of Critical Care: A pedagogy framed by concepts of 
respect, tolerance, care, and nurturing; a student group taught 
using these principles (cf. DEC) 
 
critical commentary Detailed, critical comments provided by instructor in 
response to student writing, or by students engaging in 
deracination, the aim of which is to engage critical dialogue 
and assist in the depth of revision to writing and thinking 
 
critical thinking rubric A set of questions or statements designed to guide a student’s 
critical review of another’s writing as well as their own (see 
WSUCTR) 
 
DEC Decritique: A collection of approaches underscored by the 
concepts of Deracination and the D.I.S. as a radical 
reconceptualization of critical pedagogy designed for 
teaching and learning in the first-year college English 
classroom; a student group taught using these principles (cf. 
CCC) 
 
Deracination From the French déraciner; to uproot geographically or 
socially, but in the context of Decritique to uproot 
cognitively. Deracination involves writers taking a 
consciously critical stance and acting as deracinator, whose 
task as agent provocateur is to actively seek to undermine the 
stability of meaning within a text or discourse 
 
D.I.S. Detached Intellectualized Space: An agreement made to 
work in a cognitive frame of mind that focuses on seeing 
oneself as an active critic of ideas rather than as the 
individual who owns/produces those ideas 
 
Dual Credit student An advanced high-school student, studying either the 
eleventh or twelfth grade in secondary education, who is 
concurrently enrolled in and gaining college-credit hours by 
studying first-year, accredited college coursework. College 
credit is transferable to two- and four-year institutions and 
simultaneously counts as high school credit. 
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English 1301 and 
English 1302 
English 1301 (first semester, first year) and English 1302 
(second semester, first year) are mandated courses 
comprising part of the core curriculum for both Associate 
and Baccalaureate degree programs in most colleges and 
universities in Texas. Students cannot enroll in English 1301 
without passing a Texas state-administered placement 
examination. Testing is conducted in the senior year of 
secondary schooling or provided at alternative sites for 
mature age or special-entry students. Enrolment in English 
1302 depends on students passing English 1301 with a grade 
of C (70 percent) or higher. English 1301 and 1302 
emphasize skill in composition, expository and analytical 
prose; that is, the reading, evaluation and analysis of articles, 
short stories, plays, novellas, poetry, and/or novels and 
completing written assignments in relation to those readings 
and analyses, most often in the form of essays but also 
through less formal in-class writing and discussion 
 
fall semester Sixteen week college/university semester from 
approximately September to December 
 
forum An electronic bulletin board for text-based discussion within 
a password-protected WebCT environment; forums can be 
accessible to all students (open forums) or to select 
participants (private forums) 
 
IPJ Individual Portfolio Journal: Weekly writing assignments in 
private forums, requiring students to critically reflect on 
questions relating to readings and/or coursework. IPJ forums 
are accessible only by the instructor and each individual 
student, and promote individualized dialogue and revision 
through the exchange of critical discourse 
 
open discussion Written discussion taking place in open electronic discussion 
forums where all are encouraged to participate, or whole 
class verbal discussion in the face-to-face classroom 
 
spring semester Sixteen week college/university semester from 
approximately January to May 
 
 
WebCT An institutionally supported, password-protected, integrated 
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educational software package containing numerous tools for 
teaching, including discussion forums and file sharing 
capabilities 
 
WSUCTR Washington State University Critical Thinking Rubric: 
Implemented widely as part of Washington State 
University’s Critical Thinking Initiative project, this rubric 
provides instructors with modifiable guidelines for the 
purpose of peer revision/critique 
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Appendix B: Excerpt from Expectations for Formal Written Work in College-
Level Courses 
 
A:  A paper that receives an A is an outstanding essay that makes a perceptive and 
thoughtful response to the assignment. Perhaps the principal characteristic of the 
A paper is its rich content. Some describe that content as “dense,” others as 
“packed,” because the information delivered is such that one feels significantly 
taught by the author. The A paper is also marked by stylistic fitness: the title [if 
used] and opening paragraph are engaging; the transitions are artful; the phrasing 
is tight, fresh, and highly specific; the sentence structure is varied; the tone 
enhances the purpose of the paper. Finally, the A paper, because of its careful 
organization and development, imparts a feeling of wholeness and unusual 
clarity. It is not marred by errors of grammar, punctuation or spelling, nor is it 
hindered by weak sentence structure. The writing is smooth, vigorous, fresh. The 
A paper is also neat in appearance.  
 
B:  A B paper fulfills the assignment but goes beyond a routine response and shows 
evidence of thought and planning that makes it significantly better than 
competent. The B paper delivers substantial information; its specific points are 
logically ordered, well-developed, and unified around a clear organizing 
principle that is apparent early in the paper. The opening paragraph draws the 
reader in, the supporting paragraphs are convincing, and the sentence structure is 
correct, if not original. Finally, the paper contains no major distracting 
grammatical errors. It is neat in appearance. 
  
C:  A C paper carries out the assignment in a routine but adequate way, makes a 
commitment to the topic, and provides at least a satisfactory response to it. The 
paper demonstrates clear and logical organization, though perhaps not 
consistently or completely. The introduction, body, or conclusion may not be 
well-developed. The actual information usually seems thin and common- place. 
One reason for this impression is that ideas are typically cast in the form of 
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vague generalities. The C paper often fails to demonstrate maturity of thought, 
depth of development, or sufficient attention to organization. The transitions 
between paragraphs are logical but often unimaginative; the sentences, besides 
being a bit choppy, tend to follow a predictable (hence monotonous) subject-
verb-object pattern, and word choice is occasionally marred by unconscious 
repetition, redundancy, or imprecision. The paper contains only occasional 
mistakes in grammar, usage, and mechanics. It is easily read and neat in 
appearance. 
 
D:  A D paper is weak and inadequate. Its content relates to the assignment but 
normally does not clarify a purpose or support a commitment to the topic. Its 
treatment and development of the subject are not only rudimentary but also 
needlessly repetitious. While some organization may be present, it is neither 
clear nor effective. Sentences are frequently awkward, ambiguous, and marred 
by grammatical errors. Evidence of careful proofreading is scanty, and the 
phrasing makes it difficult for the reader to understand the content. Words are 
often misused, and sentences fail to conform to conventions of edited American 
English. The paper is characterized by awkwardness throughout. It gives the 
reader the impression that the writer lacks adequate control or assurance; the 
reader has to work to understand what the writer intends. The overall lack of 
control in the D paper reveals writing that has missed the mark. The visual 
presentation often needs improvement. 
 
F:  An F paper is poorly constructed, carelessly written, and marred by grammatical 
errors so that the reader cannot follow the ideas easily. Some errors indicate a 
failure to understand the basic grammar of sentences. In short, the ideas, 
organization, style, and presentation fall far below what is acceptable in college 
writing. The information is inadequate. The paper lacks specific illustrations or 
examples or belabors the obvious. The paper also lacks organization. It may 
make some sense but only when the reader struggles to find the sense. Most 
sentences are faulty, either too short and choppy or too long and ill-constructed. 
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Word choices are poor. Usually, there are multiple grammar, punctuation, and 
spelling errors. The visual appearance is often sloppy. 
 
A plagiarized paper falls into the category of the F paper, and so does a 
stylistically adequate paper that does not adhere to the assignment. The D and F 
differ only in degree. Neither can be regarded as successful.  
  
 (Expectations 4). 
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Appendix C: WSUCTR Adaptation for the CCC Classroom 
 
 Please use this guide when you are reviewing one of your colleague’s essays. 
You might like to print it and refer to it as you draft your view. The guide provides you 
with the language and the framework for working up your peer evaluation. You will 
notice that there is a “scale” on which you are asked to evaluate your colleague’s work: 
 Lowest = Scant: Needs a lot of work 
 Highest = Substantial: Excellent 
As you review your colleague’s writing, let the following questions guide your 
responses. Because “Scant” and “Substantial” are at opposite ends of the evaluation 
criteria, “Marginal” and “Acceptable” are appropriate when the work doesn’t quite fit 
either extremes. Once you have evaluated your colleague’s draft, write a Peer Evaluation 
Response. Frame up your response using the language of this guide. The length of your 
review depends on what you have to say about the draft, but you should aim to address 
each of the six categories below, and provide evidence to support your own assertions. 
 
Area of Paper 
and Criteria 
SCANT 
Needs a lot of work 
MARGINAL 
Passable, but 
needs some work 
ACCEPTABLE 
Overall, well done; 
lacks polish 
SUBSTANTIAL 
Excellent; displays style 
and polish 
Introduction Does not identify or 
summarize prompt; is 
confused or identifies a 
different and/or 
inappropriate response; 
seems confused by the 
issue or represents it 
inaccurately 
Characteristics 
of “Scant” work, 
but not so poorly 
done as to reflect 
“Scant” entirely 
Characteristics of 
“Substantial” work, 
but not so 
developed as to 
reflect 
“Substantial” 
entirely 
Identifies and summarizes 
prompt; sees implicit 
aspects of the prompt and 
identifies them; these 
aspects are evident in the 
thesis statement 
Body 
Paragraphs 
 
 
 
 
Takes a single point of 
view or argument that is 
based almost entirely on 
personal opinion without 
offering any input other 
than what “I think” or “I 
believe” 
As above As above Identifies a thoughtful, 
reflective position on the 
issue and argues the point 
convincingly, drawing 
support from observation, 
experience, and/or 
information not provided 
in the assigned sources 
 Does not identify key 
assumptions and 
arguments that underlie 
the prompt 
As above As above Identifies/addresses key 
assumptions, arguments, 
and dimensions that 
underlie the prompt 
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Body 
paragraphs 
cont … 
Merely repeats 
information as truth, or 
posits points without 
justification or evidence; 
quote dumps; does not 
distinguish between fact, 
opinion, and value 
judgment 
As above As above Examines the evidence 
and source of evidence, 
questions its accuracy, 
precision, relevance and 
completeness; 
incorporates into 
argument skillfully and 
seamlessly 
 Discusses the issue in 
egocentric terms that 
reflect only what is true 
for that individual 
(whether socially or 
culturally). Does not 
present the issue as 
having any connection to 
other contexts such as 
cultural, political, or 
social 
As above As above Analyzes the issue with a 
clear sense of context and 
scope; that is, the 
argument presented goes 
beyond the immediate 
truth of the individual and 
shows clear and 
thoughtful connection to 
other contexts such as 
cultural, political, or 
social 
Conclusion Fails to identify 
conclusions, implications, 
and/or consequences of 
issues discussed; 
conclusion likely reflects 
a re-hash of the 
introduction with little 
evidence of trying to 
reflect on and tie-together 
the points raised 
As above As above 
 
Identifies and discusses 
conclusions, implications, 
and consequences that 
consider context, 
evidence, and judicious 
reflection on the 
assertions made. The 
conclusion contains a 
thoughtful, reflective 
commentary on the points 
raised and discussed 
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Appendix D: Deracination and the D.I.S. 
 
 Deracination and the D.I.S. (Detached Intellectualized Space) is essentially about 
the conflict of ideas. The word “deracination” comes from the French déraciner, which 
means to uproot from an environment geographically or socially. You might think of 
immigrants here; people who move away from everything they know to a new land 
where nothing is familiar – they are, quite literally, “tearing up their roots.” In our class 
environment, however, deracination refers specifically to the tearing up of ideas or 
points that a writer posits from its comfortable, familiar surroundings (what the writer 
already “knows”) to examine it in a new, unfamiliar and perhaps even uncomfortable 
light. 
 Deracination is a form of written criticism that is very critical and attempts a 
degree of objectivity to the point where both the deracinator and deracinatee detach from 
the writing in order to separate it from “personal ownership.” Writing, and the ideas 
expressed in that writing, are merely words and ideas that appear as text rather than 
something someone has taken time, effort, and personal investment to construct. In a 
deracination, it is your job to be critical of everything – to examine every point with 
what we might term “studied skepticism” and be suspicious of everything in terms of 
inconsistency and illogicity. The aim is to tear up the argument, point by point, root by 
root, especially small and seemingly insignificant points that may appear not to matter. 
 Because of its rather obsessive focus on finding the small incongruities that, 
when untangled, lead to identifying bigger issues and problems, deracination is a form of 
applied critical thinking: It doesn’t seek so much to “problem solve” but to “problem 
posit” – it’s looking for something to argue about, often when it appears that nothing is 
there to argue at all. It’s because of this that deracination can be confusing, 
disconcerting, uncomfortable, and difficult. At its core is a sense of discomfort and 
skepticism – a refusal to take anything for granted. Whereas when we are asked to 
evaluate a piece of writing we often feel we need to say something “positive” in order to 
make the writer feel good about him or herself or to gain confidence, in deracination this 
is not a consideration. When we do deracination, we can afford to ignore the old adage 
that “if you can’t say something nice about someone, don’t say anything at all.”  
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 While there is certainly passion in writing a deracination (if only to get ourselves 
worked up to the point where we care about studying a text closely in order to identify 
the small incongruities), it is NOT concerned with subjectivity and emotional responses. 
This is why it’s inappropriate in a deracination to write personal remarks or commentary 
about the author, such as: “Where did she learn the alphabet?” or “He must be really 
stupid to come up with something like this.” Deracinations are not concerned about 
where authors went to school, nor if they are stupid or not. It is only the ideas and the 
expression of those ideas that interest the deracinator. 
 If we are to critically think about evaluating a piece of writing, we should 
similarly not concern ourselves with the social manners of “not rocking the boat” or 
“only saying something positive.” In contrast, we must approach the text with a strong 
conscious effort to find fault. Of course, this is not to say that we shouldn’t state when 
something is good – if a point is well made and stands up to scrutiny, then say so. 
However, what we must try to move away from when we deracinate is the obligation 
that we must say “something nice.” 
 
The Detached Intellectualized Space 
 Despite its long title, the D.I.S. is essentially an agreement: When doing 
deracinations, we agree to move into a space for our minds to work and think – a space 
that is detached or removed from whatever we may happen to “personally” believe. 
Once the deracinations have been completed, we are quite free to step back into the 
patterns of our old belief systems, or perhaps to adapt new ones in light of the critical 
reflections we sought while working in the D.I.S.   The D.I.S. becomes a space where 
genuine and sincere effort is made to think from alternative positions. Ideally, it is a 
place where it is possible for, as an example, a religious person to think and reason as 
someone who is not religious, or vice versa; a liberal conservative to think as a radical 
democrat or vice versa; a committed socialist to think as a dedicated capitalist, and so 
on. In short, it’s an opportunity to sincerely engage in being someone we are not 
ordinarily. It’s not necessarily “real,” and we should even aim to create a paradoxical 
sense of “serious playfulness” through the use of irony, parody, and skeptical reflection. 
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These latter points are ones you will have noted in comments made on your own essays 
in this class.  
 
It’s Hard Work 
 Critically reflective thinking is not easy, and initially you may find the concept 
of “doing deracination” quite difficult. Likely, it’s a very different way of writing and 
critiquing than what you’ve done in the past. Many of you have probably been asked to 
review the writing of your colleagues at some point, and some students confuse 
Deracination with this type of writing – often ubiquitously known as The Peer Review. 
 
Deracination is Not Peer Review 
 Peer reviews, sometimes called peer critiques, are frequently addressed directly 
to the writer and seek to offer “constructive criticism” about how to improve an essay. A 
fairly typical example runs something like this: 
You had some great ideas in the first paragraph, Angus, and I really liked 
the part where you talked about how people should vote against gun 
control. It flowed really well. You need to check your grammar and 
spelling, though, because you made a few mistakes and that made it hard 
to read. Overall, I really enjoyed reading this paper. Great job! 
Let’s compare this sample from a peer review with the way an excerpt from a 
Deracination might read: 
Although Holloway [student’s last name] asserts why people should vote 
against gun control, the argument falls flat because the evidence provided 
is so shallow and superficial. Readers are merely left with Holloway’s 
“personal opinion” on the issue, such as [example taken from Holloway’s 
essay to reinforce the point], and this hardly convinces the reader to adopt 
that point of view. Also consider Holloway’s statement that, [quote from 
Holloway’s piece], an assertion that not only lacks conviction but is 
simply incorrect [the deracinator may cite research here to show just how 
“wrong” Holloway’s point is]. Moreover, poor spelling and mechanics 
only compound the problem of a lack of credibility in this piece. 
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Notice that the Deracination is not directed at the writer – in this case, someone by the 
name of Holloway. No reference is made to “you” as in the peer review. Also note that 
the deracinator has not written about the essay AS an essay, or A Paper That Will 
Receive a Grade in a College English Course, but detaches from that context to instead 
comment only on the ideas posited and the way they are defended. Moreover, the 
deracinator has done some research on her own, which has the dual-edged advantage of 
making her appear more credible at the same time as pointing out serious flaws in the 
original writer’s argument. 
 The peer review comments above are friendly, personable, and they tread very 
carefully in terms of criticism. The writer takes considerable effort to reinforce positive 
remarks, such as “great ideas,” “flowed really well,” “great job,” and “really enjoyed 
reading this paper.” Where’s the critical analysis, though? All that’s really mentioned is 
that Angus made a “few mistakes” in spelling and grammar. Such editing-level 
commentary does not provide any assistance to Angus in terms of critically and 
objectively evaluating his work, which is the objective of a deracination. Note, though, 
in the Deracination that although the writer mentions “poor spelling and mechanics,” it 
is in the context of an overall theme of the critical commentary; that is, Holloway’s 
argument doesn’t hold water because it lacks author credibility of support and evidence. 
The deracination attacks the argument Holloway has built (rather than writing to 
Holloway, he or she has written about Holloway’s writing), and gives specific examples 
to illustrate or show why and how the argument is weak. 
 
Deracination is Not Debating 
 Unlike a debate where there are two sides and each argues until a winner is 
declared, a deracinator does not necessarily have to take an opposing point of view. It 
might be a slightly different viewpoint that is put forward. Alternatively, the deracinator 
might agree with the point of view, but indicate a problem with its presentation or 
defense. There is also no “winner” in deracination. It is not so much a point scoring or 
persuasion as it is about alternative perspectives and a skeptical refusal to take anything 
at face value – even to the point of contradicting oneself. 
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Detachment 
 Doing deracinations brings with it a sense of ruthless skepticism, and it’s because 
of this that you’ll be asked to detach from the personal for this assignment; that is, to 
agree to work within the D.I.S. This means separating ourselves from taking criticism 
personally. Deracinations can, and should, be rather blunt. There’s no time to wade 
through social niceties, apologies, or comments that you know “this is only a draft” 
when your only objective is to examine an argument and the points that embellish it. 
Forget about being “nice” in your deracinations; forget about taking criticism personally 
when you receive it. This emphasis on detachment is the reason why I ask you not to use 
phrases like “this is only my opinion” or “don’t take offense,” and why I will also ask 
you to refer to your colleagues by last names only when deracinating an essay. It takes 
away the personalized, subjective nature of your writing when you don’t “apologize” for 
possibly hurting feelings, and it’s easier to detach from seeing the writer as a living 
human being with feelings when we speak of, as in the example above, Holloway 
instead of Angus.  
 It takes practice to be critical, and it takes practice to take criticism. What I want 
you to keep foremost in mind, though, is that deracination is an exercise in critical 
thinking. If practiced well, it can sharpen your intellectual acuity in terms of the way you 
think about and evaluate not only the words and ideas of others, but your own words and 
ideas as well.  
 
 
 
 
